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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the cinematic ontology of digital virtualism in the context of the 
current trend to digitalisation. I define digital virtualism as the aesthetics of assemblage and 
configuration in the age of digital images. This definition implies that digital technology 
strengthens the complex tension between physical reality and imaginary illusion. Based on 
computer simulation and synthesis, the digital image intensifies the contradiction between 
cinematic materiality and immateriality. Digital virtualism is the aesthetics of historical hybridity 
and aesthetic complexity between the actual and the virtual, the indexical and the symbolic, the 
material and the immaterial, the real and the imaginary. 
 
In this context, this thesis examines the aesthetical relationship of filmic virtuality and the digital 
image. In particular, I assert that the digital image is the new form and expansion of filmic 
virtuality. While film is always the art of the virtual, that is, the aesthetic imbrication of actual 
indexicality and imaginary illusion, the digital image intensifies the contradiction of filmic 
virtuality between reality and illusion. On one hand, computer simulation reinforces the 
indexicality of film by the principle of perceptual realism. On the other hand, it attenuates the 
causality between the object and the image by digital manipulation. I argue that digital 
technology simultaneously intensifies both filmic reality and the manipulation of the imaginary. 
Thus, the digital image expands the expressive force and aesthetic potential of cinema. 
 
After examining the cinematic aesthetics of realism, modernism, postmodernism, and digital 
aesthetics after postmodernism, this dissertation investigates the aesthetical implications of 
Deleuzian virtuality in the age of the digital image. Deleuze presents the cinematic aesthetics of 
virtual conjunction in the monism of simulacra, which implies the indiscernible and inextricable 
imbrication of the actual and the virtual, original and copy, reality and image, and cinematic 
movement and time. Following the discussion of the aesthetical ontology of Deleuzian virtuality, 
this dissertation theorises the assemblage aesthetics of digital virtualism.  
 
Consequently, this dissertation proposes the subjective and practical task of digital ethics. Digital 
technology intensifies the spectacular attraction of images and the interactive participation of 
v 
 
spectators in the cinematic process. In contrast, the digital image reveals technological fetishism 
and aesthetic commercialisation. Based on the ontological contradiction of the digital image, this 
dissertation articulates the configurative aesthetics and the subjective ethics of digital virtualism. 
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This thesis explores the aesthetics of digital virtualism as a new ontology of cinematic 
digitalisation. Digital virtualism is the hybrid aesthetics of physical reality and imaginary 
illusion. This definition implies the imbrication and bridging of the real and the unreal, 
the actual and the potential, and the material and the immaterial. Digital virtualism is the 
cinematic aesthetics of assemblage and configuration, which takes place in the virtual 
simulation of the computer. Since the rapid computerisation of film technology in the 
1990s, the aesthetics of digital virtuality has proliferated in the world of cinema. This is 
because data algorithms and numerical manipulation have intensified the virtual 
simulation of film images. Hence, digital virtualism strengthens filmic virtuality. The 
virtuality of digital cinema expands and reinforces the contradictory complexity between 
the reality and the imagination of cinema. Digital cinema is a successor to and new form 
of filmic virtuality. This thesis is based on the balanced view of continuity and 
discontinuity between film and digital image. I assert that digital technology has 
transformed the virtuality of cinema from the photochemical to the digital, which raises 
two related questions concerning the aesthetics of film.  
 
First, what is the relation between filmic reality and digital cinema? Does computer 
synthesis herald the end of filmic indexicality? Indeed, the aesthetics of digital virtualism 
evokes the issue of filmic indexicality. In this thesis, I will argue that computer-simulated 
images retain filmic indexicality. As Philip Rosen observes, ‘digital mimicry’ also works 
on the ground of indexicality and historicity.1 Although filmic indexicality is transformed 
by digital manipulation, cinema still exists in relationship to physical reality. However, 
the aesthetics of digital virtualism implies a new, different, and heightened reality of 
cinema.  
 
My next question concerns how the imaginary nature of film has changed with the spread 
of digital technology. How does digital technology transform the nature of cinematic 
illusion? Digital cinema has provoked a theoretical debate about the nature of the filmic 
imagination, including cinematic affection, thought, dream, fantasy, and illusion. The 
                                                
1 Philip Rosen, Change Mummified, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, pp.307-
309. 
2 Tom Gunning, Moving Away From the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality, A Journal of 
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imaginary nature of film goes beyond indexicality and causality to its object. In 
particular, digital cinema reinforces the imaginary and virtual nature of filmic images. 
This is because computer simulation expands the possibility of cinematic expression and 
imagination. Digital manipulation intensifies the virtuality and fantasy of filmic images. 
As Tom Gunning asserts, the aesthetics of digital cinema intensifies the cinematic nature 
of magical attraction and sensual perception beyond filmic indexicality.2 In this thesis, I 
investigate the aesthetic implications of cinematic attraction and bodily sense in terms of 
digital virtuality.  
 
In this context, I postulate that the aesthetics of digital virtualism is the contradictory 
combination of cinematic indexicality and imagination. It is both physical reality and 
imaginary illusion. While filmic indexicality implies the physical traces and causalities to 
objects, cinematic imagination expands the nature of film to the aesthetic realm of fiction 
and fantasy. This thesis argues for an aesthetics of digital virtualism that is based on the 
dialectical tension between reality and imagination. As Cassetti emphasizes, the 
aesthetics of cinema, whether in photographic form or digital simulation, is a practical 
linkage and contradictory negotiation between physical indexicality and the cinematic 
imagination. 3  The proliferation of digital technology has resulted in both the new 
possibility of realism and the expansion of cinematic expression. That is, the diffusion of 
computer synthesis has given rise to the new form of the contradiction between filmic 
reality and fantasy.  
 
On one hand, I note that digital cinema intensifies the representative indexicality of film 
by ‘the obsession of technological realism’.4  David Bordwell indicates that digital 
technology results in ‘intensified continuity’5 of cinematic time and space. Hollywood 
narrative convention is strengthened by digital simulation. Stephen Prince claims that 
digital technology intensifies the principle of ‘perceptual realism’ between cinematic 
                                                
2 Tom Gunning, Moving Away From the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality, A Journal of 
Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2007, p.48. 
3 Franco Cassetti, Sutured Reality: Film, from Photographic to Digital, October 138, Fall 2011, p.106. 
4 Gerry Coulter, Jean Baudrillard and Cinema: The Problems of Technology, Realism and History, Film-
Philosophy 14(2), 2010, p.8. 
5 D. Bordwell, Intensified Continuity: Visual Style in Contemporary American Film, Film Quarterly 55(3), 
2002, pp.16-28. 
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images and spectators.6 Moreover, digital technology has revitalized the production and 
consumption of documentary cinema, in particular, making it easier to create movies that 
record daily life. The diffusion of portable digital video cameras, simple compositing 
tools, and widespread editing software has made movie making an increasingly personal 
and popular activity. User-created content (UCC) on youtube.com already occupies the 
cyberspace of the Internet and mobile devices. It seems that they anticipate the new age 
of popular realism and the documentary.  
 
On the other hand, digital cinema attenuates the indexical causality of objects in filmic 
images. The digital manipulation simulated by computer software and databases 
reinforces the virtual nature of cinematic images. Andrew Darley terms the aesthetics of 
the computer-generated image ‘secondary’ or ‘second-order’ realism.7 He emphasises 
that computer-based synthetic images replace the first images produced by direct 
representation and imitation. Lev Manovich points out that digital cinema is an aesthetics 
of the composite that works at the level of pixels and data manipulation.8 Manovich 
highlights the synthetic traits and spectacle images of digital cinema in contrast to the 
photographic realism privileged by Bazin.9 Aylish Wood claims that the aesthetics of 
computer synthesis intensifies the creative and expressive potential in cinema production. 
According to Wood, digital manipulation goes beyond the limitations of filmic 
indexicality to separate and recreate independent image elements at the micro-level.10 
 
Based on the dialectical tension between material indexicality and virtual imagination, I 
will raise the issue of how computer-simulated images transform the aesthetic ontology 
of film, which is related to recent disputes regarding cinematic indexicality in digital 
cinema. I explore the issue by reappraising filmic ontologies both historically and 
aesthetically. I suggest the aesthetics of digital virtualism in terms of historical hybridity 
                                                
6 Stephen Prince, Digital Visual Effects in Cinema: The Seduction of Reality, New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 2012, pp. 31-37. 
7 Andrew Darley, Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres, London, New 
York: Routledge, 2000, p.83. 
8 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001, p.270. 
9 Ibid, pp.192-193. 
10 Aylish Wood, Pixel Visions: Digital Intermediates and Micromanipulations of the Image, Film Criticism, 
September 2007, pp.72-94. 
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and aesthetic complexity. In particular, I extrapolate the aesthetics of digital virtualism 
from the historical and theoretical tradition of film aesthetics. A main aim in this thesis is 
to elicit the aesthetic ontology of digital virtualism from the historicity of film theories.  
 
In light of the historicity of film aesthetics, I will reappraise Bazin’s photographic 
realism, Metz’s imaginary signifier, and Baudrillard’s hyperreality and simulation. My 
point is that film theories provide clues to the complex relation between physical reality 
and the cinematic image. I describe the aesthetics of digital virtualism in terms of the 
imbrication of materiality and immateriality that is promoted by computer simulation and 
digital interactivity. The digital virtualism goes beyond the representative aesthetics of 
physical indexicality. Simultaneously, digital virtualism maximizes the aesthetics of 
cinematic fantasy and illusion in digital spectacle and bodily sense. By reevaluating the 
main theories of the nature of the film image, I conclude that digital virtualism is the 
aesthetics of historical hybridity and ontological complexity of physical reality and the 
virtual image.  
 
Furthermore, I enunciate that digital virtualism stems from the conceptual kernel of 
Deleuzian virtuality. As Rodowick asserts, Deleuze’s cinema book is one of the most 
philosophically elaborate discussions of the concepts of cinematic movement and 
temporality. 11 In terms of the aesthetical implications of Deleuzian virtuality in the age of 
digital information images, I examine his main concepts, such as simulacra, virtual 
conjunction, material image, movement and time, crystal image, becoming, rhizomatic 
configuration, and the struggle with informatics. The main concepts of Deleuzian 
virtuality provide the theoretical basis of my concept of digital virtualism, particularly 
with regard to the inextricable and indiscernible relationships between the actual and the 
virtual and the movement-image and the time-image. In my account of the Deleuzian 
aesthetics of crystal image, the concept of digital virtualism proceeds to the aesthetics of 
the hybrid combination of physical reality and cinematic imagination. Thus, I extrapolate 
the new reality and potential of digital techno-aesthetics from the aesthetics of Deleuzian 
virtuality. 
                                                
11 D. N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007, p.14. 
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This thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first chapter, I focus on the definition of 
virtuality. I define the concept of virtuality as both the liminoid and the threshold 
between the actual and the potential, which is not actual, but real. The assumption that the 
virtual is the real is an important theoretical premise in this thesis because it postulates 
the imbricated relationship between physical reality and immaterial virtuality. Hence, I 
presuppose that filmic virtuality is the hybrid combination of the actual and the virtual, 
the material and the immaterial, the indexical and the symbolic, and the real and the 
imaginary. Furthermore, I elicit the concept of digital virtuality from the virtuality of 
filmic image. As the expansion of filmic virtuality, digital virtuality is a new form of 
filmic virtuality in the age of computer-simulated images.  
 
In the historical context, I will explain that the spread of digital virtuality is associated 
with the transformation of cinematic images from the photochemical to the numerical by 
the development of computer-generated images since the 1960s. Digital images intensify 
the aesthetic tendency of multimedia, virtual reality, and cyberspace. The manipulation 
and synthesis of computer-simulated image combines with the convergence and 
interactivity of digital arts. Digital technology expands the virtual nature of cinematic 
images.  
 
In addition, I indicate that the concept of digital virtuality raises the issue of the 
ambivalence of techno-aesthetics. On one hand, the emergence of digital virtuality from 
computer technology has resulted in the expansion of human sense and filmic reality. On 
the other hand, as Willemen states, it provokes the fetishistic desire of technological 
images and digital gadgets.12 Based on the duplexity of digital techno-aesthetics, I will 
connect the concept of digital virtuality to the subjective and practical configuration of 
cinematic images. 
 
                                                
12 Paul Willemen, Indexicality, Fantasy, and the Digital, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (14:1), 2013, pp.123-
125. 
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In the second chapter, I deal with the cinematic aesthetics of digital virtualism. I define 
digital virtualism as comprising four related concepts: hybridity, synthesis, materiality, 
and information. First, in terms of film historicity and aesthetics, I argue that digital 
virtualism is the aesthetics of hybridity. The hybrid aesthetics of digital virtualism 
presupposes the aesthetic complexity of technology and aesthetics, humans and 
computers, and physical reality and imaginary illusion. As Frank Popper clearly 
articulates, digital virtualism is ‘techno-aesthetic’.13 In addition, Donna Haraway argues 
for a new feminist theory in the age of the hybrid cyborg of human and machine, male 
and female.14 William Brown explains the hybrid nature of digital cinema as the concept 
of ‘digital complexity’ of the human and the non-human.15 Following Rosen, I assert that 
digital virtualism is the aesthetics of ‘historical hybridity’16 of physical indexicality and 
cinematic illusion, which implies a complex combination of ‘old’ film theories and ‘new’ 
reality of digital arts. 
 
In terms of the technological development of the cinema, I argue for the synthetic nature 
of computer-simulated images. My point here concerns the difference between 
mechanical reproduction and computer synthesis. Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
‘mechanical reproduction’17 is based on the reproducible ability of filmic images from an 
original in the age of industrial mass-production and consumption, whereas digital 
cinema transforms the nature of cinematic images from kinetic, chemical, and optical 
image to numerical, electronic, ecological, cybernetic, informational, and networking. In 
this sense, W. J. T. Mitchell proposes the concept of ‘biocybernetic reproduction’,18 
which implies the complex fusion of original and copy with the spread of computer 
                                                
13 Frank Popper and Joseph Nechvatal, Origins of Virtualism: An Interview with Frank Popper, CAA Art 
Journal, Spring 2004, p.65. 
14 Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century, The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader, edited by Amelia Jones, New York, London: 
Routledge, 2003, p.476. 
15 William Brown and Meetali Kutty, Datamoshing and the Emergence of Digital Complexity from Digital 
Chaos, Convergence 18(2), February 2012, pp.165-176. 
16 Philip Rosen, Change Mummified, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, p.303. 
17 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 1935, translated by Harry 
Zohn, Film Theory and Criticism, edited by Gerald Mast etc., Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992, pp.665-681. 
18 W. J. T. Mitchell, The Work of Art in the Age of Biocybernetic Reproduction, Modernism/Modernity 
10(3), 2003, p.487. 
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simulation. Aylish Wood explains the nature of digital synthesis using the concept of 
‘micromanipulation’, 19  which takes place at the level of computer data and pixel 
elements. I emphasize that the digital synthesis of various images of the human and the 
non-human proceeds to the assemblage and configuration aesthetics of digital virtualism. 
 
Third, in terms of the ontology of cinematic images, I define digital virtualism as the 
aesthetics of materiality and sensation. The materiality of digital images is associated 
with the visual attraction of cinematic movement, which precedes logic, language, 
science, and semiotic hermeneutics. As Gunning points out, it is connected to the ‘cinema 
of attraction’ beyond the realm of rationality.20 The emergence of digital attraction means 
the restoration and intensification of the materiality of images. Moreover, Thomas 
Elsaesser and Malte Hagener point out the importance of ‘haptic and embodied 
perception’ in digital cinema.21 I emphasize that the materiality of digital images cannot 
be separated from the spectator’s bodily sense and perception.  
 
Finally, I define digital virtualism as the aesthetics of information in terms of the 
convergence and divergence of media and art forms. This definition implies that digital 
cinema intensifies the immaterial nature of the image. I argue that computer simulation 
and digital manipulation expand the virtual nature of cinematic images. Computer 
networks and the interactivity of images in digital information serve to inspire the 
convergence and divergence of cinematic images. While Henry Jenkins stresses the 
tendency of ‘transmedia’ and ‘convergence’ based on the exchangeable intersection of 
media and images, 22 Peter Kiwitt highlights the ‘divergence’ of the cinema as an 
independent and autonomous ‘art form’.23 Based on the balanced position of convergence 
                                                
19 Aylish Wood, Pixel Visions: Digital Intermediates and Micromanipulations of the Image, Film Criticism, 
September 2007, pp.72-94. 
20 Tom Gunning, Moving Away From the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality, A Journal of 
Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2007, p.33. 
21 Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses, London; New 
York: Routledge, 2010, p.169. 
22 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, New York: New York 
University Press, 2006, p.282. 
23 Peter Kiwitt, What Is Cinema in a Digital Age? Divergent Definitions from a Production Perspective, 
Journal of Film and Video 64(4), Winter 2012, pp.3-21. 
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and divergence, this thesis maintains that the digital information image reinforces the 
virtual nature of cinema.  
 
In the third chapter, I deal with the debate among film theorists regarding the aesthetics 
of realism, modernism, postmodernism, and digital aesthetics after postmodernism. These 
disputes reflect the ontological change in film images caused by the diffusion of digital 
images. My question concerns the relation between physical indexicality and cinematic 
imagination in the age of digital cinema. Does digital manipulation force the 
disappearance of the photographic indexicality of the film image? How does the 
aesthetics of computer synthesis transform the imaginary nature of film? By recounting 
theories of film, I explore the complex relationship between filmic ontology and digital 
simulation.  
 
In particular, I reappraise André Bazin’s ‘photographic realism’, Metz’s ‘the imaginary 
signifier’, and Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’. Although Bazin accentuates the ‘objective 
reality’ of photochemical images, he clearly grasps the material ambiguity and 
complexity of film images. As Daniel Morgan claims, the theoretical core of Bazin’s 
realism is not the indexical traces of objects or models, but material ambiguity and 
temporal contingency.24 Bazin also articulates the position of the subject and artistic 
expression in the aesthetics of film realism. I argue that the reassessment of Bazin’s 
realism is connected to the hybrid nature of digital realism, merging the object and the 
subject, the indexical and the illusionary, and the material image and virtual expression.  
 
Second, I re-evaluate Christian Metz’s film theory of the imaginary in terms of the 
relationship of filmic reality and illusion. Despite the limitation of Metz’s film semiotics, 
in which the attractive nature of filmic materiality is superseded by scientific rationale 
and linguistics, his position on filmic reality is complex with regard to the hybrid relation 
of the real and the imaginary. Rushton asserts that Metz’s concept of the imaginary 
properly grasps the ‘reality of the imaginary’, that is, the ontological ambivalence of the 
                                                
24 Daniel Morgan, Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 32, No. 3, 
Spring 2006, p.458. 
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physical reality and the filmic illusion.25 I examine Metz’s concept of the imaginary in 
terms of the new and intensified contradictions of digital cinema concerning the real and 
the virtual. 
 
Third, I deal with Jean Baudrillard’s postmodern aesthetics in terms of the ontology of 
filmic reality and the image. Although his vision of hyperreality and simulation is 
radically nihilistic, I note his ambivalence regarding the filmic image and digital 
virtuality. Baudrillard consistently maintains that digital simulation is the end of physical 
reality and aesthetic illusion.26 However, his later works open the dim possibility of 
reality persisting in the boundary of ‘false’ simulacra. Melanie Chan claims that 
Baudrillard suggests a new possibility of symbolic images and simulacra by positing the 
notion of ‘systemic anomalies’.27 I argue that Baudrillard’s negative assertion of the 
simulated image and digital virtuality should be reinterpreted as a strong indication of the 
‘desert of the real’.28  
 
Finally, I argue that digital aesthetics goes beyond postmodernism in terms of computer 
simulation and digital interactivity. While postmodernism emphasizes the absolute 
primacy of hyper-real images over material reality, digital aesthetics pays attention to the 
interactive reality of images and the new modes of auteurism. Digital aesthetics suggests 
a different ontology of physical reality and image synthesis beyond the nihilist vision of 
postmodernism. I argue that digital aesthetics after postmodernism moves toward the 
hybrid aesthetics of physical reality and virtual image. 
 
In the final chapter, I examine Gilles Deleuze’s cinematic aesthetics. The Deleuzian 
concept of virtuality has important implications for the aesthetic ontology of digital 
virtualism. I accentuates that Deleuze extrapolates the reality of cinema in terms of the 
                                                
25 Richard Rushton, The Reality of Film: Theories of Filmic Reality, New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2011, p.80. 
26 Jean Baudrillard, Violence of the Virtual and Intergral Reality, translated by Marilyn Lambert-Drache, 
International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2005, (n.p.) 
27 Melanie Chan, Virtually Real and Really Virtual: Baudrillard’s Procession of Simulacrum and The 
Matrix, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2008, (n.p.) 
28 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman, New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1983, p.40. 
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‘virtual conjunction’ of physical reality and the simulated image beyond the copy and 
representation of material reality. Although the Deleuzian concept of virtualism does not 
directly originate in the digitalised phenomenon of film art, Deleuzian concept of 
movement and time as the aesthetic nature of virtual images has a close relationship with 
the emergence and expansion of digital information images. This thesis asserts that 
Deleuzian virtualism expands the core of aesthetic concept at the level of the molecular 
movement and crystalized temporality of computer synthetic images. Furthermore, I take 
a note that Deleuzian concept of the virtual ontology of cinematic images suggests the 
creative and configurative potential of digital cinema. In addition, I attempt to expand his 
cinematic aesthetics of virtuality to the concept of digital ethics. His main aesthetical 
concepts of simulacra, cinematic movement and time, crystal images, becoming, and the 
struggle with information image move toward the digital ethics based on the practical and 
subjective notions of assemblage and configuration. Using the Deleuzian concept of 
virtuality, I explore the configurative aesthetics and ethical task of digital information 
images. 
 
First, I deal with the ontology of simulacra. While Baudrillard considers the world of 
simulacra and digital virtuality as ‘false’ evil and violence, Deleuze postulates the 
‘univocity of being’29 in the indiscernible hybridity of physical reality and simulated 
image. For Deleuze, the virtual image is not the representation and ‘degraded copy’30 of 
material reality, but comprises different realities or new forms of realities. Thus, 
Deleuze’s concept of simulacra proposes the virtual conjunction of cinematic images in 
the immanent plane of simulacra. I develop the concepts of simulacra and virtual 
conjunction to posit the ontological potential of the cinematic image, particularly the 
aesthetic possibilities of computer-simulated images. 
 
In addition, the Deleuzian aesthetics of cinematic movement has two vital implications 
for establishing the aesthetics of digital virtualism. First, Deleuze suggests clearly that 
                                                
29 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: the Clamor of Being, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p.143. 
30 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2004, p.299. 
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cinema is the movement of material reality beyond representative indexicality.31 In terms 
of the material movement, I pay attention to the molecularisation and chromatisation of 
movement-images in the new regime of audio-visual signs. 32  Borrowing Deleuze’s 
concepts of montage, affection, and spiritual automaton, I extrapolate the potential of 
digital images from the disjunction and connectivity of the molecular particles of virtual 
images. The molecular register of the information image-surface suggests the new form 
of movement-image and filmic hybridity on the immanent plane of virtual images. I elicit 
the implication of Deleuzian movement-image in the digital age from the molecular, 
microbiological, ethological quantum state of the virtual image and of perception itself.  
 
Moreover, the movement of cinematic images is symbiotic with the spectator’s attraction, 
which is not external to the film. Thus, the reality of film derives from the combination of 
screen and subject. Similarly, Ronald Bogue indicates that the material nature of the 
cinematic image integrates the spectator’s sense and perception.33 Deleuze theorises the 
complex combination of objective movement and subjective perception, the moving 
image and spectator’s attraction, the cinematic motion and the filmic affection, and the 
physical reality and the cinematic imagination. Based on the Deleuzian concept of the 
movement-image, I suggest that digital virtualism is the hybrid aesthetics of the actual 
and the virtual, the material and the immaterial, indexicality and imagination, the screen 
and the spectator’s sense. 
 
Finally, I explore Deleuze’s aesthetics of the time-image in the context of digital 
virtualism. After examining the interdependent and contradictory relationship between 
the movement-image and the time-image, I investigate the Deleuzian aesthetics of the 
crystal image as the inextricable and indiscernible conflation between the actual and the 
virtual, the real and the imaginary, and movement and time. I postulate the ontological 
hybridity of digital cinema based on the aesthetic implications of the crystal image. I 
elicit the creative potential of a new reality and image from the complex ontology of the 
                                                
31  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, London: The Athlone Press, 1986, p.3. 
32 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 
London: The Athlone Press, 1983, pp.84-85. 
33 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, New York, London: Routledge, 2003, p.34. 
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crystal image. In particular, I attend to Deleuze’s statement of the emergence of the 
digital information image. Deleuze intuits that the aesthetics of digital virtuality requires 
questions of the ‘source and addressee of information’ and a ‘struggle with informatics’.34 
His intuition implies that the new regime of the signs produced by informatics is closely 
associated with the spiritual automaton of dynamic movement and digital time-image. 
The nature of digital images based on data transcoding and computer simulation enhances 
and strengthens the assemblage aesthetics of multiple temporalities and crystal-images, 
by which the digital time coexists in the symbiotic conflation of passing past, ephemeral 
present, and emerging future. In this sense, the digital information image connotes the 
aesthetics of complex and hybrid temporality. 
 
Thus, I suggest the aesthetic ethics and practical task of digital cinema, which demands a 
configurative aesthetics of creative realities in a ceaseless process of rhizomatic 
assemblage and becoming.35 As Damian Sutton indicates, Deleuzian ethical and political 
concept of ‘rhizome’ and ‘becoming’ is coincided with the visual arts practice against 
capitalist ideology. 36  It is the eternally multiplied process of ‘becoming others’, 
‘becoming animals’, ‘becoming minorities’, ‘becoming arts’, and ‘becoming digitals’. I 
conclude that digital virtualism expands and transforms the aesthetics of creative reality 
and imagination. It is the configurative aesthetics of computer simulation and 
interactivity. Therefore, digital virtualism moves toward an aesthetic ethics of 
subjectivity and participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p.259. 
35 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2, translated by 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p.21. 
36 Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones, Deleuze Reframed: a Guide For the Arts Student, London, New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2008, p.xv, pp.65-84. 
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In this chapter, I define the concept of digital virtuality. Digital virtuality is the virtuality 
of the image in the age of digital cinema. The virtuality of the image is part of the artistic 
history of human beings. In the history of the arts, whereas the virtuality of the image 
consistently presents physical reality and imaginational potentiality, the virtuality of the 
film image achieves technological virtuality. The technological virtuality of cinematic 
images precedes the age of digital cinema. Digital virtuality is the technological virtuality 
of the image in the age of computer simulation and mobile networks. It is the new stage 
of virtuality beyond the mechanical virtuality of film images. Digital virtuality presents 
different forms of cybernetic and synesthetic cinema. 
 
This chapter consists of the four sections related to the concept of digital virtuality. The 
first section argues the aesthetic definition of virtuality. I argue that virtuality is the 
liminoid and threshold between the actual and the potential. In particular, I investigate the 
Deleuzian concept of virtuality, which implies a creative potential and an incessant 
becoming in the monism of the immanent plane. The second section demonstrates the 
concept and history of virtual image. Based on Deleuze’s concept of virtuality, I argue 
that the art of virtual image is a complex imbrication between reality and illusion, 
materiality and immateriality, and object and subject. In the third section, I deal with the 
virtuality of film images. I demonstrate that the techno-aesthetics of film is the 
contradictory combination of physical indexicality and cinematic fantasy. I focus on the 
paradox of technological automation and filmic virtuality. The final section argues that 
the mechanical reproduction of film is transformed by the cybernetic virtuality of 
computer simulation. In particular, I stress that digital virtuality is both continuous and 
discontinuous with filmic virtuality. Digital virtuality is the new artform of virtuality 
beyond indexical reality. In short, this chapter suggests the contradictory concept of 
digital virtuality between actuality and reality. It is connected to the next chapter dealing 
with the cinematic aesthetics of digital virtualism. 
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1-1. The Concept of Virtuality 
 
Let me begin by placing the concept of virtuality in the context of the aesthetics of digital 
virtualism. Here I equate virtuality with the virtual. The term virtuality is the noun form 
of the adjective virtual; virtuality signifies nothing more than the quality and traits of the 
virtual. While the adjective virtual describes the ontological state of objects and events, 
the noun virtuality indicates the aesthetic nature of matters and beings compared with the 
concept of actuality. First, I provide the definition of the adjective virtual as given in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. According to this definition, the term virtual has complex and 
contradictory meanings: 
 
1. a. Possessed of certain physical virtues or capacities; effective in respect of 
inherent natural qualities or powers; capable of exerting influence by means of 
such qualities. Now rare … 
2. Morally virtuous… 
3. a. Capable of producing a certain effect or result; effective, potent, powerful… 
4. That is so in essence or effect, although not formally or actually; admitting of 
being called by the name so far as the effect or result is concerned.37 
 
In the archaic use of the term, the adjective virtual described powers, virtues, and 
capacities. The meaning is derived from the etymology of Latin virtus, which implies 
strength and qualities. In this usage of the term, we might call a certain prominent person 
‘a virtual person’. The more important meaning of the term virtual has to do with the 
‘effect, potent, powerful’, which relates the term to effective and potential power. The 
Oxford English Dictionary explains that virtual is not formal or actual. Although the 
virtual indicates an essence or effect of matters and objects, it does not take a concrete 
form or a palpable materiality. However, in contemporary usage, such as ‘virtually 
finish’, or ‘virtually impossible’, virtually is used to indicate ‘almost’ but not perfect or 
not complete. On the other hand, ‘the virtual’ means that a person or event does not 
                                                
37 Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/223829?redirectedFrom=virtual#eid 
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actually exist, but almost so, that is, it is not the same but is similar. Michael Heim also 
follows this general definition of the virtual. He defines the term virtual as ‘not actually, 
but just as if.’ He states that the concept of virtuality came into recent vogue with the use 
of computer techniques to enhance computer memory.38 Although the virtual connotes the 
essence or effect of things, it does not correspond to the thing itself as a concrete form or 
a material source. Therefore, we can consider the term virtual an oxymoron, which is an 
opposite and simultaneous contradiction between the essential nature of being and its 
external form. According to the dictionary definition, the virtual subsumes effective 
powers and abstract forms simultaneously. It is both an essence and an effect without 
actual and tangible forms of being. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of semiotics, also recognized the contradiction in the 
term virtual. He indicated the imbrication of the potential and the actual in the term 
virtual: 
 
(1) A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has 
the efficiency (virtus) of an X. This is the proper meaning of the word; but (2) it 
has been seriously confounded with "potential," which is almost its contrary. For 
the potential X is of the nature of X, but is without actual efficiency. A virtual 
velocity is something not a velocity, but a displacement; but equivalent to a 
velocity in the formula, what is gained in velocity is lost in power.39 
 
He defines the concept as ‘something not an X, but efficiency of X’. For Peirce, the term 
virtual is a kind of potential, in which X is and is not X, simultaneously. Moreover, he 
introduces the concept ‘displacement’ to explain a conceptual contradiction in the term 
virtual. The word displacement connotes both the removal and the occupation of a certain 
place and position. The virtual is a displacement from an actual efficiency to a potential 
X. Thus, Peirce defines the virtual as the actualization of the potential. Subsequently, 
Peter Skagestad argued that Peirce’s definition of the virtual could be grasped in the 
                                                
38 Michael Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p.160. 
39 Charles Sanders Peirce, Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by James Mark Baldwin, 
New York: Macmillan, 1902, p.372.  
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context of modern semiotics.40 According to Skagestad, Peirce conceptualizes the virtual 
in the sense of semiotics, in which the implication of the virtual is re-designated in terms 
of signs and symbols. For Peirce, the term virtual has to do with indexes or traces of 
objects and beings, although it is displaced by the ‘potentials’. Peirce defines a sign as 
anything capable of standing in for somebody or something in some respect.41 In this 
sense, he considers the irreducibly close association between the sign and its object. He 
implies that the term virtual does not refer to physical materials or objects but their 
representatives, agents and interpreters. In Peirce’s semiotic view, the contradiction of the 
virtual, which is the overlapping (i.e., imbrication) of efficiency and potentiality, is 
incorporated into the concept of signs of objects. 
Based on Peirce’s semiotics heavily that considers the nature of signs the combination of 
index, symbol, and icon,42 Deleuze also defines the nature of images in terms of complex 
hybridity of the actual and the virtual. Here Deleuze goes beyond the representative 
aesthetics of Platonism based on the ideal dualism. Instead, he follows up the Bergson’s 
these, which demonstrates the homogeneity and monism of matters and images in 
material universe.43 For Deleuze, the concept of the virtual has interexchangeable and 
contradictory relations with the actual and the real. Using the ambivalent concepts, 
Deleuze asserts a careful and elaborate argument on the ontological meaning of the 
virtual. He presents practical grounds for the concept of the virtual, contrasting it with the 
actual:  
 
Philosophy is the theory of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual 
and virtual elements. Purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual surrounds 
itself with a cloud of virtual images. This cloud is composed of a series of more or 
less extensive coexisting circuits, along which the virtual images are distributed, 
                                                
40 Peter Skagestad, Philosophy and Cognitive Science-Peirce, Virtuality, Semiotic, presented to the 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, in Boston, Massachusetts, August 10-15, 1998. 
41 Charles Sanders Peirce, Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by James Mark Baldwin, 
New York: Macmillan, 1902, p.228. 
42 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005, p.29. 
43 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, translated by N. Paul and W. Palmer, New York: Zone Books, 
1991, p.19. 
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and around which they run. These virtuals vary in kind as well as in their degree 
of proximity from the actual particles by which they are both emitted and 
absorbed.44 
 
Deleuze compares the virtual with the actual, which is not real. As Rob Shields properly 
indicates by the concept of ‘liminoid’ and ‘threshold’ between the actual and the 
potential, in Deleuzian philosophy, the virtual is real but not actual.45 Deleuze tries to 
explore a genuine nature of the real by re-defining the virtual. In a reciprocal intersection 
on an immanent plane of multiplicities, the actual and the virtual consist of the 
ontological essence of reality. Unlike the common usage of the virtual, which means 
illusion, imagination, desire, belief, fiction, image, information, mental world, and so on, 
Deleuze accentuates the reality of the virtual by distinguishing it from the actual. 
Following Proust who highlights the importance of dream and memory in virtual 
temporality, Deleuze defines the virtual as ‘real without being actual, ideal without being 
abstract.’46 According to Michael Hardt, in Deleuzian philosophy virtuality is always real 
(i.e., in the past, in memory) but may become actualized in the present.47 The virtual, in 
which the reality of objects and beings is based on its distinction from the actual, is at the 
core of the Deleuzian ontology of the image. By defining the virtual as the real, Deleuze 
attempts to reconfigure the potential capacities of the virtual, such as intangible and 
impalpable illusion, dream, imagination and intentions. For Deleuze, the term virtual is 
none other than a potential reality and a different form of physical reality.  
Similarly, Johan F. Hoorn, who tried to apply the epistemic of the virtual to a theory of 
fiction, claims that the distinction between fiction and reality is not crisp but fuzzy. For 
Hoorn, the physical world is all, and the mental activity of the virtual takes place in the 
physical world or at least is surrounded by it. He argues that the distinction between 
physical reality and the virtual has blurred edges. For Hoorn, as applied to fiction, 
                                                
44 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues 2, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.148. 
45 Rob Shields, The Virtual, London, New York: Routledge, 2003, p.25. 
46 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. NY: Zone, 1988, 
p.96.  
47 Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, p.16. 
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illusion, and information the concept of the virtual is no more than a new form of 
aesthetic expression. 48 
In general, the actual and the virtual comprise two different types of reality on an 
immanent plane. David N. Rodowick comments on the relation between the two: the 
actual is objective and the virtual is subjective, imaginary, and mental.49 Pierre Lévy also 
indicates that the actual and the virtual are two different ways of being, and the virtual 
should not be compared with the real but with the actual.50 Here the virtual is still a kind 
of reality. Dream, memory, and image are still real.  
 
Richard Rushton points out the misunderstanding of the relationship between the actual 
and the virtual. The first trap is to conceive the actual as the real and the virtual as the 
unreal. The second trap is to proclaim that the movement-image is the actual whilst the 
time-image is the virtual. The third mistake is to think that Deleuze’s aim is to downplay 
the actual and to advocate the virtual which is incorrect because there is no actual without 
the virtual, and vice versa. Rushton claims that Deleuze coherently emphasizes the 
coexistence and exchangeability of the actual and the virtual on the plane of the 
immanent.51 
 
The virtual image absorbs all of a character's actuality, at the same time as the 
actual character is no more than a virtuality. This perpetual exchange between the 
virtual and the actual is what defines a crystal; and it is on the plane of 
immanence that crystals appear. The actual and the virtual coexist, and enter into 
a tight circuit, which we are continually retracing from one to the other. This is no 
longer a singularization, but an individuation as process, the actual and its virtual: 
no longer an actualization but a crystallization. Pure virtuality no longer has to 
actualize itself, since it is a strict correlative of the actual with which it forms the 
                                                
48 Johan F. Hoorn, Epistemics of the Virtual, Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 2012, p.44, p.144, pp.187-190. 
49 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, Durham: Duke University Press, 1997, p.92. 
50 Pierre Lévy, Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age, New York, London: Plemum Trade, 1998, 
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tightest circuit. It is not so much that one cannot assign the terms 'actual' and 
'virtual' to distinct objects, but rather that the two are indistinguishable.52 
 
In turn, Deleuze explains that the virtual actualizes on the immanent plane, and vice 
versa. They coexist and are exchangeable in a tight circuit. Deleuze calls the reciprocal 
and interactive process the crystallisation of individuality and singularity, or the actual 
and the virtual.  
 
In this sense, Pierre Lévy demonstrates the interactive process of actualization and 
virtualization. 53 According to Lévy, actualization appears as the solution to a problem. It 
is the creation and the invention of a form based on a dynamic configuration of forces 
and finality. In contrast, virtualization is the movement of actualization. It is not a 
derealization (the transformation of a reality into a collection of possibles), but a change 
in identity, a displacement of the centre of the ontological gravity of the object 
considered. The virtual is actualized to solve problems through the encounter and 
resonance of events and serials, whereas the actual is virtualized to make a difference and 
to realize creative potentials through eternal repetition. In the process of difference and 
repetition by the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of events and serials, 
immanent reality reveals the force of virtuality beyond the actual.  
 
In light of his notion of the ontological circuit and entanglement of actualization and 
virtualization, Deleuze brings this concept into the chaotic order of temporality; the 
actual is the present, while the virtual consists of the past and memories.54 In the 
perpetual flow of the present and the past, the actual and the virtual are ineffable, 
inextricable and indiscernible. The virtual is crystalized in the fluidity of time, that is, in 
duration. Thus,  
 
                                                
52 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues 2, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp.150-151. 
53 Pierre Lévy, Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age, New York, London: Plemum Trade, 1998, 
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54 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, London: 
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The actual object and the virtual image, the object become virtual, the image 
actual, are all figures dealt with in elementary optics. This distinction between the 
virtual and the actual corresponds to the most fundamental split in time, that is to 
say, the differentiation of its passage into two great jets: the passing of the 
present, and the preservation of the past… The passing of the present, the 
preservation and self-preservation of the ephemeral each occur according to their 
own scale of measurement. Virtuals communicate directly over the top of the 
actuals, which separate them. The two aspects of time, the actual image of the 
present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved, are 
distinguishable during actualization although they have unassignable limits, but 
exchange during crystallization to the extent that they become indiscernible, each 
relating to the role of the other.55 
 
For Deleuze, the term, the virtual, is associated with the indiscernibility of a crystal 
image in the perpetual and ephemeral flow of time. In the imbrication and entanglement 
of actuality and virtuality, Deleuze re-designates the realm of reality. The virtual 
constantly actualizes in events and movements, while the actual simultaneously 
deterritorialises through the rhizomatic intersection and assemblage of virtualization. It is 
the process of differentiation, heterogenesis, and becoming others.56  
 
For these reasons, Antony Bryant states that Deleuze conceptualizes the virtual in terms 
of creative possibility, potential actuality, transformative potentiality, and expandable 
reality by defining virtuality as the relation between the real and the actual.57 According 
to Bryant, Deleuze defines the virtual and virtualization as a nomadic struggle in the 
crystallisation of time to move towards creative potential and new reality. In short, the 
virtual is the realm in which creative potentiality is becoming constantly actualized. For 
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56 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2, translated by 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p.10. 
57 Antony Bryant, Digital and Other Virtualities: Renegotiating the Image, London: I. B. Tauris, 2010, 
p.15. 
 23 
Deleuze, the virtual is the foundation of reconfiguring the aesthetic ontology between 
reality and the image.  
 
 
1-2. The Virtuality of the Image: History and Aesthetics 
 
In light of this contradiction in the concept of virtuality, the virtuality of the image 
subsumes contrasting meanings: materiality and the ideal, actuality and potentiality, 
object and subject, being and imagination, and reality and illusion. The term image is also 
as contradictory as the concept of virtuality. Above all, although it is related to something 
mental and psychological, the concept of image originates in material reality. For 
example, the image of a tree in the mind stems from a real tree in the actual world. 
Therefore, the virtuality of the image is both actual and ideal. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines two different aspects of the word image: 
 
1. An artificial imitation or representation of something, esp. of a person or the 
bust of a person… 
2. b. A visible appearance; a manifestation of a figure; an apparition… 
3. a. A visual representation or counterpart of an object or scene, formed through 
the interaction of rays of light with a mirror, lens, etc., usually by reflection or 
refraction… 
5. a. A mental representation of something (esp. a visible object) created not by 
direct perception but by memory or imagination; a mental picture or impression; 
an idea, conception…58 
 
On one hand, the image is a kind of physical imitation, appearance, and representation of 
something material. On the other hand, it is a mental imagination and impression of 
human beings. Hence, the term image combines a figural agent and a mental idea. This 
                                                
58 Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/91618?rskey=ArNiiu&result=1&isAdvance
d=false#eid 
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contradiction in the term image results in two different perspectives on the ontology of 
the image.  
 
Historically, the virtuality of the image is related to the development of arts. As Elizabeth 
Grosz properly points out, the concept of virtuality is not only a recent phenomenon 
caused by the proliferation of computer technology and digital civilization,59 rather it has 
a long story having kept pace with the historical development of human beings and image 
art. When the concept of virtuality is defined as a creative reality and potentiality in view 
of the contraction between material reality and imagination, the historicity of virtuality is 
closely associated with the historical evolution of the image art. This is because art is a 
kind of creative activity to make new reality by the virtual like fiction, imagination, 
consciousness and intention of human beings. In conceptual essence, art differentiates the 
meanings of objects and beings in actual world by the force of virtuality. Hence, art is the 
virtual, and aesthetic is the exploration of virtuality. In particular, it is clear that the art of 
image like painting, sculpture, architecture, photograph, and film definitely has the 
virtuality. This is because the art of image pursues a new reality and potentiality in actual 
world by making creative figures. Therefore, the historicity of virtuality comes together 
with the history of image art in a broad sense.  
 
In light of the historicity of image, the first virtual art can be considered as ancient cave 
murals at Lascaux and Altamira approximately 17,000 years ago. These cave paintings 
expressed human desires for hunting and survival in the virtual images. We can easily 
guess that these cave paintings might be combined with virtual story telling of hunting in 
daytime. In those days, cave paintings functioned as an artistic and virtual tool to express 
their reality and life. In this sense, cave murals are the progenitor in the genealogy of 
virtual art. Regis Debray demonstrates that the virtuality of image was born in death, 
which means that it was inevitably born in the process of life and death for the survival of 
humankind. 60 He says that it was spawned by the denial of death and the desire for 
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eternal life of the ancients, by the means of immortal existence linking the finite lives of 
human beings forever, by the condolence of people who are alive, by the tool of ideology 
that connects the domains of the deceased and the living. Included are visible images in 
ancient times, such as hieroglyphics, sculptures, and cave paintings.  
 
Here my point is the fact that the ancients identified the actual and the virtual. Unlike the 
modern humans, they did not strictly distinguish real objects from virtual images. They 
believed that the mummy is the same as the real human, and cow’s image is identical 
with real cow. The ancients pursued the actual reality in the virtuality of images. Human 
figurines and idols were none other than virtual agents of life resisting death. 
Nevertheless, representing something in virtual arts means only making absent things 
present to us. Therefore, the virtual image does not only occur in our minds, but it 
complements the sufficiency of the real and alleviates the anxiety, fear, and grief of the 
real resulting from it. The ancients identified the world of physical reality with the 
virtuality of image in order to preserve their ‘actual’ efforts and costs. 
 
According to Regis Debray, the historicity of image art based on virtuality can be 
formulated by three stages of the mediasphere. 61 The first phase is the era of the 
Logosphere, which was characterized by writing and orality. It is a system of idolatry 
based on the supernatural and the transcendent. In this stage, the image reveals a 
transcendent being, which is another name for the real. In the era of the first Logosphere, 
God was the sole artist. In the age of the idol ruled by religion, images existed only as 
‘eyes without subjects’. The second stage of the mediasphere is the era of the 
Graphosphere, which was triggered by the invention of printing. It is the age of art based 
on representation and illusion. Here the image constantly reflects and represents the real 
world. The second phase is the age of art, in which the artist has replaced God in the first 
stage. In the sacred times of art achieved by humanism and freedom from theology, the 
image indicates only ‘subjects existing behind eyes’. In today’s world, the virtual image 
dominates the real. This era is called the age of the videosphere, which is caused by 
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visual media. Whereas previously we were in front of the image, we are now in the 
image. The eruption of the image paralyses our thinking. In modern times, people are 
surrounded by visual media such as TV, movies, videos, and the Internet and thus are 
encircled by ‘vision without eyes’. In the age of the videosphere, the virtual image 
achieves a new world where its purpose is not transmission and storage, but manipulation 
and synthesis. What were called art works in the past has become a visual industry of the 
tools and methodology for the accumulation of profits.  
 
Consequently, Debray’s notion of videosphere asserts that image arts are facing the new 
stage of virtuality in modern times. The prehistory of virtuality from cave arts in ancient 
times to paintings and sculptures in the middle ages was the age of handicraft arts without 
the interference of technology and media. However, the age of videosphere stemmed 
from photograph, film, TV, video, and computer image proceeds to the new phase of 
virtuality dominated by technological media. Here the virtuality of image converts to the 
concept of ‘technological virtuality’. In this context, the concept of virtuality is 
historically distinguished into three different kinds of virtuality: the manual, the 
technological, and the digital. While manual virtuality indicates the prehistory of 
technological virtuality, digital virtuality indicates the evolutional form of technological 
virtuality. Basically, the age of technological virtuality begins with the invention of 
photograph and film because those liberate the arts from human manual labour and 
acquire the mechanical automatism of the arts. 
 
Although Debray extrapolates the nature of image arts from its representative 
characteristics unlike the Bergsonian or Deleuzian concept of virtual images, I consider 
that his argument of the historical development of image arts provides us with a 
theoretical clue of how the virtual image actualizes in the process of historical evolution. 
On the ground of Debray’s concept of videosphere, I take note of the fact that 
technological virtuality has a negative effect causing a reversed and overturned 
relationship between physical reality and image world. Unlike the age of handicraft 
artworks, people in modern times do not adore subject-oriented reality. They would 
rather worship the immediacy and superficiality of the virtual image itself blindly, as 
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people did in the age of idol. The virtuality of image now substitutes for the idol, as it is. 
People in current society worship the virtual image itself instead of the world of physical 
reality that was represented by the image in ancient times. Contemporary visual media 
have accomplished an image world, reality without history, and reality that is not the real, 
that is, the transformation of reality from the actual to the virtual.  
 
There are many theorists criticizing the negative influences of virtual image in modern 
society. In the early 1960s, Guy Debord strongly criticizes the limits of virtuality and 
spectacle in modern society.62 He indicates that the credibility of physical reality is 
subverted by virtual image. Baudrillard also conceives the concept of virtuality in terms 
of the simulation of hyperreal image, which is more real than physical reality.63 He takes 
note of the adverse effects of hyperreal image in virtual world. Baudrillard claims that 
nobody apprehends immediate reality in the world of simulated virtuality. Nobody lives 
in the actual world. Nobody experiences the world without the mediation of the virtual 
image. Nothing remains but to live in the world of the virtual image, where the real that 
we can see and hear is mediated. The age of the virtual art reliant on simulation 
transforms the real to visual codes, symbols, and signs based on hyperreal virtuality. The 
more that signs and symbols overflow the world, the less the truth and authenticity of 
reality remains in it. This paradox in the age of the technological art has led human 
society to a harsh and odd landscape where physical reality is eroded by the virtuality of 
hyperreal image.  
 
While Debray, Debord, and Baudrillard pay attention to the historical negativity of 
virtuality and image art in modern society, Vilem Flusser optimistically accentuates the 
progressive hope of virtual technology and image art. In particular, Vilem Flusser 
introduces the notion of ‘technical image’ into the history of virtuality and image art. 
Like Debray, he conceptualizes virtual images by the development of tools and media in 
history. However, the concept of image defined by Flusser is unique. His description of 
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technical image shows that technical apparatuses like photograph and film transformed 
the virtuality of image art in the history of technological media. 
 
Flusser argues that images are significant surfaces. 64 In other words, the image is a 
significant thing on the superficial surface for him. He argues that images signify-mainly- 
something ‘out there’ in space and time that they have to make comprehensible to us as 
abstractions (as reductions of the four dimensions of space and time to the two surface 
dimensions). According to him, this specific ability to abstract surfaces out of space and 
time and to project them back into space and time is what is known as virtuality and 
imagination. His proposition ‘images are significant surfaces’ essentially consists of the 
combination of two sentences. The first sentence is ‘images are surfaces’. It means that 
the image is a kind of medium between ‘out there’ and ‘in here’, object and sense, matter 
and perception, and the world and human beings. This sentence expresses an abstraction 
and the imagination of the second dimension against the fourth dimension in space and 
time. Unlike linear thinking, it also results in circulating, sensitive and imaginary 
thinking based on surfaces. The second sentence is ‘image has significances’ on the 
surface. In this stage, the image becomes a complex of symbols. Furthermore, he 
consistently demonstrates that it is not denotative but connotative. This is because the 
image can have a variety of interpretations. Unlike number, which is unambiguous, the 
image has the characteristic of ambiguity. Consequently, as a phenomenologist, Flusser 
emphasizes that the image is a symbolic passage to access the essence of the world. 
Indeed, it seems that he positively trusts the capability and possibility of the image, which 
makes it comprehensible. For Flusser, wandering over the surface of the image is a kind 
of scanning or expedition in order to understand and access the four dimensional orders 
in space and time. 
 
In my view of the virtuality of the image, Flusser’s concept of image can be compared 
with Deleuze’s concept of the virtual. Like Deleuze, Flusser also indicates the fact that 
the virtuality of image exists in the nexus and interface between surface and depth, time 
and space, object and sense, matter and perception. However, while Flusser defines the 
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image as significant surfaces between ‘out there’ and ‘in here’, object and sense, matter 
and perception, and the world and human beings, Deleuze conceptualizes the dynamic 
force of virtual art based on fiction and imagination along the indiscernibility and 
hybridity between the actual and the virtual, matter and image, the present and the past. 
Deleuze conceptualizes the virtual between the actual and potentiality in view of the 
creativity of physical reality. Deleuze’s virtuality is also related to the logic of a dynamic 
force and becoming to make a difference on the plane of immanence. This pursuit of 
dynamicity and multiplicity let Deleuze define the virtuality and image arts as a power of 
the false.65 In particular, virtuality has to do with the indiscernibility of crystal image in 
his cinema philosophy. 66 He suggests the aesthetics of the virtual image in the relation of 
inextricable and interactive exchange and transformation between the present and the 
past, being and perception, reality and potentiality.  
 
Next, let us investigate the Deleuzian concept of the virtuality of the image in more 
detail. Virtuality concerns the question of the nature of the image. The question ‘What is 
image?’ implies an answer that is opposite to itself. Traditional idealist thoughts based on 
Platonism assert that the image is none other than a reflection in our mind of the real 
world. While Hegel considers the virtuality of image the phenomenology of absolute 
geist,67 Tolstoy defines that the virtual art is the feeling and infection of emotion.68 They 
argue that the nature of image and art is the replica or representation of a model or 
something that actually exists. In this definition, the image is considered a dependent 
variable of the real, which is based on the separation between the world and illusion or 
matter and consciousness. In particular, Plato, who is considered the founder of idealism 
in the western philosophical tradition, presents this perspective in his famous ‘Allegory 
of the Cave’.69 Plato asserts that the image is the world of the false and is therefore not in 
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the realm of Idea, which is the world of truth. Like prisoners in a cave, human beings can 
only recognize the world of truth by the fictional image of simulation. In his view, an 
image is merely an imaginary copy of an ideal model of either physical reality or an Idea; 
hence, the original precedes the image, and the model of great ideals can only explain the 
ontology of the image.  
 
In contrast, Deleuze overturns Platonism. 70  In Plato’s idealism, the original takes 
precedence over the image, whereas Deleuze deconstructs the separation of the image 
with the original.  Plato conceives of a preceding model and the falsehood of its image; 
Deleuze, based on material monism, goes beyond Platonism by drawing on the power of 
simulation and falsity. Platonism is based on the idea of a distinction between ‘the thing 
itself’ and the simulacra. Here, difference is not thought of as a thing in itself but as 
related to a ground that is subordinated and subject to mediation in mythic form. For 
Deleuze, in overturning Platonism, then, the primacy of original over the copy, of model 
over image is denied, thus glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.71 Plato 
concentrates on the falsehood of the virtual and simulated image in light of the 
transcendental Idea. In contrast, Deleuze establishes the immanent corporeality and the 
physical movement of the image. In materialist thought, the image is considered a figure 
of sense or substance. The history of the image is the movement of matter and the 
evolutionary process of historical incidents. For Deleuze, the image is living matter and 
internal movement instead of transcendent schema or ideology. Therefore, the essence of 
images is not in the ideal and in transcendence, but in material life, historical movement 
and immanent construction.  
 
According to Gregory Flaxman, in order to grasp Deleuze’s methodology in overturning 
Platonism, ‘one must affirm the powers of the false.’ This is because ‘these powers create 
an excess of truths, a plurality of possible worlds that bear the world beyond the precincts 
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of truth and lying.’72 Deleuze insinuates himself into Platonism to overturn the dualism of 
originals and images within themselves. Leaving aside the transcendent essence of Idea, 
he implodes Platonism by turning it inward. Deleuze denies the dualism of model and 
imitation, and restores the creative force of simulacra. Flaxman states that Deleuze 
achieves an immanent critique against Plato’s idealism by eschewing all external or 
transcendent perspectives. He points out that Deleuze strips the privilege of originality 
and theorizes the power of the false. 73  Unlike Plato’s negation of simulation and 
virtuality, the concept of the virtuality of the image as defined by Deleuze practically 
overcomes the dichotomy between original and copy, reality and image. He theorizes the 
ontological contradiction and hybridity of image as the power of false. 
 
In this sense, in Deleuzian virtuality, the image resides not only in its materiality and 
reality but also in the force of fiction and imagination. It is important to grasp the 
contradictory concept of the image. Image is both the material and the imagined. It is a 
complex hybridity of the actual and the potential. Therefore, by virtue of the power of the 
false, the simulacra of image create different modes of physical reality, which are nothing 
more than enhanced and expanded reality. In terms of the virtuality of images, the power 
of the false is associated with the concept of ‘the body without organs’, producing 
creative reality and possibility.  
 
In this context, the virtuality of images postulates the concept of ‘the body without 
organs’. In other words, the creative power of false is reified by the concept of the body 
without organs. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze borrows the term ‘the body without 
organs’ from Artaud’s radio play, “To Have Done with the Judgment of God”: “When 
you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all 
his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.”74 Deleuze argues two 
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different ways to encounter the world between the little girl and the schizophrenic.75 
While the little girl stays on the surface of life, the schizophrenic explores into the depth 
of the world. According to Deleuze, the schizophrenic body, that is, the superior body or 
body without organs of Antonin Artaud, is a new dimension of being and an organism 
without parts that operates entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid 
transmission. In their collaboration, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1, 
Deleuze and Guattari develop the term ‘the body without organs’ into the concept of 
creative virtuality:  
 
The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, 
with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking 
the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject developing along 
these particular vectors. Nothing here is representative; rather, it is all life and 
lived experience: the actual, lived emotion of having breasts does not resemble 
breasts, it does not represent them, any more than a predestined zone in the egg 
resembles the organ that it is going to be stimulated to produce within itself. 
Nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds, and gradients. A harrowing, 
emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as 
possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter….76 
 
Deleuze and Guattari oppose the organism of the body, which repress and deteriorates the 
flow of living and desiring forces in the actual world. Instead, they advocate non-organic 
and unorganized multiplicity and the dynamicity of the rhizomatic and molecular war-
machine. They disparage the inertia and spiritlessness of the world of imitation and 
representation, and value highly the creativity and potentiality of simulation and virtual 
images. For them, the force of virtuality multiplies by dismantling the organic body on 
the plane of immanence. They highlight struggling desires and pleasures that de-
territorialise and traverse the axes and thresholds between the actual and the potential on 
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the plane of consistency. Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize the potentiality of a new 
reality by the dynamic becoming of a body without organs. 
Brian Massumi explains Deleuze’s non-organic philosophy in terms of the virtuality of 
images. He states that the body should be imagined in suspended animation, intensity = 0, 
outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory.77 He points out that in 
this imagination the body is considered from the point of view of its potential or virtuality 
passing through a threshold state on the way from one determinate state to another. For 
Masssumi, the body without organs is none other than ‘the body as virtuality’. The body 
is an open system of pure potentiality and pure virtuality. The body without organs is a 
subset of the body’s plane of consistency, which is the Milky Way of its potential orbits 
and trajectories. The body is a region of the Milky Way made by a constellation, 
including an infinity of background stars visible at varying degrees of intensity.78 
Massumi connects this hovering over the conjunctive synthesis and resonance with the 
beginnings of human subjectivity.79 He states that Deleuze’s concept of the organless 
body is the actualization and conjunction of virtuality. Instead of organs, modes of 
composition in the virtual attractor govern the actualization of the threshold state.80 For 
Massumi, the image of reality is the potential on the consistent plane.  
 
Consequently, the image, as Deleuze said, is not a notion or concept but a practice or set 
of practices.81 The potentiality of the image, the creativity of simulation, the virtuality of 
reality and the virtualization of the actual are a matter of assemblage and becoming. 
Deleuze’s concept of the virtuality of images presents one point regarding the creative 
subjectivity of human beings in the virtuality of image world. 
 
 
1-3. The Virtuality of Film 
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As we can have seen in the prior section, the virtuality of image is the imbrication 
between the actual and the potential. As it were, the virtual image is the threshold 
between physical reality and fantasy. In this section, I extend the concept of virtual image 
to the territory of film art. I argue that film is the art of virtuality, which implies the 
liminal between reality and image. In particular, I distinguish film from the traditional 
arts like painting or architecture in terms of technological virtuality. Film art presents the 
new phase of virtuality because it is mediated by technological automation. Unlike 
traditional image arts reliant on human’s manual operation, the virtuality of film stems 
from mechanical apparatuses like camera, film strips, and screen. On one hand, film 
invokes the technologically mediated physical reality; on the other hand, it causes 
potential power of fictional imagination and fantasy. The virtuality of film is the 
contradictory duality between materiality and immateriality, actuality and potential, 
indexicality and fantasy. 
 
Historically, the virtuality of film has evolved along two paths: the reproduction of 
physical reality and the projection of visual illusion. On one hand, as Benjamin intuited, 
it involves the history of the technology of reproducing images with the invention of the 
camera and celluloid filmstrips.82 On the other hand, it is the history of visual illusion and 
spectacle as conveyed by the projection apparatus of the screen. <deleting 32-35> In the 
prehistory of film, the virtuality of images has developed through the two different ways. 
While camera obscura and photography succeeded in capturing physical reality, magic 
lantern and screen instruments projected the visual illusion. The mechanical apparatus of 
cinematography integrates these two different streams. Auguste and Louis Lumière 
effectively combined the contradictions of the reproduction of reality and the presentation 
of illusion into two different aspects of filmic virtuality. For the first time in the history of 
art, human beings succeeded in the technological representation of objects and the public 
presentation of virtual images. Lumière brothers’ cinematograph showed scenes of 
everyday life that were produced in one shot and one scene using a fixed camera. The 
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concept of shooting and editing did not yet exist. Although these scenes were given 
narrative titles, such as the Arrival of a Train, Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory, and 
The Sprinkler Sprinkled, they were primitive documentary newsreels showing people’s 
daily routines.  
 
According to Noel Burch, early movies, such as Lumière’s films, centred on visual 
presentation using primitive modes of representation (PMR).83 He contrasts them to 
institutional modes of representation (IMR), which concentrated on narrative cinema. 
Tom Gunning also sets a high value on the reality and spectacle of moving images in the 
early cinema, designating them as ‘the cinema of attraction.’84 According to Louis 
Giannetti’s description of the early history of film, Lumière is the first realist because his 
filmstrips are mainly dedicated to capturing and recording physical reality.85 Lumière’s 
team wandered around the world seeking interesting scenery and curious customs, such 
as the New York subway, Niagara Falls, and the coronation of the Russian Czar. His 
films evidence the early features of the later genre of documentary. In contrast, Giannetti 
explains that, while Louis Lumière focused on the realistic essence of film, Georges 
Méliès concentrated on the magical and fantastic aspects of filmic virtuality.86 Whereas 
Lumière’s films presented people’s real, contemporary lives, Méliès explored the 
potential of the virtual using a variety of techniques and experiments. Méliès created 
magical effects by various camera tricks, special effects, and editing techniques, such as 
time-lapse photography, multi exposures, dissolves, fade-outs, and hand-printed colour. 
He manipulated and re-composed the reality of film by combining his imagination with 
technological experiments. In 1902, he made Voyage to the Moon, the first science fiction 
film. Méliès’s films offered spectators magical curiosity and fantastic pleasure. For him, 
cinema was the art of the dream and imagination instead of realistic record. In terms of 
filmic virtuality, Méliès’s films developed the imaginational aspects of film using 
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experimental techniques, which is distinguished from the characteristic of physical 
indexicality and reality. 
 
Nevertheless, as Thomas Elsaesser properly points out, 87 Lumière’s reality does not 
absolutely have a confrontation with Méliès’s fantasy. This is because the filmic 
virtuality essentially subsumes the immanent contradiction of physical indexicality and 
magical illusion. In this sense, Elsaesser emphasizes that Lumière’s cinematographs also 
showed the magical characteristics based on artificial compositions and stylistic desires 
despite its main traits as a real documentary. Lumière and Méliès represent two different 
aspects of filmic virtuality, in which physical reality is complexly entwined with magical 
illusion by the force of technological apparatuses such as camera, filmstrips, projector, 
and screen. Consequently, the invention and evolution of film was a technological and 
aesthetic combination of physical reality and visual illusion. It relied on the technological 
development of virtual images, which created magical illusions and visual spectacles by 
seizing material reality and projecting light and images in a darkened environment. Here 
my point is that the history of film presents the hybrid combination of the actual and the 
virtual, and physical reality and illusionary spectacle. The history of filmic virtuality 
shows a consistent attempt to combine technologically and aesthetically the reality and 
the illusion of the image. 
 
Based on the historical review of the contradictory development of filmic virtuality 
between physical reality and illusionary fantasy, let us move on the issue of the aesthetic 
concept of filmic virtuality. First, I begin from the fact that filmic virtuality establishes a 
close rapport with physical reality. With the help of technological apparatuses, the art of 
film realistically records and imitates material objects and referents. Walter Benjamin 
delineates the reproductive features of film by the concept of ‘mechanical 
reproduction’. 88  According to Benjamin, the mechanical reproducibility of film 
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revolutionises the history of the technology of reproduction. Although artwork has 
always been replicated and imitated in principle, it not perfected until the new 
phenomenon called mechanical reproduction finally arrived. The role of the artist’s hand 
has been fully converted to a mechanical process by the photograph and the film beyond 
the phase of xylography and lithography. Mechanical reproduction has replaced manual 
reproduction. By using the camera lens for the reproduction of reality, humans achieve a 
strict objectivity that is separate from imperfect manual work. The technology of visual 
reproduction using the camera apparatuses indeed has become the essential factor in 
innovating conditions for the production and consumption of artwork. 
 
Like Benjamin, Vilem Flusser also accentuates ‘the technical image’ of film, which 
captures and records material reality.89 He describes the main characteristics of the 
technical image, comparing it to the ages of the traditional image and alphabetical 
writing.  According to Flusser, the era of the traditional image refers to the world of 
ancient magic and myth, cave arts, murals, engravings, carvings, and sculptures. 
Communication in this world is ritualistic, religious, and oral. This era is similar to the 
era of the technical image such that the dominance of the image is a way to access the 
world. It is based on chaos and circulation, unlike the era of the alphabet and writing, 
which was founded on linear thinking. In other words, the image has become the most 
vital mediator between humans and nature and individuals and groups in both eras. 
However, the technical image is definitely different from the traditional image. Flusser 
emphasizes that unlike the traditional image, which was directly and manually forged by 
humans, the technical image indirectly and automatically mediates between humans and 
the world by machines and other apparatuses. Images taken by the camera are very 
different from images created by painters. Machines like the camera used for photographs 
and films break the chain of image and significance, whereas painters work out the 
virtuality of the image ‘in their heads’.90 Therefore, Flusser claims that the technical 
image is an abstraction of the third order, whereas the traditional image is an abstraction 
of the first order. That is, the technical image is not subjective but objective because of 
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the use of apparatuses and mechanical automatism without the intervention of the human 
body. For Flusser, the technical image of film opens the new world of post-history, going 
beyond the era of history. 
 
Stanley Cavell draws his philosophical concept of ‘scepticism’ from the automatism of 
film. Although it is true that his scepticism postulates the imaginative nature of cinematic 
images, he also emphasizes the photographic and instrumental automatism. He takes note 
of the material reality of film by the concept of ‘a succession of automatic world 
projections’.91 As it were, he maintains that the mechanical and automatic characteristics 
of film make the succession of the image projecting the world. For him, the automatism 
and succession of film images is prerequisite for the mechanical reproducibility of 
instrumental apparatuses like camera, lens, raw film stocks, and projector. Cavell stresses 
that filmic virtuality and skepticism can be realized on the material ground of 
technological automatism and succession. For him, filmic virtuality just exists in relation 
to physical reality. It is ‘the world viewed’, which is created by technological automatism 
and aesthetic scepticism. 
 
In contrast, although many scholars and researchers including Benjamin, Flusser, and 
Cavell appropriately point out that the ontology of film originates in the instrumental and 
mechanical characteristic of film images, the technological image of film raises the issue 
of the complex relationship between physical reality and filmic imagination and fantasy. 
Even though it is clear that film mechanically and automatically reproduces physical 
reality, it has a diversity of implications in terms of artistic imagination and aesthetic 
practice. Above all, film technology is absolutely not objective and neutral. Rather, 
cinema is always a medium of subjectivity, despite its appearance of technological 
objectivity, which can be hidden by film authors. Since then, as theorists of cinematic 
apparatus Jean Louis Baudry and Jean Louis Comolli argue, the camera lens is always 
subjective. The succession of images on the screen forces us to accept the ideological 
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meaning ascribed by filmmakers.92 Cinema apparatus implies a subjective vision, in 
which it reflects the worldview and opinions of the subject, both technologically and 
ideologically. In addition, Christian Metz defines the nature of cinema as ‘the imaginary 
signifier’ of absent desire and unconsciousness in the discourse of film semiotics.93 He 
articulates that film has the characteristics of fiction and illusion besides the imitation and 
reproduction of the real world. For him, ‘the scopic regime’ of cinema goes beyond 
physical reality and mimetic representation. The aspect of filmic imagination and fantasy, 
as well as the aspects of the technological reproduction of physical reality, should 
simultaneously illuminate the ontological nature of film images.  
 
In this context, we can extrapolate the fictional and imaginative traits as a different 
feature of filmic virtuality. In light of the contradiction of filmic virtuality between reality 
and image, it is necessary to contemplate the artistic aspect of film mediated by 
technological apparatuses. In fact, Benjamin points out that the mechanical 
reproducibility of film gives rise to the important transformation of human sense and 
artistic expression. He argues that the mechanical reproduction of film causes the decay 
of aura and the emergence of tactile perception.94 In addition, Flusser indicates that the 
technical image intensifies the superficiality of images. He praises ‘the significant 
surface’ of technical images.95 Cavell’s concept of automatism also goes beyond the 
concept of instrumental and photographic reproducibility: “The ‘sense of reality’ 
provided on film is the sense of that reality, one from which we already sense a distance. 
Otherwise, the thing it provides a sense of would not, for us, count as reality.”96 As 
Rodowick properly points out, Cavell’s automatism is associated with the consecutive 
movement of filmstrips, the complexity of filmic time, and cinematic thoughts and 
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scepticism.97 Like this, the theorists who accentuate the technological automatism of film 
images also keep in mind that the imaginative and fictional nature of film should be 
indicated at the same time. 
 
In view of techno-aesthetics of film, the technological reproducibility of physical reality 
should be grasped in relation to aesthetic activities and expressive methodologies. The 
aesthetic aspect of film technology postulates the concept of filmic imagination and 
fantasy, author’s intention and techniques, and cinematic philosophy and thoughts. In this 
respect, Scott McQuire takes note of the ambivalence of film technology, which 
simultaneously works as the technological reproduction and the tool of thinking.98 For 
him, the technology of film is both instrumental apparatus and aesthetic thoughts, as the 
term technology derives from techne in Greek meaning art. In particular, he highly 
evaluates Dziga Vertov’s Man with the Movie Camera (1929) as a representative 
example of ‘a machine for thinking with’. Vertov’s ‘Kino-Eye’ extolls the techno-
aesthetics of film and its revolutionary thoughts and utopianism as well.99 McQuire 
exemplifies the thinking force and aesthetic potential of film technology through 
Vertov’s experimental documentary. 
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For his inability to control his movements, WE temporarily exclude man as a subject for film. Our 
path leads through the poetry of machines, from the bungling citizen to the perfect electric man. In 
revealing the machine’s soul, in causing the worker to love his workbench, the peasant his tractor, 
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epics of electric power plants and flame, we delight in the movements of comets and meteors and 
the gestures of searchlights that dazzle the stars. 
 
Dziga Vertov’s Kino-Eye is associated with the mechanical aesthetics of modernism. It also relates to the 
experiment of film medium exploring the essence of cinema as new contemporary art. In addition, his film 
and theory is deeply rooted in the social atmosphere regarding the success of first socialist revolution and 
the accomplishment of new order. 
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Deleuze would be one of the most vital philosophers who theorise aesthetically the 
relationship between film machine and thoughts. He proposes the concept of ‘spiritual 
automaton’ in order to explore the spiritual potential of film machine. He states that the 
movement-image of cinema produces spiritual thoughts:  
 
It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the 
image is realized: producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the 
cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly. Because the 
cinematographic image itself 'makes' movement, because it makes what the other 
arts are restricted to demanding (or to saying), it brings together what is essential 
in the other arts; it inherits it, it is as it were the directions for use of the other 
images, it converts into potential what was only possibility. Automatic movement 
gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, which reacts in turn on movement. 100 
(Deleuze’s emphasis) 
  
Moreover, Deleuze demonstrates that the spiritual automaton produced by the film 
machine evolves to the thought of the outside in the modern cinema. While the 
movement-image in Eisenstein’s concept of montage produces intellectual shock, 
attraction, and pathos, Dreyer, Bresson, Rohmer and Godard’s films invoke the new type 
of cinematic thoughts. Deleuze argues that this is the thought seized from the outside and 
the unthinkable in thought. For him, the time-image of the modern cinema is the question 
of properly cinematographic automatism, and its consequences. It is the material 
automatism of images which produces ‘from the outside’ a thought which it imposes, as 
‘the unthinkable’ in our intellectual automatism: 
 
The automaton is cut off from the outside world, but there is a more profound 
outside which will animate it. The first consequence is a new status of the Whole 
in modern cinema. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a great difference 
                                                
100 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p.156. 
 42 
between what we are saying now, the whole is the outside, and what we were 
saying about classical cinema, the whole was the open. But the open merged with 
the indirect representation of time: everywhere where there was movement, there 
was a changing whole open somewhere, in time. This was why the 
cinematographic image essentially had an out-of-field which referred on the one 
hand to an external world which was actualizable in other images, on the other 
hand to a changing whole which was expressed in the set of associated images.101 
(Deleuze’s emphasis) 
 
Deleuze definitely postulates that the movement and temporality of film machine 
provokes spiritual automaton, in which human can think the unthinkable, as it were, a 
different type of life and belief. In terms of Deleuze’s concept of filmic virtuality, the 
technological automation of cinema moves toward the thought of the outside, which is 
nothing but the potential and possibility of new life going beyond actual reality.  
 
In this sense, Bogue asserts that Deleuze’s concept of spiritual automaton is ‘a thought 
beyond thought’ in modern cinema.102 He also explains that spiritual automaton is the 
free indirect seeing and thinking in cinematic images on the screen. According to Bogue, 
spiritual automaton is both inside and outside, inside the viewer and outside in the image. 
Thus, Deleuze’s concept of spiritual automaton is associated with the virtuality of film. 
That is to say, the spiritual automaton presents the border and bridge in-between 
technology and aesthetics, actual reality and virtual image, the world and human brain.  
 
By the same token, Richard Rushton also considers that spiritual automaton is one of the 
most significant concepts of Deleuzian cinema aesthetics.103 According to him, spiritual 
automaton is a machine or mechanical device that is endowed with a spiritual life, a 
machine that thinks. In addition, Rushton accentuates Deleuze’s insight that the thought 
made by cinematic apparatuses does not originate ‘in’ our minds, rather it is the product 
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of the sensations, objects and events, in short, the outside, with which we come into 
contact. For Rushton, what is most crucial in Deleuze’s concept of spiritual automaton, 
while we are watching a film, is that we are traversed by sensations, affects and 
perceptions that are not ours but the outside, a new and different way of life and thought.  
 
In Deleuze’s concept of the filmic virtuality, cinema is both technological and spiritual 
automaton. It is the thought and possibility toward the outside beyond actual reality. The 
virtuality of film produces new and different ways of life and belief. It is a contradictory 
combination and hybrid imbrication between physical reality and fictional imagination. 
Filmic virtuality is mediated by the technological automatism of camera apparatuses. The 
consecutive movement and the complex temporality of cinema create the virtual nature of 
film images. As Rodowick properly said, the basis of all cinematic representation is 
virtuality, and the film is the art of virtual images, living in-between physical reality and 
illusionary fantasy. 104  
 
In this context, Gunning proposes that filmic reality should not be reduced to the aspects 
of physical indexicality. Rather, he considers cinematic visuality and sensation as the 
core factors of film art.105 In addition, Mary Ann Doane concedes that film would be 
excellent examples of sign systems that merge icon, index, and symbol:  
 
Although indexical because the photographic image has an existential bond with 
its object, they are also iconic in relying upon a similartity with that object. To the 
extent that photography and film have recourse to language (or are labeled 
themselves), they invoke the symbolic realm. It is interesting to note that Peirce 
himself seemed to situate photography as primarily indexical, subordinating the 
iconic dimension to secondary status. Photography’s iconicity was a by-product 
of its indexicality.106  
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Paul Willemen also proposes that the indexicality of film should be combined with the 
concept of icon and symbol in Peirce’s complex taxonomy.107 Unlike Gunning and 
Doane’s perspective, Willemen accentuates the primacy of indexicality over filmic 
fantasy in Peirce’s triadic terms. Although there are many differences related to what the 
main point is, it is true that most film theorists agree with the assertion that the reality of 
film is the combination of indexical and symbolic traits. I will in more detail deal with 
the contemporary disputes of filmic indexicality related with digital virtualism in the next 
chapters. In this chapter, I just clarify the concept of filmic virtuality between reality and 
illusion, indexicality and imagination, materiality and immateriality, technological 
reproduction and aesthetic expression. Here my point is that the technological virtuality 
of film presents the magic and imaginary features as well as the indexical traces of 
physical reality. It is a bridge and a threshold between material indexicality and fictional 
imagination. 
 
 
1-4. Digital Virtuality: Concept and Historicity 
 
In this section, I will deal with the digital virtuality as the new artform of filmic virtuality. 
Digital virtuality is the expansion and transformation of filmic virtuality. On one hand, 
Digital virtuality inherits the aesthetic contradiction of film images between indexicality 
and imagination. It subsumes both technological reproduction108 and aesthetic expression. 
On the other hand, the virtuality of cinema is transformed filmic modes to the new 
dimension of digital virtuality. The development of computer technology converts the 
mechanical virtuality of film to cybernetic virtuality. In addition, I explore the main 
features of digital virtuality in the conceptual categories of multimedia, virtual reality, 
and cyberspace. 
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There is a diversity of definitions of digital virtuality. Shields defines digital virttuality as 
the ‘liminoid’ between concrete actuality and intangible potential in computer 
simulation.109 For him, digital virtuality is the cultural impact of computerisation. Here 
Shields consistently applied his concept of the virtual, which means real, but not actual. 
As it were, he argues that digital virtuality is the hybrid imbrication of the actual and the 
potential in the environment of computerised simulation and cyberspace: 
 
The virtual is liminal, ‘betwixt and between’, a threshold (limen) between at least 
one immediate lived milieu and the distant ground of the other(s). In it, everything 
is representational, a convenient fiction by which participants ‘meet’ but only 
figuratively; elements interact ‘in essence’ but not physically. Beyond the 
transmission, bricolage and the animation which is the labour of the technologies 
involved, there is always an innately human work of metaxis, translation and 
imagination which transposes digital action and virtual encounters to the world of 
living animals and objects.110 
 
Bryant also demonstrates that digital virtuality is related to the conceptual oxymoron of 
the virtual, which is real, but not real existing.111 He indicates that there has been a new 
negotiation and resonance between analogue indexicality and digital virtuality since the 
development of computer technology and cyberspace since the 1960s. However, he 
argues that this distinction between photochemical indexicality and cybernetic virtuality 
are not absolute and exclusive, as Rosen suggested the concept of ‘digital mimicry’.112 
Bryant stresses that we have to avoid any risk of simplifying an opposition between 
analogue film and digital image in terms of the trace or indexicality of time. For him, 
digital virtuality is not the dichotomy between filmic indexicality and digital 
manipulation, but a consistent process of becoming and unbecoming, presence and 
absence, appearing and vanishing, zeros and ones. 
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Furthermore, Pierr Lévy positively advocates the creativity of digital virtuality. He 
defines digital virtuality as ‘the virtualisation of information and communication’. 113 
Like Shields and Bryant, he also illuminates the concept of digital virtuality in terms of 
the contradiction of the actual and the potential. For Lévy, the virtual is not the opposite 
of the real but the opposite of the actual. Virtuality is the contradictory ontology of digital 
images in the age of computer networks. He states that digital virtuality is technologically 
founded on a computer memory and software. He also argues that the digital image, in its 
philosophical meaning, is virtual on the hard disk and actual on the screen. Virtualisation 
is digitalisation and actualisation is display. Therefore, digital virtuality is none other than 
the new form of physical reality in computer networks and screen projection. In this 
definition, Lévy emphasises that the affirmative effects of digital virtuality, although no 
positive effect is guaranteed, could be a new stage of human experience and collective 
intelligence:  
 
Digitalisation and virtualisation of information is a new stage in the making of 
collective intelligence. We can now share in real time not only static records but 
constantly evolving dynamic memories. We can now share, trade and collectively 
refine simulations, which are externalised and exchangeable dynamic mental 
models. Expert systems allow a very easy and quick sharing and distribution of 
empirical knowledge. We can use computer supported cooperative work systems 
or computer supported cooperative learning networks. We can coordinate actions 
or competences among thousands of people without a centre, without being 
obliged to plan or design every step in advance. We can communicate 
interactively ‘many to many’ (and not only ‘one to many’ as in the traditional 
communication networks like postal services or telephone). In parallel with the 
growth of the distributed hyperbody, humankind experiences the fast growth and 
extension of a global hypercortex.114 
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As Lévy points out, digital virtuality is the technological virtuality of the image in the age 
of computer simulation and mobile networks, while the technological virtuality of film is 
based on the photochemical mechanism of the image reproduction. Although it is 
unreasonable to extrapolate the untraversable gap between film and digital images, digital 
virtuality is the new stage of the virtual image beyond the mechanical virtuality of film. It 
extends the virtuality of film, and presents different forms of cybernetic and synthetic 
image. 
 
In 1970, Gene Youngblood, a pioneer in the theory of expanded cinema, pointed out that 
based on computer technology, cybernetic cinema contributes to the amplification of 
human freedom and intelligence. 115 He demonstrated that the computer does not replace 
human beings; instead, it liberates them from specialisation. Youngblood evaluates that 
the development of computer technology gives rise to the expansion of human sense and 
aesthetics. For him, digital virtuality implies the creative potentiality of computer 
technology. It is a creative potentiality of the ‘new reality’ produced by digital 
technology.  
 
Above all, the aesthetic ontology of digital virtuality derives from the technological 
difference between the analogue and the digital image. Whereas the analogue image is 
based on continuously varying voltage or physical quantities, the digital image is based 
on discrete data signal systems, such as 0 and 1. The analogue clock has rotating hands, 
whereas the digital clock is electronic and displays numbers. Analogue film is comprised 
of photosensitive materials, whereas digital film relies on computer data and software. 
Analogue film reveals images using tangible material, whereas digital cinema is 
expressed by invisible codes. Therefore, whereas the analogue image is exposed as an 
integrated whole that is difficult to separate, the digital image consists of innumerable 
splinters and fragments created by numerical modules and codes. Technological 
differences between the analogue and the digital image, such as continuity and 
discontinuity, whole and part, and integration and fragmentation, shatter the frame in the 
production and consumption of these images. The formation and transformation of the 
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analogue image as a continuous and integrated whole are unusually difficult and 
challenging because the material nature of the medium itself is damaged. In contrast, the 
formation and transformation of the digital image as discontinuous and fragmented 
modules are easy and convenient because shifts in data and the revision of programs are 
always available.  
 
According to Rodowick, the output of digital images is separated from the input, whereas 
analogue images have continuity in inputs and outputs.116 Digital images are based on 
numerical calculation and transcoding, while analogue images are focused on the record 
of physical reality. Digital images are discontinuous, whereas analogue images are 
continuous with their sources. Consequently, the technological differences between 
digital images and analogue images entail the ontological transformation of cinematic 
virtuality. 
 
Historically, it is clear that the concept of digital virtuality has evolved along with the 
path of the development of computer technology. As Gene Youngblood indicates, the 
evolution of computers has simultaneously taken place in both the technology of 
hardware and the informatics of software. While the computational hardware has 
functioned the physical cerebral cortex for numerical calculation, the algorithmic 
software has developed ‘conceptual camera’ for filmmaking.117 The first computer can be 
considered the abacus, which was invented in Babylon circa BC 2400.118 The modern 
computer was invented in 1936 and had the capacity to process and program data. The 
American George Stibitz’s ‘Model K’ and the German Konrad Zuse’s ‘Z-series’ were 
invented during World War II and were the first electronic digital computers to perform 
calculations using the binary form.119 In 1936, a paper by the English Alan Turing proved 
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the theoretical definition of a universal computing machine.120 Invented in 1946, the 
electronic numerical integrator and computer (ENIAC) was the first electronic general-
purpose computer in the US. It combined a high-speed memory of 80 bytes with 
programming ability. It was a huge Turing-complete device with 18,000 vacuum tubes. 
In 1952, IBM made the first business computer, the IBM 701 EDPM, and announced 
FORTRAN as the first high-level programming language in the next year.121 In 1975 and 
1976, the business computer evolved from the personal computers, IBM 5100 and the 
Apple I, II in 1976, respectively. In 1984, Apple’s Macintosh computer introduced the 
first graphic interface and painting program into the world of the computer, which were 
followed in 1991 by QuickTime software for movies.122 In this process of the modern 
computer evolution from Alan Turing to Steve Jobs, the computer as a mechanical 
calculator gradually developed into an effective tool for image making and digital 
multimedia. 
 
Concerning the diffusion of computer-generated images, the digitalisation of film has 
gradually been proliferated since the 1960s. At first, it was related to the aesthetic 
experiment of avant-garde films. Many avant-garde directors such as John Whitney, John 
Stehura, and Stan Vanderbeek explored the techno-aesthetical potential of emerging 
computer-cybernetic images. According to Youngblood, the avant-garde artists in the 
1960s experimented the material transformation of film medium using geometric images 
generated by computer. For them, computer-cybernetic images implied the expansion of 
human senses and artistic expression. They attempted to go beyond the dramatic narrative 
and commercial entertainment of mainstream films by computer cinema.123  
 
In contrast, in Hollywood mainstream films, computer technology was introduced to 
films in order to show realistically images that were difficult to express by conventional 
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shooting or special effects. It was an effective tool for representative realism, spectator’s 
identification, and technological spectacle. The computer graphic or computer-generated 
image (CGI) has effectively represented images that do not exist in real life. In addition, 
computer technology transforms an image that is shot to a synthesized image, in which 
the actual shooting clips is mixed with computer graphics. Pioneering companies for 
computer graphics like Lucasfilm and Digital Impact suddenly emerged in the 1970s, and 
CGI has been widely used since the 1980s. Made in 1982, Tron was the first film to use 
CGI.  In 1989, director James Cameron’s The Abyss became a landmark film in digital 
history because of its innovative use of 3D computer software and special effects by 
Dream Quest Images (DQI) and Industrial Light & Magic (ILM). It was followed by 
Terminator 2 in 1991, in which T-2000 was synthesized with a human image and 
computer graphics by using a morphing technique.  
 
As Vivian Sobchack sharply points out, the film aesthetics of computer synthesis by the 
morphing technique presents the aesthetics of an ‘effortless shape-shifting’ against the 
ground of the photo-realism of film. With the advent of computer-synthesized morphing 
images, filmic realism faces the confusions of the real and the unreal, the animate and the 
inanimate, and the stable and the uncanny, and the human and the non-human.124 Darley 
suggests the notion of ‘second-order realism’ in order to theorize effectively the new 
trend of realism. 125 For him, ‘second-order realism’ indicates the new order of digital 
realism generated by computer graphics. Darley describes that second-order realism is a 
synthetic realism beyond the first realism of representative image. It is not realism but 
realism beyond realism. 
 
Since the 1990s, the digitalisation of filmstrips and the aesthetics of computer synthesis 
have become more widely proliferated along some different ways. I describe the 
evolutionary phenomena of computer cinema in terms of historical and taxonomic 
approach. First, computer drawing and graphic images was successfully contributing to 
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the hybrid combination of filmic illusionism and visual spectacle in live-action films. In 
1993, Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park authenticated the fact that the technological 
spectacle of computer graphics can combine with the realistic illusionism for popular 
consumption. Stephen Prince named this new trend of Hollywood spectacle-narrative 
cinema the ‘perceptual realism’.126 The spectacle images produced by computer graphics 
were dedicated to spectator’s perceptual illusion and filmic identification. As David 
Norman Rodowick describes, the ‘digital paranoid’ has caused a broad range of the 
ontological and allegorical conflict between the representative images and computer 
simulations. 127  The digital films like The Matrix, Dark City, Thirteenth Floor, and 
eXistenZ in the 1990s simultaneously presented the possibility and limitation of new 
representative aesthetics.  
 
In the 2000s, the spectacle images by computer simulation have been extensively 
accepted as a necessary element for the storytelling of the Hollywood narrative cinema. It 
has also made and transformed a diversity of film genres based on magical fantasy and 
imagination: Fantasy movies like The Lord of the Rings (2001-2003), and Harry Potter 
(2001-2011), Super hero films like The Matrix (1999-2003), the Batman series (1995-
2012), and the Spider-Man series (2002-2012), SF movies like I, Robot (2004), The 
Island (2005), and War of the Worlds (2005), the action thrillers like King Kong (2005), 
Mission Impossible series (1996-2006), and the Transformers series (2007-2011), and 
even historic movies like Troy (2004), 3D disaster films like Gravity (2013) and so on. 
Through the 2000s, while live-action filmstrips conflated with computer-generated 
images, photo-realism of film has an encounter with the spectacle aesthetics of computer 
simulation. As Scott Mcquire argues, the ‘impact aesthetics’ of digital spectacle images 
has an ambivalent nature. On one hand, it expands the realm of cinematic expression and 
imagination. Digital spectacles reinforce the visionary attraction of cinema. On the other 
hand, the impact aesthetics intensifies the ‘California ideology’ based on commercial 
entertainment and de-historicity. It produces a new illusionism based on digital 
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technology. 128 
 
Furthermore, since the 1990s, the new ‘digital ecosystem’ 129  for filmmaking and 
consumption was getting settled down in the process of digitalisation of film medium. 
There has been the wide spread of digital devices and institutional system such as digital 
camera, computer editing, digital projection, and digital distribution. Since the 1990s, the 
use of the digital camera has been popular. Many films have been made using digital 
cameras, such as Festen (1998) and Idiots (1998), which were directed by the Dogma 
movement, Timecode (2000), which was directed by Mike Figgis, and Aleksandr 
Sokurov’s Russian Ark (2002), which shows the digital aesthetics of an uninterrupted 
shooting of eighty-six minutes’ duration and a direct recording to hard disk.130 In 1999, 
George Lucas released Star Wars Episode 1-The Phantom Menace, which achieved 
digital screening for the first time. The 16 scenes in the movie were shot using a Sony 
F900 HD camera, and the whole film was digitalized. It was followed by transmission via 
satellite network and was screened by digital projector. In 2003, seven major filmmakers 
in Hollywood established the digital cinema initiative (DCI) in order to prepare for a 
system of digital production and distribution. The digital ecosystem of movie world 
transforms the old process of filmic business. While digital production intensifies the 
‘non-linear and interactive system’ of shooting and editing,131 the digitalisation of film 
medium reinforces the new trend of film distribution and consumption. As Rodowick 
exactly points out, box-office receipt is no longer primarily in the movie business. 132 In 
2004, video sales and rental revenues of studio feature-film records three times over box-
office receipts. Due to the spread of digital production and distribution, the new related 
sources of revenue such as DVD sales, computer game, and Internet download service 
has continuously have replaced movie theatre business. In particular, digital purchases 
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and streaming services of movies from new online players such as Netflix, Comcast, 
Paramount and Amazon have become Hollywood’s most important revenue fraction to 
growth in the 2010s, which has eclipsed slumping DVD sales. While digital spending on 
movies rose to $1 billion in 2013, which means the growth of 50 per cent compared with 
2012, the whole market of home entertainment reached at 18.2 billion in 2013.133 The new 
ecology of digital production and distribution has rapidly transformed film business and 
aesthetics. The film art proceeds to digital multimedia based on online network and home 
entertainment beyond movie theatres. 
 
Finally, it is remarkable that there was the appearance and diffusion of 3D computer 
animation, which was followed by the shrinkage of 2D cell animation. Toy Story, the first 
completely computer graphic animation, was created in 1995, the same year that Steve 
Jobs left Apple Computer to joined Pixar, which was a spin off from Lucasfilm. Toy Story 
was made using MAYA software, which is a comprehensive composition tool that 
includes the whole process of 3D animation, such as modeling, simulation, visual effects, 
rendering, and matchmoving.134 Although this movie was a small animation for children, 
there is no doubt that it was a giant step for digital cinema. Disney acquired Pixar in 
2006, declared the end of the age of 2D cell animation and converted to the system of 3D 
animation.135 There are many examples proving the attenuation of cell animation and the 
dominance of computer animation: the Shrek series (2001-2010), Finding Nemo (2003), 
The Polar Express (2004), Madagascar series (2005-2011), Monster House (2006), 
Ratatouille (2007), Wall-E (2009), Kung Fu Panda series (2008-2012), Frozen (2013) 
and so on.  
 
To sum up, the historical evolution of digital virtuality is closely associated with the new 
trend of film production, aesthetics, and industry; the conflation of live-action images and 
computer graphics, the combination of filmic illusionism and digital spectacle images, 
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the settlement of digital ecosystem such as digital shooting, editing, screening, and 
distribution through all areas of filmmaking and distribution, and the replacement of 2D 
animation by 3D computer animation. In 2009, the movie Avatar intensively presents the 
main tendencies and hybrid aesthetics of digitalisation.  As William Brown argues, based 
on the combination of live-action and 3D computer animation, and filmic illusionism and 
spectacle aesthetics, the humanistic and the non-humanistic, Avatar shows the new 
aesthetic stage of ‘stereoscopic cinema’ and ‘3D gaseous perception’.136  In particular, 
with the help of digital technology, this movie succeeded in capturing minute details in 
facial expressions, gestures, and motions. The film’s virtual characters, which replace 
real human bodies and actions, emerge as genuine protagonists. In addition, Cameron’s 
film created both the realistic and the spectacular effects of computer graphics by virtue 
of 3D virtual camera, motion capture technology, and a non-linear system in the process 
of shooting and editing. In this film, the representative aesthetics of filmic illusionism 
effectively combines with the ‘impact aesthetics’137 of digital spectacle images.  
 
In light of the short history of digital cinema, it is now rapidly evolving. What is digital 
cinema? Lev Manovich stated: ‘Born from animation, cinema pushed animation to its 
boundary, only to become one particular case of animation in the end.’ Therefore, it 
seems that the ‘digital cinema is a particular case of animation which uses live action 
footage as one of its many elements’.138 Expanding Manovich’s definition, I define that 
digital cinema is the digitalisation of cinema in the whole process of production, 
distribution, screening, viewing, circulation and consumption. The digital cinema is 
cinema made by computer technology instead of celluloid filmstrips. Data files shot by 
the digital camera create completely different cinema images by mixing them with 
previous data through editing software programs. Digital technology also changes the 
method of screening and enjoyment of the image as well as the production of cinema. 
The computer files received by the Internet and satellite networks are distributed and 
screened by a digital projector instead of filmstrips rolled in round tin containers. Movie 
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files stored in computers are reproduced infinitely by DVD, the Internet, and mobile 
devices. Cinema has become information as well as art. Movies produced on computers 
diversify time and space in distribution, screening, viewing, circulation and consumption. 
Cinema has become cultural contents that audiences enjoy by using multimedia devices, 
such as computers, the Internet, mobile phones, personal multimedia players (PMP), and 
even game consoles. Cinema is available not only in theatres but also everywhere all the 
time, ubiquitously. Cinema is about to reach the new stage of innovation in methods of 
production, circulation, and consumption. 
 
In terms of the ontology of digital cinema, the development of digital computer 
technology has changed the characteristics of cinematic images from the photochemical 
to the numerical. While the photographic film is based on the analogous connections with 
the physical reality, the digital computer depends on the binary numerical system. It 
transforms the material image into the binary digits of one and zero. Whereas the 
language of film depends on chemical, optical, and mechanical process of image, the 
algorithmic language of the computer consists of hardware and software. 139  The 
hardware of the human brain is the physical cerebral cortex, its neurons and synapses, its 
software consists of logic or intelligence, which animates the hardware. In the computer, 
the hardware is technology and the software is information. The algorithmic language of 
computer programs simulates the lines, curves, patterns, and colours of images. The 
computer becomes ‘the conceptual camera’ using the language of numerical algorithm.140 
The digital computer transcodes the virtual image into the numerical and computational 
concept. The digital computer transforms the virtuality of the image into the aesthetics of 
numerical manipulation and abstract synthesis. 
 
The conceptual transformation of image by computer technology results in the new form 
of techno-aesthetics. Doane defines the concept of medium specificity as the process of  
‘a continual reinvention’.141 The medium is continuously transformed and reborn under 
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technological and aesthetic influence. She argues that a technological medium goes 
through a resistance to resistance, a transgression of what are given as material 
limitations, which nevertheless requires those material constraints as its field of 
operations. In this sense, Doane indicates that the photochemical indexicality of film has 
been transformed to the digital virtuality by the development of computer technology. 
She claims that the aesthetics of new medium should pay more attention to the 
immateriality and timelessness of digital virtuality: 
 
On the other hand, such an argument has the flavor of a theology, and it is not 
surprising that the discourse of indexicality seems indissociable from that of the 
relic. For the index is never enough; it stops short of meaning, presenting only its 
rubric or possibility, and for that reason it is eminently exploitable—as is the 
fantasy of immateriality, the dream of the perfect archive, of digital media. The 
challenge of digital media, in its uses and theorization, is that of resisting not only 
a pervasive commodification of the virtual but also the digital’s subsumption 
within the dream of dematerialization and the timelessness of information, 
returning history to representation and reviving the idea of a medium. Making it 
matter once more.142 
 
McQuire indicates that techno-aesthetic in the history of cinema has developed through 
the aesthetic experiment of avant-garde films, as well as through the special effects of 
Hollywood genre films.143 Avant-garde films, from Dadaist in the 1920s to Structural 
films in the 1960s and recently digital arts, deny the narrative convention of mainstream 
cinema, and experiment with the limitation and materiality of medium specificity. In the 
1920s, Dadaist films such as Man Ray’s The Return to Reason (1923), Fernand Leger’s 
Ballet Mechanique (1924), Marcel Duchamp’s Anemic Cinema (1926) exclude story 
telling and continuous editing, and present raw and absolute images. In addition, 
Absolute Films in Germany, Hans Richter’s Rhythmus series (1921-1925), Viking 
Eggeling’s Symphonie Diagonale (1921), Walter Rutmann’s Lichtspiel:Opus seires 
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(1921), Oskar Fishinger’s Studie seires (1929-1932) etc, explore the expression of visual 
language and the limitation of film medium. Absolute Films pursue an abstract visuality 
and a direct sense reliant on the arbitrary irrationality of lines, geometries, colours, and 
sounds, instead of an ideal meaning. 144  
 
The experiment of film images and medium specificity is also connected to the American 
Underground and ‘Structural Films’ in the 1960s. 145  In particular, Structural films 
challenge the material nature and structure of film. Peter Kubelka, Michael Snow, Paul 
Sharits, Peter Gidal, Andy Warhol, and Stan Brakhage investigate the nature of light, 
time, and space in the image of film. They experiment with the materiality of film 
through absolute signs, graphics, fragmental images. Kubelka’s Arnulf Reiner (1958-
1960) is the epitome of abstract cinema. He depicts subtle motions and stream of colours 
in Adebar (1957). Sharits’s Razor Blades (1968) reveals repetitive signals, irregular 
images through the flicker effect. Hollis Frampton’s Lemon (1969) explores a feeling of 
objects induced by the movement of lights with fixed camera and object. Similarly, 
Snow’s Wavelength (1967) experiments cinematic temporality and duration using a 
continuous zoom technique. Through the extremely slow forward zoom, audiences 
experience the deep and profound change of time and space.  Brakhage is one of the most 
prominent directors of American Avant-garde. His movies like Mothlight (1959), Dog 
Star Man (1966) presents the various techniques of film scratches, collage, action 
painting, superimposition, and flicker effect. He deconstructs the material foundation of 
film medium by the new aesthetics of filmstrips without camera.  
 
Peter Wollen indicates that structural films are in the new forms of counter-cinema in the 
1960s and 1970s with the cinema of political modernism.146 According to Adams Sitney, 
who is one of the most trailblazing researchers of Avant-garde films, American avant-
garde movement in the 1960s recreates film art as a ‘radical otherness’ and a ‘different 
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realm’ as exclusive and independent medium.147 He considers that the material figures of 
film such as light, time, and process are the aesthetic essence of structural films. For him, 
structural films present the materiality of film medium containing the light, time, and 
space of images. Similarly, Rees evaluates structural films as ‘a cinema of vision’, which 
replaces seeing and reading films. 148  Structural films depend on the technological 
manipulation and transformation of filmstrips and camera apparatuses. It explores into 
the material nature of film and the spatial-time of medium.  
 
In terms of the materiality of cinematic images, avant-garde films have a close 
relationship with the aesthetics of digital virtuality based on computer technology. Since 
the 1960s, avant-garde films have contributed to the experiment of medium specificity 
and the creation of new artform. The tradition of avant-garde films evolves in new types 
of techno-art and image arts since the 1980s. It had an impact on mainstream cinema such 
as Stanley Kubrick’s 2001; A Space Odyssey (1968), which reappropriates the material 
aesthetics of structural films for the psychedelic expression of space. In addition, the 
material aesthetics of avant-garde films influenced a diversity of media fields such as TV 
commercials, music videos, video installations and digital arts.  
 
Youngblood theorises the aesthetics of avant-garde films and the possibility of computer 
technology through the concept of ‘expanded cinema’.149 He intuits that the introduction 
of computer technology into film images results in the expansion of human sense and 
new aesthetics of reality. For him, the aesthetics of computer cinema is nothing but the 
potential for ‘new reality’. He argues that the cybernetic cinema based on computer 
simulation is ‘the end of drama’ and ‘the beginning of synesthetic cinema’. According to 
him, computer cinema decentralises and indivisualises the communication channels of 
humanity. He highly evaluates the positive potential of computer-generated images. It is 
the interactivity between technology and aesthetics, human and computer. For him, the 
computer as ‘the aesthetic machine’ is the tool of cybernetic art and the programming of 
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the artist’s emotional state. 150 Furthermore, the computer aesthetics of ‘new reality’ will 
reside in the nonrepresentational system of information. The age of electronic reality will 
rely on a metaphysical system of information. For him, computer-generated images 
create new possibilities for human communication. He theorises the emergence of 
computer cinema in terms of the expansion of human consciousness and sense: 
 
It is quite clear that the trend of human communication is towards these 
possibilities. If visual subsystems exist today, it would be folly to assume that the 
computing hardware will not exist tomorrow. The notion of ‘reality’ will be 
utterly and finally obscured when we reach that point. There will be no need for 
movies to be made on location, since any conceivable scene will be generated in a 
completely convincing reality within an information processing system. By that 
time, of course, movies as we know them will not exist. We are on the cusp of a 
mythic age of electronic realities that exist only on a metaphysical plane. 
Meanwhile, some significant work is being done on the development of new 
languages through computer-generated, nonrepresentational graphics in motion.151  
 
From this perspective, Youngblood analyses several artworks by the most prominent 
artists in the field of computer cinema in the 1960s: he points out that A. M. Noll, a 
pioneer in three-dimensional computer films at Bell Telephone Laboratories, created the 
visualization of the invisible. Youngblood argues that Noll’s computer cinema inspired a 
new conceptual art, in which imaginative ideas combine with technological, numerical, 
and abstract manipulations. 152  He stresses that a diversity of experimental artists 
experiment with the limitation of film medium, and expand the new artform of computer 
cinema; The Whitney family’s composition of time images based on the combination of 
eastern philosophy and modern science; John Stehura’s aesthetics of machine language, 
which shows the simultaneous awareness of inner and outer space and time; and Stan 
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Vanderbeek’s mosaics of the mind, which presents a harmonious work between live-
action and animation, single and multiple projection, and intermedia events.153  
 
In the history of film, the techno-aesthetic of avant-garde films since the 1960s is 
connected to the concept of digital virtuality. This is because the aesthetics of expanded 
cinema has experimented and reinvented the medium specificity and materiality of film. 
The expanded cinema is the aesthetics of new reality based on technological virtuality of 
film. It is the technological and aesthetic experiment of film medium between physical 
actuality and computer-simulated virtuality. As Rees recounts Youngblood’s intuitive 
vision of the new language and aesthetics of the emerging cybernetic cinema,154 the 
aesthetics of expanded cinema is increasingly re-evaluating in terms of digital virtuality.  
 
Valie Export argues that, the expanded cinema is ‘expanded reality’ in the age of digital 
image.155 In the contemporary condition of techno-aesthetics, the aesthetics of virtuality 
expands the concept of filmic reality. It is the reality technologically mediated and 
simulated by computer simulation and cyberspace. Valie argues that the ‘expanded 
reality’ of digital cinema implies the extension of physical reality by the computer 
simulation, that is to say, the expansion of space and time. She claims that digital 
virtuality is a collage expanded around space and time beyond filmic representation and 
illusion. That is because digital cinema is based on mixed media, multiple projection, and 
intermedia technology. For Valie, the new aesthetics of digital virtuality provides an 
expanded reality beyond filmic indexicality and representation. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not necessary to extrapolate the untraversable gap between filmic 
reality and digital virtuality. Although Negroponte proclaims the future-casting vision 
that digital media results in the expansion of individual choice and human freedom 
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beyond the limit of analogue media with the help of computer technology,156 there are 
many different views of the contradictory characteristics of digital media and aesthetics. 
Rosen indicates that digital utopia should not be proposed by ‘the strategy of the 
forecast’, or ‘the historiography of conquest’.157 For him, digital virtuality is none other 
than a historical hybridity between filmic indexicality and digital manipulation. Bolter 
and Grusin also suggest the concept of ‘remediation’, and ‘hybridity’ between old and 
new media. 158  They state that digital media have incorporated the aesthetics of 
transparency and narrative of film, while film has been rapidly transformed by computer 
technology and synthetic aesthetics. In this sense, Bolter claims that the digital virtuality 
is underpinned by the hybrid aesthetics of ‘mixed reality’ between physical reality and 
simulated images.159  
Futhermore, John McMullan claims that the digital image is more indexical, transparent, 
and instantaneous than film images in light of its comparatively low frame rate, shallow 
depth-of-field, and essential property of temporal displacement.160 On the ground of 
Peirce’s semiotics that the reality of film derives from the hybrid combination between 
index, icon, and symbol, he denies the premise that film images are indexical, while 
digital images are numerical and symbolic. Rather, he emphasizes the similarity between 
the analog atoms and the digital bits in terms of contemporary quantum physics. For him, 
the cinema, either film or digital, is a complex artform, which fuses indexicality, iconicity 
and symbols.  
 
The concept of digital virtuality goes beyond the indexical trace of physical reality. Mark 
Poster points out that the concept of reality becomes multiple in the age of digital media. 
161 He claims that physical reality becomes multiplied, and real spatial-time takes a 
variety of artforms: 
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The terms ‘virtual reality’ and ‘real time’ attest to the force of the second media 
age in constituting a simulational culture. The mediation has become so intense 
that the things mediated can no longer even pretend to be unaffected. The culture 
is increasingly simulational in the sense that the media often changes the things 
that it treats, transforming the identity of originals and referentialities. In the 
second media age ‘reality’ becomes multiple.162 
 
Poster argues that the multiple realities in the age of digital media give rise to 
‘postmodern virtuality’. For him, postmodern virtuality is underpinned by new 
methodologies of communication: decentralised networks and interactivity. Poster 
indicates that postmodern virtuality based on computer networks and interactive media 
constitutes multiple, dispersed, unstable, and fragmented subjects with a certain fluidity 
of identity. For him, while the concept of traditional reality is fixed and stable, 
postmodern virtuality is uncertain and unstable. Consequently, he points out that the 
concept of digital virtuality associates postmodern subjectivity with multiple realities. For 
Poster, digital virtuality is a new means of communication and aesthetics, in which the 
potential of technological utopia coexists with the uncertainty of postmodern subjectivity 
simultaneously.   
 
While many theorists focuse on the aesthetic hybridity of the digital image beyond 
physical indexicality, McQuire points out that the aesthetics of digital virtuality should be 
understood in the context of the political economy of Hollywood cultural industry beyond 
aesthetic agenda. 163 He sharply indicates that the impact aesthetics of digital cinema 
creates ambivalence between utopia and dystopia. According to him, techno-aesthetics, 
especially the impact aesthetics of digital cinema, should be grasped on the ground of 
dialectical perspectives between narrative and spectacle. Although digital cinema has a 
positive aspect challenging the identification ideology of Hollywood narrative cinema, it 
also has a negative aspect in relation to the blockbuster marketing and entertainment 
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ideology of Hollywood global capitals. He points out that the techno-aesthetics of digital 
cinema is not simply ‘realism’ but ‘reality’ in the socio-economic context of 
contemporary capitalism.  
 
Similarly, Willemen also indicates that digital virtuality could fall into a trap of stock-
broker aesthetics of Hollywood industry and finance capital.164 Reappraising Andy and 
Lana Wachowski’s The Matrix Reloaded (2003), Willemen argues that the scene of 
‘bullet time’ in the movie shows the technological fetishism of digital gadgets, which 
overwhelms the narrative by stressing the demiurgic powers of the narrator. He claims 
that rotational swivel in Matrix Reloaded is a sign of megalomania, which dispossesses 
the author-narrator and its narratorial position, and at the same time displays the self-
celebration of digital gadgetry. 165  Willemen criticises the negative effects of 
technological spectacle and attraction, that is to say, the lethal dimension of a digitised 
film industry’s aggressive fantasies. He alerts the ‘real’ risk that the aesthetics of digital 
virtuality in Hollywood cultural industry arouses technological fetishism, and saves the 
dead-labour of digital gadgets beyond the living-labour of physical reality: 
 
My main criticism is reserved for the way it is used now in commercial (and 
aspirant commercial) narrative film contexts. There, it betrays the presence of 
nefarious fantasies programmed into the technology as it has been developed and 
designed for use in the film industry, and there, at the same time, it connotes a 
particular phase in the struggle over the management and control of the dead-
labour savings account stored in the form of technology.166 
 
Based on a diversity of conceptualisation of digital virtuality, let me move to the next 
argument of some sub-categories to define the digital virtuality in more details. Here I 
would investigate the three sub-categories in relation to the concept of digital virtuality: 
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Multimedia, virtual reality, and cyberspace. As James Monaco states,167 these sub-
categories give a useful classification to extrapolate the concept of digital virtuality. This 
is because these sub-categories could properly reveal the development of contemporary 
digital technology and the aesthetic implication of digital virtuality. 
 
First, in terms of multimedia, digital virtuality accompanies the dynamic process of the 
convergence and divergence of broad ranges of media. As Henry Jenkins precisely 
indicates, the development of digital technology results in the tendency of ‘convergence’ 
and ‘transmedia’.168 Computer networks and cyberspace converge with all kinds of data 
and information, and diverges from different forms of media. Texts, sounds, and visuals 
are transcoded and exchanged into united digital formats by the binary number system 
and computation. These digital formats then remake new creations of synthesis and 
transformation by computer simulation.  
 
The digital cinema evolves into the multimedia integration of various texts, signs, sounds, 
live-action images and graphic animations. Monaco states that because artists have been 
combining text, images, and sounds since the invention of movies, Edison was the first 
multimedia artist, and film is the first multi-medium.169 Digitalizing images and sounds 
intensifies multimedia in a new way. In the age of multimedia, digital cinema has the 
shape of digital contents. It is a numerical and computational fusion and manipulation of 
a diversity of image formats. The convergence and divergence of media stem from the 
ontological characteristics of digital images. Synthesis and transformation is necessary to 
the ontology of digital images. In digital virtuality, the possibility of mixing and 
assembly is extended. By virtue of a simple and easy transformation, the digital image 
opens a new phase of the virtual image, in which reproduction and manipulation can be 
infinitely possible in the synthesis of images.  
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Antony Bryant points out the difference between mechanical ‘reproduction’ and digital 
‘production’.170 He distinguishes digital images from Benjamin’s concept of mechanical 
reproduction. In his view, digital imaging does not consist of reproducibility. Instead 
Bryant asks wherein the ‘re’ lies? In Benjamin’s concept of reproducibility, film images 
are numerical copies of the original; however, digital images do not have an original. 
Digital imaging fundamentally denies the separation between an original and its copies. 
Therefore, he claims that digital images are not reproductions, but productions. It means 
that the same digital formats between original and copy inspire the convergence of 
images and media. 
 
In addition, I would add that the ontology of digital images consists of synthesis and 
transformation. Although it is clear that digital images retain physical reality and 
indexical traces as Philip Rosen wisely observes,171 they move towards a new aesthetics 
of complexity and hybridity, based on synthetic images. Even though analogue and 
digital images similarly appear to the eye of the spectator, according to the principle of 
‘perceptual realism’172, they proceed to different ontologies in the history of the virtual 
image. Digital virtuality goes beyond the photographic representation of film images.173 
Photographic film is transcoded into compact memories, analogue TV changes digital 
TV, and DVD supplants videotape. Shifts in hardware entail changes in software and 
content. The production and consumption of the image then becomes possible only with 
the compatibility of computers and digital technology. In the contemporary era, computer 
and digital technology have become meta-media, ruling all mediums, such as writing, 
painting, photography, radio, TV, video, the internet, the mobile phone, and even cinema. 
It is impossible to maintain our daily lives and image associations without depending on 
computer technology. Created as a calculator, the computer has changed the virtual image 
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into whatever can be calculated and manipulated. The audio-visual image has been 
transformed into data and information. Digital virtuality is nothing more than a 
programming consciousness that dominates the thoughts and minds of humans. Thus, the 
computer has become the god of images, manipulating human memory and spirit. 
 
In terms of digital contents, digital cinema has become both art and information. In other 
words, the digital cinema intensifies the immaterial and virtual characteristic of 
information. It is able to restore itself and reproduce virtually, regardless of the material 
traits of the medium. Movies that assume the shapes of a DVD, Laserdisc, and digital file 
have become multimedia content that enters the intimate realm of personal computers, 
home theatres, and mobile networks, beyond the public threshold of theatres.  
 
In this regard, Monaco stresses that the major advantages of digitization’s instant access 
to information and its comprehensive indexation have more to do with the rise of 
networks and their databases than with the combination of media.174 Moreover, Lev 
Manovich claims that digital cinema is a ‘network cinema’, or a ‘database cinema.’175 For 
him, digital network and database create a new methodology of film production, 
screening, and distribution, which causes the convergence and divergence of a diversity 
of image formats. Digital cinema has immaterial virtuality in the form of information and 
interfaces with different media expressed by numerical formats of the digital. It is mixed 
with a variety of media, such as TV, cable, the computer, Internet, and the mobile phone. 
The virtual image of digital cinema goes beyond the threshold of theatre. 
 
Second, regarding virtual reality (VR), the term has been given various definitions. In 
common usage, what is real is real, what is virtual is not real. It is both an oxymoron and 
a contranym. Much confusion has resulted from the contradictions of the term. However, 
the exact meaning and usage of the term is discussed earlier in this thesis. In particular, 
Deleuze defines the concept of the virtual as an extension of physical reality. It is not 
actual, but real and expresses the creative potentiality of the real in movement and time. 
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Deleuze demonstrates the reality of the virtual in light of the concept of immanent plane 
and actualization. For him, the virtual reality connotes the inextricable and exchangeable 
imbrication and interfaciality of the actual and the virtual, the matter and the image, and 
the object and the subject. It is ‘a line of flight’, ‘the deterritorialisation of line of the 
earth’, and ‘the movement of flight’ in the plane of immanence.176  
 
“The plane of immanence includes both the virtual and its actualization 
simultaneously, without there being any assignable limit between the two. The 
actual is the complement or the product, the object of actualization, which has 
nothing but the virtual as its subject. Actualization belongs to the virtual. The 
actualization of the virtual is singularity whereas the actual itself is individuality 
constituted. The actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst the actualization 
relates it back to the plane as if to that which turns the object back into a subject.” 
177 
 
Concerning the definition of the virtual reality in the digital age, Michael Heim combines 
the dictionary meanings of virtual and reality: ‘Virtual Reality is an event or entity that is 
real in effect but not in fact.’ 178 He reinterprets the dictionary meaning from the 
perspective of digital virtuality. For him, VR is any simulation that makes something 
seem real that is in fact not real. Virtuality games combine a head-tracking device, 
gloves, and computer animation to create the effect that entities are moving towards the 
player, which are in fact not real. In addition to the dictionary meaning of the term VR, 
Michael Heim asserts that the concept of VR includes the seven traits of computer 
technology and digital culture; simulation, interaction, artificiality, immersion, 
telepresence, full-body immersion and network communications.179  
According to Ken Hills, VR is a hybrid concept that includes the dimensions of 
technologies and individual experiences. He states that in theorizing VR, it is productive 
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to distinguish between technical and social components. He suggests the concept of 
virtual environments (VE) in contrast to virtual 3-D technology. For him, VEs are a 
special form of interactive and immersive communication because of the social 
relationships fostered by digital technology. Using the concept of virtual environments, 
he tries to theorise the experience of users as aspects of social communication. 180 
Similarly, Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener claim that VR can be better understood 
as the concept of ‘a total environment’.181 They point out that VR is different from 
traditional definitions of cinematic realism. For them, ‘reality’ in VR does not mean 
index, trace, and reference. It concerns not correspondence theory but coherence theory. 
They explain the concept of VR in connection with the user’s bodily and sensory 
experience. VR is associated with emphasis on the immersive, tactile, and haptic 
properties. It is the body-based aspect of the experience. Bodily sensations are distinct 
from pictorial illusionism. What we see is not something that is real, but we enter the 
‘reality’ of VR in fascinated self-oblivion and submerged self-presence. For these 
reasons, Elsaesser and Hagener argue that VR is distinguished from the concept of 
imaginary reality (IR). Whereas IR is based on concepts of fiction, narrative, and 
representation, VR relies on the technology of simulation, the spectator’s presence, 
immersion and interactions. In the total environment of VR, the bodies and senses of the 
players and operators experience a coherent, diegetic world. 
In Oliver Grau’s definition, VR is a ‘mixed reality’.182 He states that old media are not 
obsolete, but newly defined, categorized, and interpreted. For him, virtual art exceeds by 
far a purely mimetic view. He says that VR introduces a new realism in which the 
immersive environment of virtual reality integrates the image and observer. For him, VR 
combines the panoramic view and sensorimotor explorational images in living 
environments. In the telepresence experience, images change in a multisensory 
interactive space. He claims that the new concept of immersion facilitated by a head-
mounted display and simulation technology combines with the interaction and interface 
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between human sense and the image world. Thus, VR provides a new concept of mixed 
reality in a world of artificial images. 
In contrast to many digital theorists that emphasize the difference, discontinuity and 
novelty between digital virtuality and traditional representation, Philip Rosen pays 
attention to their historical continuity and hybridity. He claims the concept of ‘digital 
mimicry’ or ‘digital indexicality’, which means that the digital image has indexical traces 
of physical reality. 183  For him, digital cinema is the imbrication of indexical 
representation and digital simulation. He suggests three reasons for digital indexicality. 
First, the digital camera is also a lens base that collects light, which leaves indexical 
traces of physical reality. Second, the sources of the numerical manipulation of the digital 
image are based on indexical images. Third, since the 1990s, digital images have 
increasingly focused on the imitation of photographic forms with the help of digital 
technology. He stresses the continuity of the digital image with photographic reality. For 
him, digital manipulation is not a matter of kind and quality but of the degree of a 
quantity, an increase, and an easiness because both painting and film can manipulate 
objects. In terms of the historical continuity of cinema, he emphasizes that the hybridity 
of the digital and indexicality is at the heart of the definition of the digital. In this context, 
Rosen demonstrates that theoretically, digital virtuality remains within traditional 
concepts of reality and representation: 
 
Virtuality and simulation presuppose a basic minimum of representational 
credibility, simply because the digital subject must recognize that he or she is 
entering a (virtual) world and must identify objects in that world in order to 
interact with them. In that case, such interactivity assumes the depictive imaging 
codes that Darley argues displaced the dominant alliance with a nonfigurative, 
modernist abstraction of early computer graphics. Digital mimicry will often be 
important here….184 
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Rosen explains the immersive and interactive characteristics of digital virtuality. For him, 
VR is not the collapse of the oppositions of inside and outside, but is a new form of 
representation in virtual environments. The creation of special illusions in VR means 
nothing more than the pursuit of the ‘more real’.185 Digital virtuality is a particular kind of 
reality modeling afforded by the digital image. Interactivity makes virtuality credible, but 
its fantasy is increased in the indexical model. In this sense, the definition of interactivity 
is the real manipulation of both unreal and virtual objects. The subject knows that his or 
her actions towards objects are real, not a fantasy. The real action of the subject creates 
fantasies and virtual feelings.  
 
Moreover, Rosen emphasizes the simultaneous and reciprocal effect of the subject and 
object. The immersion and interactivity of digital virtuality exists in relation to a 
powerful impression of reality and its effects. In VR, the subjects are divided, not unified. 
For Rosen, digital virtuality is the world of hybridity that exists in the persistent indexical 
traces of physical reality and the virtual immersion of subjective interactivity. 
Consequently, he claims that cinema is not the opposite of the digital, but a historical, 
hybrid entity merging of the old and new, the filmic image and digital virtuality. 186 
 
Lastly, I examine the concept of digital virtuality in terms of the cyberspace. The term 
‘cyberspace’ is derived from William Gibson’s short story Burning Chrome (1982) and a 
science fiction novel Neuromancer (1984): “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination 
experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being 
taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the 
banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light 
ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, 
receding.”187 Gibson has a grasp of the meaning of cyberspace in terms of the relationship 
between a graphic representation of computer data and a consensual hallucination of 
users. Although Gibson later commented in the independent documentary No Maps for 
These Territories that the term cyberspace seemed like ‘an effective buzzword’ rather 
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than having a ‘real semantic meaning’, the term properly presents the new characteristics 
of computer networks and user’s experience caused by digital technology. The term 
cyberspace coined by the author’s literary imagination and intuition is becoming 
increasingly popular through the boom of Internet and telecommunication in the 1990s. 
 
Etymologically, the term cyberspace means the virtual space of numerical data and 
abstracted information rather than the space of material objects and physical reality. 
Marcos Novak indicates the conceptual characteristics of cyberspace in terms of the 
development of computer networks and human communication:  
 
Cyberspace is a completely spacialized visualization of all information processing 
systems, along pathworks provided by present and future communications 
networks, enabling full copresence and interaction of multiple users, allowing 
input and output from and to the full human sensorium, permitting simulations of 
real and virtual realities, remote data collection and control through telepresence, 
and total integration and intercommunication with a full range of intelligent 
products and environments in real space.188  
 
For Novak, cyberspace involves a reversal of the current mode of interaction with 
computerized information. In the similar way that Debray describes the characteristics of 
videosphere in terms of the inner domination of the image space,189 Novak demonstrates 
that cyberspace subverts the relationship between external and within the information. 
Whereas the information, so far, was external to us in physical reality, cyberspace let us 
enter into the space of information. In the new space of information, subjects should be 
connected with bits, data, and system. In this sense, cyberspace is reliant on the 
interactive communication between users and computer system, physical reality and 
informational image, and objects and subjects. The interactive communication and 
interface within cyberspace is a necessary premise to create the immersive experience of 
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subjects. Cyberspace creates the subjective effect of immersion based on interactive 
connection with the world of virtual data and information. 
 
In this sense, the term cyberspace used to mingle with VR. Both of them indicate in 
common the virtual characteristics of digital technology. They are related to the ontology 
and epistemology of digital virtuality. However, it is reasonable to distinguish the 
conceptual kernel of cyberspace from the category of VR. This is because the concept of 
cyberspace has more to do with the concept of digital networks. In the context, Monaco 
describes the history of VR in view of verisimilitude and interactivity, and the 
chronology of cyberspace in light of the development of on-line database and Internet.190 
Whilst the concept of VR is focused on the reality effect of simulation and immersion by 
digital apparatuses like computer games, head-mounted displays (HMD), and 3D movies, 
the concept of cyberspace is more closely associated with the interactive way of human 
communication and image representation caused by Internet and mobile networking.  
 
Historically, the development of computing hardware and software combines with the 
new ways of human communication by computer networks since the 1960s.191 In 1969, 
the emergence of ARPAnet opens the new age of computer and mobile networks. The 
Ethernet Computer Networking develops in 1973. The concept of the connection and 
communication of ubiquitous computers develops the concept of World Wide Web by 
Internet companies like AOL, Nescape, and Lycos in the 1990s. In the 2000s, a wide 
range of computer networks were connected by TCP/IP, and a large number of Internet 
websites such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube has evolved a new way of 
human communication based on an information superhighway.192 Moreover, as Manuel 
Castells properly indicates by the expanded concept of ‘mobile network society’, the 
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Internet is connected to the development of mobile communication.193 Since Motorola 
invented the first mobile phone in 1973, the hardware and softeware of mobile 
communication has consistently developed.194 The world's first commercial automated 
cellular network was launched in Japan by NTT in 1979. In 1991, the second generation 
(2G) cellular technology was launched in Finland by Radiolinja on the GSM standard. 
NTT DoCoMo launched the third generation (3G) on the WCDMA standard in Japan in 
2001. In 2007, Apple’s I-phone based on the touch screen combines mobile 
communication and Internet services.195 As we can definitely see in brief history of 
cyberspace, the main axes leading invisible and intangible space of digital virtuality are 
computer data, Internet, and mobile communication. All types of computer data like 
Texts, sounds, visual images are mixed with Internet and mobile communication. In these 
days, computer networks are becoming more and more combined with the technology of 
mobile communications.  
 
The territory of cyberspace expands to the concept of telepresence. An American 
cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky coined the term telepresence in 1980.196 He studies the 
technological combination between intelligent robotics and telepresence. He develops 
remote controlling technology giving an actual feeling at a different location by making 
the first mechanical hands with tactile sensors, visual scanners, and their software and 
computer interfaces. Since David Allen and Harold Williams successfully introduce the 
concept of remote business meeting in 1993,197 the technology of telepresence is utilized 
in a wide range of industries and arts like remote conference, 3D traveling, distant 
education, surgery hospitals, dangerous works, pipeline inspection, and video installation 
art. Google glass project, which is demonstrated in February 2013, is also one attempt to 
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combine the technology of head-mounted display and the concept of telepresence.198 
Telepresence combines remote location and live-action. Users can feel the reality of 
distant location in a real time. It raises the concept of ‘augmented reality’199 in the 
imbrication of human and computing, reality and virtuality, and immersion and 
participation. 
 
As Bolter indicates that contemporary computer technology develops the concept of 
hybrid and mixed reality with pure virtuality,200 telepresence presents a new type of 
reality. The reality of telepresence is different from traditional reality in film. While film 
images offer illusionary reality on separated points of view with spectators, the 
cyberspace of telepresence provides users with correspondent point of views. Users can 
sense the physical reality, following their body’s motions and directions in real-time and 
live-action. This is called the concept of augmented reality, which is different from VR. 
VR is focused on immersive reality within virtual environments, augmented reality 
creates the reality in the mixture of physical location with virtual environments. 
Cyberspace is connected to the telepresence based on the concept of augmented reality. 
Telepresence creates the concept of new reality through the condensation and 
exchangeability of multiple space and time. Cyberspace of telepresence reduces the 
physical distance, and crystalises the concept of time. It creates the new concept of the 
virtual reality based on real-time telecommunication with remote location.  
 
According to Yongblood, the power of digital virtuality exists in invisible images and 
uncontrolled conversations on cyberspace and the Internet.201 He pays attention to the 
positive potentials of digital virtuality as the concept of telepresence. For Youngblood, 
telepresence on the Internet is a utopian dream to constitute humankind’s ultimate reality, 
and a public sphere to achieve global democracy. 202 It is the virtual image of collective 
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forces that transcend space and implode time. He discovers the power of digital virtuality 
through the telepresence on computer networks and Internet, which constitutes a global 
multimedia conversation. He argues that telepresence separates time, creates spectacular 
images of assembly in space, and interacts with a common database. For him, the reality 
of digital virtuality means the active interaction and participation of spectators into the 
time and space of global multimedia teleconference. 203  Youngblood advocates an 
effective counterculture of the potential reality in the contemporary conditions of digital 
virtuality. Cyberspace and telepresence is the expansion of human communication and 
image world based on the concept of synesthetic time and space. For him, digital 
virtuality is a matter of digital ethics to achieve the new reality of computer simulation 
and cyberspace.   
 
To sum up, I have defined the concept of virtuality in terms of the hybrid combination 
between the actual and the virtual, the reality and the image, and physical indexicality 
and imaginary fantasy. In particular, although techno-aesthetics has a latent risk of 
technological fetishism and commercialization, I propose that the concept of digital 
virtuality provides image art with the creative potential of new reality and artforms. 
Deleuzian concept of digital virtuality accentuates the physical reality of the virtual and 
the process of endless becoming in the contemporary phenomenon of media convergence, 
virtual reality, and cyberspace. It is a matter of subjective and practical assemblage and 
aesthetic configuration. In this context, I will move on the next chapter as regards the 
cinematic aesthetics of digital virtualism. 
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2. The Aesthetics of Digital Virtualism 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of virtuality is derived from the 
imbrication of the actual and the potential, and the art of film presents the technological 
and aesthetic virtuality residing in physical indexicality and imaginary illusion. In this 
context, I defined digital virtuality as the new phase of the virtual image, subsuming a 
new reality in the age of computer-simulated images. I suggested that the main concepts 
of digital virtuality are explored by three categories of multimedia, virtual reality, and 
cyberspace. 
 
Based on the concept and historicity of virtuality, as defined in the previous chapter, this 
chapter explores the cinematic aesthetics of digital virtualism. While the term ‘virtuality’ 
indicates the objective aspects of digital phenomena, the term ‘virtualism’ suggests the 
subjective aspects of digital arts, which is the same as the relation of realism and reality. 
Whereas the term reality implies the ontological objectivity of the film image, the 
aesthetics of realism comprises historical and aesthetical movement by subjects. Hence, 
this dissertation uses the term digital virtualism to signify cinematic movements and 
subjective activities in response to the objective phenomena of digitalisation in the 
cinematic world. The arts not only passively reflect and represent objective phenomena 
and contemporary tendencies, but also actively express and interfere with their 
developmental direction. In this chapter, aesthetic tendency and movement are tested 
using a theoretical hypothesis and a practical trial. Therefore, the aesthetics of digital 
virtualism is an attempt to achieve a subjective intervention and perform practical activity 
in the objective flow of digital virtuality. 
 
Digital virtualism is an aesthetic response to new technology in the digital age. It is the 
aesthetics of hybridity, synthesis, materiality, and information. First, in terms of film 
history and theory, digital virtualism is a contradictory, hybrid combination of realism, 
modernism, and postmodernism. I assert that digital virtualism is associated with the 
aesthetic complexity of a wide range of film theories. Second, in terms of the evolution of 
film technology, digital virtualism is the aesthetics of computer simulation and synthesis. 
I examine the concept of reproduction and manipulation in the digital age, as well as the 
difference between filmic montage and digital collage. Third, in terms of the ontology of 
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the cinematic image, digital virtualism is the aesthetics of material images. It means that 
digital aesthetics contributes to the technological attraction and the visual spectacle of 
cinema. I demonstrate that the bodily sensations of digital cinema present a new mode of 
perception and simultaneously describe the traps of technological determinism and 
commercial fetishism. Finally, digital virtualism is the aesthetics of information in terms 
of the complex conflation of a wide range of media ad arts. It is related to the 
immateriality and virtuality of computer-simulated images. The informational nature of 
digital cinema proceeds to the convergence and divergence of different images and 
media. The age of transmedia gives rise to the complex transformation of the cinematic 
art. This chapter is dedicated to the new conceptualisation of cinema as the aesthetics of 
digital virtualism. 
 
 
2-1. The Aesthetics of Hybridity 
 
In this section, I theorise digital virtualism in terms of the hybridity of ‘old’ theories of 
film and the ‘new’ reality of digital cinema. The definition is historical and aesthetical. 
With regard to historical hybridity, digital virtualism has inherited a diversity of film 
theories, such as realism, modernism, and postmodernism. According to Rodowick, 
‘while film disappears, cinema persists’.204 Accordingly, I will place the aesthetics of 
digital virtualism in the context of the historical continuity of cinematic movements and 
theories. I also investigate the discontinuity of digital virtualism compared with ‘old’ film 
theories. In view of aesthetical hybridity, digital virtualism presents the contradictory 
combination of humans and computers, technology and aesthetics, and reality and image. 
It explores the complex linkage between physical reality and virtual image. In short, in 
this section I explore the historical and aesthetical hybridity of film theories and the 
digital phenomenon. 
 
First, this thesis argues that digital virtualism is underpinned by the diversity of film 
theories in the context of film history. The cinematic ontology of digital virtualism 
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derives from the history and aesthetics of film, particularly in relation to the film theories 
of realism, modernism and postmodernism. It requires aesthetical integration and the 
combination of the actual and virtual in the monism of simulacra. In the age of digital 
cinema, ‘the crisis of representation’ is irresolvable in the frame of traditional realism. 
However, it is also difficult to discover an alternative within the frame of (post)-
modernist aesthetics. Thus, a productive theory of digital cinema should be established by 
breaking the contradictory frameworks of both physical indexicality and cinematic 
illusionism. This thesis takes note of both the continuity and discontinuity of film 
theories, such as realism, modernism, and postmodernism, in terms of digital aesthetics. 
There is a need for a new concept that goes beyond the conceptual duality and limits of 
previous film history and theories. The new concept also attempts to develop the 
conceptual advantages and disadvantages of antecedent film theories. From the realist 
accentuation of the priority of reality in cinematic image making, it borrows the concept 
of the creative configuration of physical reality. Instead of the radical denial of cinematic 
indexicality, digital virtualism conceptualises the extension of physical reality in a new 
and different context. In this sense, the aesthetics of digital virtualism tries to develop the 
ontological significance of realism.  
 
At the same time, digital virtualism also goes beyond the indexicality of film. It takes on 
the positive aspects of modernist aesthetics, which accentuate the imaginary and 
psychological effects of cinematic images. In particular, I assert that the imaginary nature 
of film is not in opposition to physical reality. The illusion and fantasy of cinema coexists 
with physical reality in the contradictory ontology of digital virtualism. While Bazin 
stresses the continuity and transparency of the image with physical reality, the aesthetics 
of political modernist theorists, including Peter Wollen, Christian Metz, and Stephen 
Heath, emphasises the ideological and subjective reconfiguration of the film image. I 
extrapolate the aesthetics of digital virtualism from the hybrid conflation of realism and 
modernism.  
 
In addition, I point out the aesthetical ambivalence of postmodernism, which focuses on 
the superiority of simulacra to the real world. On one hand, postmodern aesthetics denies 
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the affirmative force of the cinematic image, which produces a new reality. On the other 
hand, it allows the composite aesthetics of the image to surmount the limitations of 
physical actuality. Postmodern aesthetics raises the issue of the spectacle and sensation of 
cinematic images. The aesthetics of digital virtualism simultaneously sublimates the 
ambivalence of postmodernism between the surrender to fetishist images and the utopian 
dream of the image world. 
 
With regard to aesthetic hybridity, digital virtualism denies the dichotomy between the 
real world and simulacra, indexicality and illusion, and the actual and the virtual. In the 
light of scientific relativity, the real world derives from simulacra in the molecular and 
microscopic dimension. While reality is imaginary, the image is a possibility of reality. 
Similarly, when actuality fades away in changing reality, virtuality emerges to achieve a 
potential actuality. Hence, based on the aesthetics of Deleuzian virtuality, the new theory 
of digital cinema transcends the dualism of reality and simulacra. It is reliant on the 
monism of simulacra beyond the contradiction of the real world and the imagination. In 
the conceptual extension of Deleuzian virtuality, the crystal image and the time-image 
question the source and the addressee of the digital information image in the age of 
global capitalism and neoliberalism. The world of digital cinema is the immanent plane 
of simulacra on which the informational image mixes with reality, and virtuality 
converges with actuality towards cinematic practice and participation.  
 
Therefore, the ontology of digital virtualism is the hybrid and complex aesthetics in the 
monism of simulacra. It is connected to the composite aesthetics of the cinematic image 
in the intersection and resonance of reality and hyperreality, the complex fusion of the 
actual and the imaginary, and the subverting practice of the cinematic image against the 
dichotomy of the original and the copy, that is, realism and postmodernism. Digital 
virtualism maximizes the imagination and the illusionism of cinema. It is necessary to 
reconstitute and reorganize the aesthetics of virtual imagism both subjectively and 
practically so that the new aesthetics of digital virtualism is reborn in the tradition of a 
variety of film aesthetics. It is the aesthetics of hybridity and complexity bridging 
physical reality and imaginary illusion. Digital virtualism pursues the ‘virtual 
 81 
conjunction’205 of a diversity of cinematic images on the immanent plane of simulacra. 
Thus, digital virtualism is the cinematic aesthetics of composition and synthesis. 
 
Philip Rosen accentuates the historical hybridity of digital images in the continuity of 
film history.206 According to Rosen, hybridity is a core concept of digital images because 
the latter still represent the indexical traces of physical reality. The novelty of digital 
cinema combines with the ‘obsolete’ aesthetics of the film medium. Therefore, he argues 
that digital cinema is not a pure utopian dream but an impure historical hybridity of the 
old and the new: 
 
In that case, the historiography of old and new, which is so often at the heart of 
conceptions of the digital, threatens to dissolve into a complex, “impure” 
historicity and a complex, “impure” historiographic temporality. The digital 
would have to be referred to a radical historicity without stable points of source 
and end, old and new. Historical sequencing would have to become provisional, 
and the categories enabling such sequencing would themselves have to be 
temporalized (historicized), de-idealized, returned to the complexity that 
characterizes the concrete rather than the conceptual, the nondigital as much as 
the digital. My point here is not that ideals should never be articulated or 
presented as purities, or that it is possible to completely avoid sequenciation; 
however, that said, one would have to seek the digital in the contradictory 
junctures of idealized purities and impure hybridities.207 
 
In this context, he opposes the strategy of the forecast, in which digital cinema is 
considered both a pure ideal and a prophetic transition. He disavows the historiography of 
conquest in the movement towards the digital utopia. Digital cinema is ‘the contradictory 
junctures’ of idealized purities and impure hybridity. Consequently, he asserts that digital 
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aesthetics should be regarded as both historical hybridity and temporal complexity 
instead of the rhetoric of prophecy and the aesthetics of conquest in film history. 
 
While Rosen pays attention to the aspects of the historical continuity of digital images 
with filmic indexicality, Frank Popper highlights the hybrid combination of technology 
and aesthetics in the age of digital arts. According to Popper, digital virtualism is ‘techno-
aesthetic’.208 He defines the aesthetics of virtualism in terms of the communicable 
hybridity of humans and computers and technology and aesthetics. The humanization of 
technology is through the artistic imagination. For Popper, the techno-aesthetic of digital 
virtualism is neo-communicability and new possibilities that take place in the passage 
from technological art to virtual art. Although it is clear that film art essentially depends 
on the nature of ‘techno-aesthetic’, computer technology expands the technological 
virtuality of film art to the level of digital hybridity and interactivity. Popper argues that 
the digital virtualism is associated with the combination of technological and aesthetical 
changes from the 1980s to the present: 
 
Technically speaking, virtual art, to my mind, includes elements from all the arts 
made with the technical media developed at the end of the 1980s (or a bit before, 
in some cases). One of its aspects, at the time, was that interfaces through which 
exchanges passed between human and computer - for example: visualization 
casks, stereoscopic spectacles and screens, generators of three-dimensional sound, 
data gloves, data clothes, position sensors, tactile and power feed-back systems, 
etc. - allowed us to immerse ourselves completely into the image and interact with 
it… Aesthetically speaking, virtual art, as I see it, is the artistic interpretation of 
the contemporary issues mentioned previously, not only with the aid of the above 
technological developments but through their integration with them. Such an 
integration - or combination - allows for an aesthetic-technological logic of 
creation which forms the essential part of the specificity of the virtual art works I 
am describing in this book and which differ from other art works in the sense that 
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the latter lack this logic of creation based on the combination of current technical 
and aesthetic issues.209 
 
In his definition of virtual arts, Popper combines the technological with the aesthetic 
concept of virtualism. He claims that ‘what is new in virtualism is precisely its virtuality, 
its potentiality and above all its openness’. In particular, he stresses the openness of the 
virtual arts because ‘this openness implies a certain amount of liberty and freedom for 
action and creation but not at all to radically destroy what happened before’. Popper 
argues that the innovation and dynamism of virtualism stems from its aesthetic openness, 
which exists in technological creativity and artistic interactivity. According to his 
definition of virtualism, virtual arts develop the concept of reality through the hybridity 
of technology and aesthetics. He demonstrates that the impression of reality in virtualism 
is provided by not only vision and hearing but also the other bodily senses. This multiple 
sensing is empirical, participatory, and virtual. Therefore, virtualism subsumes not only 
reality itself but also the simulation of reality. In the age of digital arts, reality is multiple 
instead of singular. Mark Poster said that reality is multiple and multisensory in the 
environment of multimedia and postmodern virtuality.210 In the same manner, Popper 
demonstrates that the aesthetics of virtualism develops the new form of reality in the 
hybrid combination of digital technology and aesthetics. 
 
Many theorists argue the hybrid relationship between technology and art and humans and 
machines in the era of cybernetics. In her memorable essay, ‘A Cyborg Manifest,’ Donna 
Haraway suggests a new gender politics in the posthuman age: 
 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, 
pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic 
wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher 
unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense - a 'final' 
irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' escalating 
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dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all 
dependency, a man in space.211 
 
According to Haraway, cyborg is a strong metaphor that goes beyond naturalism and the 
essentialism of traditional gender politics. In this sense, Haraway criticizes traditional 
feminism, which is based on the gender identity of male and female. She argues that 
feminism should move to the territory of affinity and the postmodern cyborg beyond the 
limits and boundaries of gender identity. The concept of cyborg is a useful strategy to 
overcome the dichotomy between humans and machines, humans and animals, and man 
and woman. In the posthuman age, the hybridity between human and machine creates a 
new form of paradigm and subjectivity from representation to simulation, from bourgeois 
novel to science fiction, from modernism to postmodern techno-science. 
 
While Haraway redefines feminist theory in the posthuman age through the concept of 
hybrid cyborg, William Brown attempts to establish the concept of posthumanist cinema 
in the digital era. He appropriates the title of Dziga Vertov’s famous film, Man With a 
Movie Camera (1929). His expressions of digital cinema, man without a movie camera 
and movies without men, are interesting and witty.212 These expressions imply that digital 
cinema can be made without camera devices and human actors. In this sense, digital 
cinema challenges the concept of traditional film, which requires embodied camera shots 
and human characters as necessary cinematic elements. Brown observes that digital 
technology helps to create a posthumanist cinema. Digital technology makes synthetic 
images that transcend human viewpoints and captured reality. Digital technology can 
transform and manipulate a variety of captured images with the help of computer 
graphics. In this sense, digital cinema is posthumanist cinema and goes beyond filmic 
humanity and reality.  
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However, Brown emphasises that posthumanist cinema does not mean the absolute 
separation of filmic reality and humanism. Instead, digital cinema is a hybrid 
combination of humans and computers, reality and hyperreality, and humanism and 
posthumanism: 
 
Posthumanism instead offers us this new perspective through a synthesis of the 
old and the new, in the same way that a cyborg is both human and machine (as 
opposed to either human or machine). Similarly, a posthumanist cinema is not a 
cinema created by a spectacular split or schism from old cinematic techniques-a 
point that I should take great care to emphasize (hence evoking Méliès, Phalke, 
Lye, McLaren, and the American avant-garde above). Rather, it is a cinema that 
involves old techniques in conjunction with new techniques; it is, as Manovich 
("Image Future") has pointed out, a hybrid cinema that combines the two, but 
which, by combining the two, draws out the inherent potential for posthumanist 
thinking that has long since been overshadowed by cinema's "humanist" norms.213 
 
In this context, Brown defines digital cinema as ‘Supercinema’.214 Digital cinema is a 
hybrid combination of digital technology and film aesthetics. For Brown, the meaning of 
supercinema is twofold. On one hand, supercinema goes beyond the technological 
limitations of traditional film to expand the cinematic ability to express the impossible 
with the help of computer technology. Supercinema is the superpower of cinematic 
expression. On the other hand, supercinema also resembles superman hiding his ability to 
expand technologically. While analogue cinema can be seen to resemble Batman, who 
tries to be a superhero but is all too human, digital cinema resembles Superman 
pretending to be human. In other words, while film as a human art form tries to hide its 
technical limitations, digital cinema as a new art form tries to hide its posthuman 
expansion behind the film aesthetics of humanism and reality. Therefore, as supercinema 
digital cinema is a hybrid of ‘old’ film aesthetics and ‘new’ technology, humans and 
computers, and reality and hyperreality. 
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Furthermore, Brown and Meetali Kutty suggest the concept of digital complexity to 
explain the hybrid nature of digital cinema.215 Digital complexity stems from the theory 
of digital chaos, in which data loss and corruption consistently take place. The chaos of 
digital images is inevitable because of the numerical and computational nature of digital 
data. Digital ‘datamoshing’ is a ceaseless process of data degradation and compression, 
instead of the infinite and stable process of reproduction. Brown and Kutty claim that the 
emergence of digital complexity from digital chaos provides artists with a diversity of 
opportunities and motivations to create new forms and works of arts: 
 
With regard to datamoshing, it seems that we are confronted with a visual 
expression again of a certain complexity theory. Digital images may undergo 
entropy when left alone (i.e. when in a closed system, as per the Toy Story files), 
but this does not mean that they are not susceptible to interventions – here, on the 
part of an artist. What the artist does is to reappropriate the ‘chaos’ of the 
corrupted/compressed file and to turn it into an artwork, or what we shall argue 
here is a new ‘order’. The same seems to happen visually in the films: from the 
digital soup and swirling colours changing in time, patterns seem spontaneously 
to emerge, such that a new aesthetic meaning occurs. In the same way that the 
process of order out of chaos seems in many respects to defy ‘common sense’ 
logic, which is predicated upon stability and an absence of change, so, too, do the 
datamoshes visualise a non-common sense ‘logic’ of changing subjectivity, 
swallowing up and emergence, or what in short we shall call, after Manovich 
(2001) and Deleuze and Guattari (1984) combined, colours becoming in time. 
What to some observers is an error or a thing of ugliness, precisely because it 
appears to be disordered, is to others a thing of beauty, a new type of ‘order’ that 
challenges and allows our conceptions of ‘beauty’ to evolve.216 
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According to Manovich, digital cinema is simply ‘colours changing in time’.217 In this 
definition, digital cinema mainly depends more on the computational flow of pixels and 
data than on captured real images of live-action. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest the new concept of subjectivity.218 In the schizophrenic reality of capitalism, we 
cannot have a single essence of reality with a fixed subjectivity because the reality and 
subjectivity of capitalism is multiple and schizophrenic. Hence, Deleuze and Guattari 
claim that new forms of reality and subjectivity are in a ceaseless process of becoming. 
This process of rhizomatic assemblage and complex multiplicity gives rise to endless 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.219 Brown and Kutty reappropriate Deleuze’s 
concept of becoming and the assemblage of beings to describe the concept of digital 
complexity. They demonstrate that digital aesthetics is a process of consistent becoming 
in open temporality and duration. Digital aesthetics depends on the glitch art and 
datamoshing of computer science. It is a creative interaction between and hybridity of 
humans and computers. Digital complexity is the coexistence and hybridity of different 
temporalities. It is a process of changing and becoming in the temporal fluidity of beings.  
 
In summary, digital cinema is the aesthetics of historical and aesthetical hybridity. It is a 
contradictory combination of ‘old’ film aesthetics and ‘new’ digital technology in which 
technology combines with aesthetics and computers mix with humans. Digital virtualism 
is techno-aesthetics. It is a complex fusion of humans and computers, physical reality and 
hyperreality, and realism and postmodernism. Digital virtualism presents the aesthetics of 
historical and ontological complexity in the posthuman age. 
 
 
2-2. The Aesthetics of Synthesis  
 
In this section, I assert that digital virtualism is a techno-aesthetics based on computer 
synthesis. I argue that digital synthesis is distinguished from the aesthetics of filmic 
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reproduction by different ways of image production and consumption. Mechanical 
reproduction represents the image of mass production in the age of industrial capitalism, 
whereas digital synthesis suggests a new form of image arts in the age of informational 
cybernetics. In this section, I also demonstrate that the aesthetics of digital virtualism, 
which is founded upon computer simulation and synthesis, changes the concept of 
montage in the aesthetics of traditional film. Although it is true that the concept of 
montage suggests the aesthetic importance of cinematic movement,220 computer synthesis 
creates the new concept of digital collage instead of the traditional concept of montage. 
Digital virtualism creates the new aesthetics of computer synthesis and digital collage in 
the complex and creative flow of digital data and pixels.  
 
Walter Benjamin uses the concept of ‘mechanical reproduction’ to advocate the artistic 
potential of film.221 The mechanical ability of film collapses the aura of traditional arts, 
such as painting, sculpture, and architecture. 222 While traditional arts depend on the 
human production of images by touch, film produces and reproduces mechanical images 
of reality. The mechanical reproducibility of film has caused a revolution in the history of 
technological reproduction. It has created a new meaning of tactile perception and mass 
art. 223 In this sense, Benjamin considers that filmic art is a kind of radical evolution in the 
history of art.  
 
However, it is both necessary and important to reinterpret and re-emphasize Benjamin’s 
concept of mechanical reproducibility in the age of digital cinema. This is because 
although Benjamin’s intuition of the innovative possibility of technological art still shines 
on the shoulder of the digital age, the contemporary environment of image arts has 
changed the aesthetics of film from mechanical reproduction to digital complexity. As I 
have already noted in the previous section, Brown indicates the fact that datamoshing and 
digital complexity has replaced the mechanical aesthetics of film. Based on computer 
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simulation and synthesis in the posthuman age, the mechanical reproducibility of the film 
image is gradually transformed by the concept of digital hybridity.  
 
W. J. T. Mitchell proposes the concept of ‘biocybernetic reproduction’ to replace 
mechanical reproduction. 224  He demonstrates the fundamental transformation in the 
nature of media and the arts from the reproduction of identical images to the production 
of ‘infinitely malleable and digitally animated’ images, which means the change from 
mechanical replication to biological and digital cloning. First, Mitchell attempts to 
designate the age of digital arts as ‘biocybernetics’.225 He considers that the other terms, 
‘digital’, ‘information’, and ‘cybernetic’ show only one side of the contemporary 
phenomenon. These terms do not effectively describe the complex and conflicted 
tendency of the present towards incalculability and uncontrollability. He argues that the 
age of information might be better called the age of mis-information and that the age of 
cybernetics is really the era of loss of control. That is to say, Mitchell tries to reveal the 
dialectical tension and contradiction of digital cultivation by using the prefix ‘bios’ 
because it implies incalculability and resistance against the rational possibility of 
technological and social control. In the concept of biocybernetics, he stresses the two-
way operation of the disintegration of the opposition of the technological and the organic. 
 
Moreover, Mitchell reinterprets the concept of ‘reproducibility’ in the age of 
biocybernetics. Based on the aesthetic issue of original and copy, he claims that in the 
biocybernetic era, the copy is no longer an inferior or decayed relic of the original, but is 
in principle ‘an improvement on the original’. Whilst in Benjamin’s formulation, the 
mechanical reproducibility of filmic art brings about the decay of the aura, that is to say, 
a loss of the unique presence, authority, and mystique of the original, Mitchell asserts that 
biocybernetic reproduction results in an improvement on the original: 
 
Biocybernetic reproduction carries this displacement of the original one further 
step, and in doing so, reverses the relation of the copy to the original. Now we 
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have to say that the copy has, if anything, even more aura than the original. More 
precisely, in a world where the very idea of the unique original seems a merely 
nominal or legal fiction, the copy has every chance of being an improvement or 
enhancement of whatever counts as the original. The digital reproduction of 
sounds and visual images, for instance, need not involve any erosion of vividness 
or lifelikeness, but can actually improve on its original material. Photographs of 
artworks can be “scrubbed” to re-move flaws and dust; in principle, the effects of 
aging in an oil painting could be digitally erased, and the work restored to its 
pristine originality in a reproduction. Of course this would still constitute a loss of 
the aura that Benjamin associated with the accretion of history and tradition 
around an object, but if aura means recovering the original vitality, literally, the 
“breath” of life of the original, then the digital copy can come closer to looking 
and sounding like the original than the original itself. Indeed the miraculous 
programming framework of Adobe Photoshop even preserves the “history” of 
transformations between original and copy so that any transformations can be 
reversed.226 
In contrast to Mitchell’s argument that in the age of biocybernetics, the copy has ‘more 
aura’ than the original, Brown demonstrates that digital reproduction has undergone an 
even greater loss of aura. 227  According to Brown, this has occurred because the 
compression of images causes the loss and degradation of computer data. Regardless, it is 
clear that in either case of Mitchell’s ‘more aura’ or Brown’s ‘less aura’, digital 
reproduction leads to the transformation of the relation of original and copy. However, I 
would say instead that the separation of original and copy is meaningless in terms of 
digital reproduction. Because of the complex fusion and manipulation of computer data 
and pixels, the claim of the separation of originals from copies is a kind of nonsense. 
Instead, a new paradigm is needed, one that is beyond the concept of mechanical 
reproduction based on the separation between the real model and its replica. Therefore, 
digital reproduction moves towards a new framework of computer simulation and 
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biocybernetic synthesis beyond the opposition of original and copy, model and clone, and 
physical reality and images. In the movie Matrix 2, the infinite clones of the agent Smith 
shows the uselessness of the distinction between original and copies. All smiths are a 
Smith, and vice versa. In the virtual world of computer matrix and digital hybridity, the 
concept of mechanical reproduction is transformed to the new form of computer 
simulation and digital synthesis.  
According to Lev Manovich, digital synthesis is a kind of computer work that assembles 
a number of elements to create a single seamless object.228 It is associated with the 
principle of computer operation. He explains that computer media are operated by two 
logics—selection and compositing—and that their relationship is interactive throughout 
the production process. In the interaction of selection and compositing, all elements retain 
their separate identity, and simultaneously can be modified, substituted, or deleted. 
Manovich claims that in this manner, the principle of computer synthesis is made 
possible by the modular organization of a new media object on different scales. Computer 
media have a new form of image synthesis made possible by the numerical and modular 
principle of image organization. The singularity and identity of separate elements of data 
and pixels persist and assemble in the process of computer operation. They are selected 
and composited by the automatic processing of computer hardware and software.  
 
According to Rodowick, the process of digital synthesis is the separation of inputs and 
outputs.229 Unlike analogue media where outputs maintain a materiality that is identical to 
inputs, digital images are transformed and manipulated at the level of digits and pixels. 
Borrowing Deleuze’s terminology, it is a perpetual process of ‘becoming’ and 
‘assemblage’, and a sequential process of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’ of 
‘singularity’ in the immanent plane of virtual reality. 230 In other words, computer 
synthesis, to appropriate Stanley Cavell’s term, achieves a new form of technological 
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‘automatism’.231 While film represents an automatic image of ‘the world viewed’, digital 
images present a new form of technological reproduction based on computational 
simulation and a modular system.  
 
In contrast, Philip Rosen claims that digital synthesis and manipulation are not much 
different from the manipulation of filmic images.232 He states that film has already 
persisted in a long history of the manipulation of images through blue matte, animation, 
and a variety of editing techniques. He also considers that digital cinema maintains 
indexical traces of physical reality despite computer synthesis. Hence, he indicates that 
the difference of digital cinema from filmic manipulation is a matter not of kind and 
nature, but of the degree and quantity of manipulation: 
 
Given the possibility of manipulability in the stipulated realm of the indexical, 
then, it is more precise to try to describe the newness of image manipulability in 
the digital as a matter of degree rather than kind. There is an increase, in the ease 
and hence the “quantity” of manipulability. But then we must ask, quantities of 
what? Time is as good as answer as any. Just as theories of the indexical image 
tend to presuppose the film developing process, theories of the digital presuppose 
the technological capacity for high-speed computation. If the flexibility of digital 
image formation and transformation does have limitations, these consist only in 
the speed with which numerical operations can be processed. And in that case, as 
they say, speed is of the essence.233   
 
Although Rosen considers that in the history of cinema, the difference between filmic and 
digital manipulation is not essential but secondary, it is clear that digital synthesis 
manipulates and configures images differently. It is inevitable that the change in 
‘quantities’ is associated with the transformation of ‘qualities’. The rapid increase of 
speed converts the nature of objects and matter to a new form when it reaches a critical 
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point. Hence, this thesis pays more attention to the fact that digital synthesis invokes the 
new concept of image transformation based on computational manipulation and modular 
reconfiguration. Digital synthesis goes beyond the concept of mechanical, photographic, 
indexical, and representational reproduction. 
 
Aylish Wood’s concept of pixel vision and micromanipulation is useful in the 
examination of the nature of digital synthesis.234 Wood defines the ability of digital 
technology in terms of image manipulation at the level of the pixel. Moreover, she 
demonstrates that digital synthesis is the expansion of creative and expressive potential in 
cinema production. According to Wood, digital technology makes possible the 
manipulation and transformation of separate and independent elements of the image at a 
micro-level. She terms the nature of digital transformation ‘genetic manipulation’, 
borrowing Barbara McClintock’s theory of the genetic transformation of movable DNA 
elements. 235  She argues that digital synthesis is a genetic and transformable 
reconfiguration that occurs in the shift from macro to microstructures. In particular, she 
attests her hypothesis of micromanipulation in the process of digital intermediate (DI) 
through her analysis of comic book adaptations, such as Hulk (Ang Lee, 2003), Batman 
Begins (Christopher Nolan, 2005), and Sin City (Robert Rodriguez, 2005). She uses the 
term ‘grouping and transformable’ elements in order to reveal their adaptation strategy by 
digital intermediate: 
My point here is not to make any judgments about the efficacy or fidelity of these 
adaptations but instead use the concept of adaptation to gain further purchase on 
textual manipulations. As I will show, grouped imagery in Batman Begins adheres 
to many of the expressive codes that already exist within cinema, at times 
extending their possibilities, while the ungrouped imagery of Sin City more 
explicitly reveals the extent to which elements of the image are increasingly open 
to transformation.236 
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In Wood’s analysis, the adaptation strategy of Batman Begins is the grouping of audio-
visual elements based on psychological realism. These are revealed by the unified 
strategy of Nolan’s psychological character and melodramatic mise-en-scene, such as set 
dressing, colour design, costume choice, lighting, and camera framing. Batman Begins 
creates a psychological milieu of digital images by the integrated grouping of 
transformational elements. By contrast, Wood explains that the expressive codes in Sin 
City are located in separate layers through the process of digital intermediate. A diversity 
of elements of imagery, such as the contrast of light and shadow, colour and grey scales, 
and black and white aesthetics are manipulated by the strategy of ‘ungrouped’ image 
elements. These are definitely intended to intensify of the expressive strategy of the 
digital elements. Hence, Wood exemplifies the expressive strategy of digital synthesis in 
the dimension of micro and genetic manipulation.  
Moreover, Wood delineates the connection between the nature of digital manipulation 
and the concept of affection. According to Brian Massumi, affection has no direct 
relationship between the qualification of the imagery and the intensity of response. 
Instead, he defines the concept of affection as follows: ‘the relationship between levels of 
intensity and qualification is not one of conformity or correspondence but rather of 
resonation or interference, amplification or dampening’.237  The aesthetics of digital 
affection (‘afx’) caused by pixel vision and micromanipulation suggests an opening of the 
gap between the image and referent. Digital afx is not directly representative, but is 
instead evocative of something that provokes unease. Thus, digital dressing and 
manipulation induce a resonant and interactive affection between image and referent. 
Wood explains that through the empirical analysis of Sin City and 300 (Zack Snyder, 
2007), digital dressing stirs up trouble in the relationship between the figure and location 
and character and action. The relationship between reality and image and imagery and 
response shifts from reflective and representative forms to open and resonant modes by 
the complexity and potentiality of separate and independent image elements at the level 
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of pixels. 238  Consequently, digital synthesis modifies the relationship between the 
intensity of the imagery and the qualification of the response to it. It thereby alters our 
interpretations of the contents of representation. The aesthetics of digital synthesis 
transforms the representative characteristics of filmic manipulation to the open, separate, 
expressive, and resonant traits of digital images. 
Furthermore, it is clear that digital synthesis changes the concept of montage in 
traditional film theories. While filmic montage is founded on mainly the temporal 
connection of different shots, digital synthesis depends on the spatial composition and 
configuration of pixels and image layers. Although they have the similar aim of creating 
cinematic fiction and manipulating virtual images, the working method of digital 
synthesis differs from the principle of filmic montage. Based on the collage of pixel 
images, the temporal continuity of filmic montage converts to the spatial montage of 
digital synthesis.  
Etymologically, the term montage was derived from the French monter, which translates 
as the English assemble.239 In general, montage signifies the linkage and editing of 
temporally consecutive shots. In Deleuzian terms, montage is a core technique of ‘the 
movement-image’ and is used to endow the dead time of the still image with movement 
and life.240 The basic unit of montage is the shot, and the connections among shots create 
the movement and fictional diegesis of film. In the history of film, montage has been a 
main technique of image representation and manipulation to create the world of filmic 
diegesis. Although the early cinema shows the simple attraction of filmic realism based 
on the fixed frame of 'one-shot, one-scene', the development of filmic aesthetics is closely 
associated with the evolution of editing techniques in which the temporal connection 
between shot and shot creates new meanings of filmic virtuality.  
Sergei Eisenstein suggested the theory of ‘conflict montage,’ 241  based on dialectic 
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materialism, in which the collision of shots arouses the emotional and intellectual 
awakening of audiences by image manipulation to create a filmic fiction. He formulated 
five methods of montage: metric, rhythmic, tonal, overtonal, and intellectual.242 While 
metric montage is the temporal collision between short and long shots, rhythmic montage 
is the visual continuity and contrast between still and moving images. Tonal montage is 
the collision between darkness and brightness and plane and cubic, while overtonal 
montage is a complicated and associated combination of metric, rhythmic, and tonal 
montage. Intellectual montage is the metaphoric and symbolic connection of colliding 
shots. Eisenstein suggested the aesthetics of dialectical montage in Soviet-revolution 
movies, such as Strike (1924), The Battleship Potemkin (1925), and October (1928). 
Eisenstein’s concept of dialectic montage focused on the collision of shots and the 
creation of the third meaning. The rhythm of editing is dynamic and explosive, by which 
audiences realize a new meaning of the film image that is caused by the conflict and 
collision of shots. While Hollywood montage of classical realism, concentrating on the 
concealment of filmic fiction through the seamless and continuous connection of shots, 
Soviet montage tried to provoke political awakening on the audience by the dynamic 
force of montage based on the collision of shots.  
 
It is important here to recall that in both the continuous and sutured montage of 
Hollywood cinema and Eisenstein’s experimental and expressive montage, the technique 
of montage is devoted to the creation of filmic fiction and imagination. In short, montage 
is a technique of manipulation to create the fictional time and space of filmic diegesis. In 
this sense, André Bazin opposes the aesthetics of montage. Instead of montage, he 
advocates deep focus and long-take although he does not ignore the importance of a 
variety of expressive techniques and styles.243 According to Bazin, montage attenuates the 
credibility and authenticity of physical reality by the fragmentation and manipulation of 
images. He considers that montage undermines the realism of filmic images. I will deal in 
more detail with the concept of montage in relation to cinematic movement and Bazin’s 
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realism. Here I concentrate on the difference between montage and digital synthesis. 
 
The development of digital technology leads to a significant transformation in the 
aesthetics of montage. Manovich claims that montage is no longer the dominant 
aesthetics, even though it has been central throughout the history of film from the avant-
garde of the 1920s to the postmodernism of the 1980s.244 He argues that the aesthetics of 
montage has been replaced by digital compositing, which creates a single seamless 
virtual image in cinematic space. While montage aims to create visual, stylistic, semantic, 
and emotional dissonance between different shots, digital compositing aims to mix and 
blend different elements of computer data into a seamless whole. This means that the 
fundamental unit of digital synthesis is the computational manipulation of pixel data. 
Manovich defines digital compositing as ‘the aesthetics of continuity’ by computer 
simulation. The aesthetics of continuity substitutes the aesthetics of discontinuity in 
filmic montage. Unlike Rosen’s opinion that the difference between digital and film is a 
matter of quantity, Manovich suggests that the aesthetics of digital compositing is an 
alternative to filmic montage, instead relying on the ‘discontinuous’ connection of shots 
because digital montage can eliminate the sutured traces of images at the level of pixels 
along the aesthetics of spatial continuity. Unlike the process of mechanical editing and 
the chemical production of special effects, digital synthesis seamlessly mixes the 
elements and erases the boundaries between spaces by the numerical manipulation of 
computer software and data operation. For instance, the morphing face of T-1000 in 
Terminator 2 shows the seamless continuity of computer synthesis in a single frame and 
shot by morphing techniques. In addition, 3D one-take and a continuous non-interrupted 
first-person narrative of computer games and VR are good examples of the seamless 
continuity of digital synthesis. In this context, Manovich demonstrates that ‘the spatial 
montage’ of digital composite has replaced ‘the temporal montage’ of film aesthetics.245 
While the aesthetics of film shows the connection of shots along a temporal continuity, 
digital synthesis presents the aesthetics of spatial montage by which a diversity of images 
is simultaneously assembled and juxtaposed within a single space and screen: 
                                                
244 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001, p.136. 
245 Ibid, p.270. 
 98 
 
As the narrative activates different parts of the screen, montage in time gives way 
to montage in space. Put differently, we can say that montage acquires a new 
spatial dimension. In addition to montage dimensions already explored by cinema 
(differences in images' content, composition, movement) we now have a new 
dimension: the position of the images in space in relation to each other. In 
addition, as images do not replace each other (as in cinema) but remain on the 
screen throughout the movie, each new image is juxtaposed not just with one 
image, which preceded it, but with all the other images present on the screen. The 
logic of replacement, characteristic of cinema, gives way to the logic of addition 
and co-existence. Time becomes spatialized, distributed over the surface of the 
screen. In spatial montage, nothing is potentially forgotten, nothing is erased. Just 
as we use computers to accumulate endless texts, messages, notes and data, and 
just as a person, going through life, accumulates more and more memories, with 
the past slowly acquiring more weight than the future, spatial montage can 
accumulate events and images as it progresses through its narrative. In contrast to 
cinema's screen, which primarily functioned as a record of perception, here 
computer screen functions as a record of memory.246 
 
Manovich’s logic of the ‘spatializing of time’ in digital composite resembles the 
aesthetics of Deleuze’s concept of the time-image, in which the present consistently 
mixes with the past and inextricably flows towards the future.247 Digital technology 
expands the virtuality of images in the hybridity of complex time, in which the past and 
present coexist and mix with each other. While filmic montage mainly depends on long-
term temporal connection and continuity because of the technological limitation of filmic 
manipulation, digital composite randomly and naturally assembles and reconfigures a 
variety of image sources and multi-dimensional temporality in a single space and screen. 
Deleuze states that the time-image is an indiscernible crystal image of the past and the 
present and the actual and the virtual. There is no doubt that all digital images are not 
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crystal images, because it absolutely depends on the aesthetic norms instead of 
technological criteria. Nevertheless, it is also clear that digital technology expands the 
aesthetic foundation of virtuality and crystal image, because it reinforces the ‘dynamic 
desynchronisation’ and ‘molecularised perception’ of virtual image and sound.248 The 
molecular particles of digital information images reciprocally multiply and intersect with 
one another in a spatial fusion of diverse temporalities and an indiscernible coexistence 
between actual and virtual images. Thus, the digital synthesis and collage based on pixels 
and algorithms expand and transform the aesthetics of filmic montage and temporality.  
 
Brown’s concept of ‘monstrous cinema’ is appropriate to explain the continuity aesthetics 
of digital synthesis.249 According to Brown, digital cinema is the cinema of showing 
‘whole’, which results in the ‘intensified continuity’250 of digital virtuality in cinematic 
time and space. In this concept, digital synthesis reduces and replaces filmic cutting and 
montage and expands the reality and continuity of cinematic time and space. Brown 
claims that digital cinema achieves a ‘monstrous’ continuity between human and 
monster, the actual and the virtual, visible and invisible, and live-action and animation. 
 
On the other hand, Aylish Wood points out the contradictory nature of digital time and 
space.251 She argues that digital synthesis is not only the aesthetics of seamless continuity 
and increased realism but also moves towards expression beyond the invisible coherence 
of different image elements. Digital simulation gives rise to the reciprocal interactivity of 
cinematic ‘timespace’ beyond the dichotomy of narrative and spectacle. In addition, she 
demonstrates that the ‘animated space’ created by digital technology is both participatory 
and hybrid, going beyond coherent space and singular temporality. 252  Therefore, 
cinematic space simulated by computer synthesis is not only continuous and coherent 
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space but also the contradictory and complex ‘timespace’ that occurs in the creative 
interactivity of different images.  
 
In summary, the aesthetics of digital virtualism based on computer synthesis creates a 
new form of cinematic manipulation. The aesthetics of filmic montage reliant on the 
temporal connection of shots has changed to the aesthetics of digital collage through 
computer pixels and image layers. Digital collage goes beyond the aesthetics of the 
temporal continuity of filmic montage. The spatial collage of digital images is not only 
the aesthetics of seamless continuity and increased reality but also the dynamically and 
interactively composite process of a diversity of images and elements. It presents the 
indiscernible coexistence of different temporalities and crystal-images. Based on 
computer simulation and synthesis, the aesthetics of digital virtuality suggests a new way 
of assemblage and reconfiguration in cinematic time and space. 
 
 
2-3. The Aesthetics of Materiality  
 
In this section, I deal with the material nature of digital cinema. The aesthetics of digital 
virtualism restores and intensifies the materiality of the image and the sensation of 
cinema. The material essence of digital cinema bifurcates to the technological attraction 
of virtual images simulated by the computer and the multi-sensory methodology of 
perception executed by physical experience. On one hand, the technological attraction of 
digital cinema stems from the curiosity and novelty of virtual images made by computer 
simulation and synthesis. I will examine the contradictory implication of digital attraction 
and spectacle with cinematic narrative. On the other hand, the sensual traits of digital 
cinema are related to the change in perceptual method from visual illusion to multi-
sensory experience. Digital virtualism advocates the aesthetics of synesthetic perception 
and feeling instead of the aesthetics of semiotic and psychological hermeneutics. 
Although digital virtualism depends on the materiality of computer images and the 
expansion of human sense caused by techno-aesthetics, this section also investigates the 
limitations of technological determination and the threats of capitalistic fetishism to the 
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materiality of digital cinema. The aesthetics of digital virtualism explores the imbricated 
boundary between the affirmative potential and actual limitations of digital attraction. 
 
First, let me describe the materiality of image arts before I proceed to explain the 
expansion and reinforcement of materiality in digital images. Generally, the term 
materiality signifies the nature of objective matter as independent of human 
consciousness. Thus, the materiality of the image indicates that it is an independent, 
physical reality, regardless of human mental states and ideals. In this view, humans can 
access material images only by sensible perception. In this conception, human sensation 
mediates material images of physical reality, consciousness, and imagination. Therefore, 
the materiality of images is closely intertwined with the logic of sense. Indeed, Deleuze 
explained the ontology of art as ‘the logic of sense’: 
 
Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute 
of the state of affairs. It turns one side toward things, and another side toward 
propositions. But it cannot be confused with the proposition which expressed it 
any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition 
denotes. It is exactly the boundary between propositions and things.253 
 
According to Deleuze, as the medium of propositions and things, sense consists of the 
essential ontology of arts. The logic of sense denies the dualistic opposition of reality and 
image. In particular, the logic of sense highlights the materiality and sensation of cinema, 
which in the history of film theory, is associated with the restoration of spectacle 
imagism and sensible attraction of cinema that has been confined by the narrativisation of 
realism and the psychoanalytic hermeneutics of modernism. The cinematic image is 
‘feeling and sense’ before it is the object of scientific analysis and theoretical 
interpretation.  
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Tom Gunning argues that the emergence of narrative form in classical Hollywood cinema 
contributed to the contraction of the material attraction of cinematic images. According to 
Gunning, seeing cinema ‘as a way of presenting a series of view to an audience’ is more 
attractive than understanding it ‘as a way of telling stories’254 because the spectacle of 
material images directly fascinates the sense of audience. Despite Christian Metz’s 
complicated logic of film semiotics, cinema is a sensuous and material combination of 
images instead of a scientific and logical language. Regis Debray demonstrates that the 
image has the characteristics of figurality, embodied consciousness, sensual agitation, 
and physical movement. Debray explains that the traits of the image are nature, body and 
perception, whereas the traits of language are culture, spirit and intelligence.255 As soon as 
cinema is considered a language, it will have lost its internal instinct, such as brilliant 
eyes, sensuous touches, rude gestures, bloody flesh, sexual bodies, joyful desires, 
powerful passions, and so on. This is the very reason that a diversity of film theories 
relies on modernism to move further and further away from the simple beauty and 
popularity of movies, in spite of their scientific and elaborated hermeneutics. In the next 
chapter, I will meticulously demonstrate the limitation of a variety of semiotic, political, 
psychological modernist theories in the 1970s in terms of the materiality of cinematic 
images.  
 
Similarly, Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener state that cinema is not ‘the translation 
of sense perception to conscious thought’. 256  In addition, as Jacques Aumont 
appropriately explained in his book, The Image, the image itself is closely related to the 
process of visual perception, in which the coding process takes place without interruption 
from the retina to the cortex. 257 That is, the image is a physical process that takes place 
through our eyes, brains and senses. He regards the image as coding the information of 
light, and he explains the perception of the image in three successive transformative 
stages: optical, chemical and nervous. What we see is essentially nothing but perceived 
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light through the physical process of the human body, although there is no doubt that it 
has a subjective and social context. 
 
Hence, if the essence of cinema focuses on the logic of conventional narrative and 
signification, its vivid and vibrant sensibility and physicality could disappear into the 
tedious storytelling of literature and science. Cinema is not the dead copy of reality. It is 
the resonance of opaque visuals, inconsistent sounds, and rhizomatic composition. 
Cinema is based on the depth and width of light and darkness, the sensual encounter and 
the configuration of colour and sounds. It is the sense and body of physical reality. Here 
Gunning’s concept of ‘the cinema of attraction’ provides a useful tool for examining the 
materiality and sensation of cinema: 
 
What precisely is the cinema of attraction[s]? First, it is a cinema that bases itself 
on the quality that Léger celebrated: its ability to show something. Contrasted to 
the voyeuristic aspect of narrative cinema analysed by Christian Metz, this is an 
exhibitionist cinema. An aspect of early cinema which I have written about in 
other articles is emblematic of this different relationship the cinema of attractions 
constructs with its spectator: the recurring look at the camera by actors. This 
action, which is later perceived as spoiling the realistic illusion of the cinema, is 
here undertaken with brio, establishing contact with the audience. From 
comedians smirking at the camera, to the constant bowing and gesturing of the 
conjurors in magic films, this is a cinema that displays its visibility, willing to 
rupture a self-enclosed fictional world for a chance to solicit the attention of the 
spectator.258 
 
According to Gunning, the cinema of attraction is founded on the exhibition of cinematic 
visibility and spectacle instead of aspects of realistic narrative. He stresses the visibility 
and sensibility of cinema because cinema is not the logic of semiotic signs and the realm 
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of the rationale.259 In addition, he argues that the attraction of cinema derives from the 
movement of images and the sensation of spectators.260 In other words, for him, the magic 
and fantasy of cinema are related to the motion of cinematic images. Although Gunning 
highlights that screen exhibition is an effect of the spectator’s experience, in his view the 
magic of cinematic motion definitely includes the processes of the production and 
screening of images. He points out that cinematic motion, which is the movement of 
camera and the exhibition of moving images, is the origin and essence of cinematic 
attraction. 
 
In this regard, Gunning’s assertion that cinematic motion is the origin of cinematic 
attraction recalls Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image. Deleuze defines the 
movement of images as the ontology of cinema, which is not only the succession of still 
images but also the transformation and duration towards an open whole. Therefore, for 
him, the movement-image of cinema is ‘the capacity for thinking the production of the 
new’, thus opening to chance and accident.261 In this sense, Gunning expands the concept 
of Deleuze’s movement-image to aspects of screen projection and the spectator’s 
sensations: 
 
Cinema, the projected moving image, demands that we participate in the 
movement we perceive. Analysis of perceiving motion can only offer some 
insights into the way the moving image exceeds our contemplation of a static 
image. Motion always has a projective aspect, a progressive movement in a 
direction, and therefore invokes possibility and a future. Of course, we can project 
these states into a static image, but with an actually moving image we are swept 
along with the motion itself. Rather than imagining previous or anterior states, we 
could say that through a moving image, the progress of motion is projected onto 
us. Undergirded by the kinesthetic effects of cinematic motion, I believe 
“participation” properly describes the increased sense of involvement with the 
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cinematic image, a sense of presence that could be described as an impression of 
reality.262 
 
Gunning views the magic and attraction of cinema in terms of the spectator’s sense and 
perception of moving images. He defines the attraction of cinema as residing in the 
spectacle of image motion, which is inevitably related to the spectator’s sensation and 
perception. Moreover, Gunning tries to go beyond the dichotomy of narrative and 
spectacle in terms of the concept of cinematic motion. He explains that the attraction of 
cinema created by the movement of consecutive images intensifies the impression of 
reality created by narrative and storytelling:   
 
As cinematic experience, motion can play an intense role both in sensations of 
intense diegetic absorption fostering involvement with dramatic, suspenseful plots 
à la Hitchcock and in kinetic abstraction, thrusting viewers into unfamiliar 
explorations of flexible coordinates of space and time.  
Theoretical exploration of cinematic motion need not contradict, but can actually 
supplement, photographic theories of cinema such as those of Kracauer and 
Bazin.263 
 
Following Gunning’s concept of the attraction and spectacle of cinema, I will move 
towards the issue of the materiality of digital images: Does the digital image intensify the 
materiality of cinema? If we answer yes, then how is it possible? First, I will examine the 
nature of the technological attraction of digital cinema in terms of the complex 
relationship between narrative and spectacle. According to Andrew Darley, the 
technological spectacle of digital images breaks down the priority of narrative in 
Hollywood cinema. 264  He demonstrates the definite waning of narrative and the 
resurrection of the mode of the visual spectacle by analysing Hollywood blockbuster 
films and music videos produced since the late twentieth century: 
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The notion of controlling or regulating the tension between narrative and image, 
as I have already intimated, has taken on an ever greater importance with the 
recent growth of special effects driven films. Indeed, particularly in recent 
‘technological thrill’ films, where heightened forms of image and movement now 
figure so prominently, the conception that film equals narrative, which 
predominated in the classical era, appears now to have been all but superseded. 
No longer ‘isolated and intermittent ... digressions or flashes of virtuosity’, the 
new digitally licensed visual and action effects have now become the predominant 
aesthetic characteristic of such films. As such they elevate certain of the 
principles of the classical Hollywood style such as, ‘mimesis, self-effacing 
craftsmanship and cool control of the perceiver’s response ... ’, whilst at the same 
time privileging motives of spectacle over those of narrative… For in such films it 
is precisely new kinds of formal concern, tied to the emergent space of 
intertextuality, and centred upon the imaging of action, imagery and imaging 
itself that is at the forefront of their aesthetic operation. In this important strand of 
New Hollywood, traditional narrative containment of spectacle has crumbled in a 
manner that is quite unprecedented.265 
 
Darley designates the new phenomenon caused by computer images as the prevalence of 
technique and image over content and meaning, which also means that the elevation of 
the immediately sensuous constituent vies with our usual means of entry to symbolic 
meaning, that is, narrative. Even though the proliferation of digital spectacle does not 
mean the disappearance of the significance of narrative form in the new Hollywood, the 
vitality and feasibility of visual display and technological spectacle have become 
increasingly diffused in the aesthetics of computer simulation. This is because digital 
technology had made the impossible possible by the virtuality of computer images. The 
virtual images generated by computer graphic and synthesis provoke the visual curiosity 
and attraction of spectators. Examples are cyberspaces and digital vehicles such as light-
cycles, tanks and ships in Tron (1982), virtual animals in The Abyss (1989) and Jurassic 
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Park (1993), the cyborg in Blade Runner (1982) and Terminator 2 (1991), the virtual 
reality and cybersex in The Lawnmower Man (1992), 3-D animated creatures in Toy Story 
(1995), simulated ships in Titanic (1997), the virtual computer world in Matrix (1999), 
spectacular actions in Spiderman (2002) and Batman Begins (2005), the ecological and 
virtual utopian images in Avatar (2009), and the 3D simulation of catastrophic space in 
Gravity (2013). The technological virtuality of the digital image generates the magic and 
spectacle of cinema as well as the impression of reality. The material images of digital 
cinema attract and enlarge the bodily sensations and perceptual experience of spectators. 
Consequently, digital technology has brought about the aesthetics of visual exhibition and 
spectacle attraction through the gap of Hollywood narrative cinema. The visual attraction 
of virtual images generated by computer simulation goes beyond the subordination of 
spectacle to narrative. The technological virtuosity and novelty of computer images 
intensifies the tension between narrative and visual spectacle. Digital technology restores 
and expands the materiality and sensation of cinema, which have been suppressed by the 
narrative forms of Hollywood realism since the early cinema. In this sense, digital cinema 
is the new form of material images and technological attraction. The attraction of cinema 
enters the virtual images of computer simulation. 
 
Whilst Darley claims that digital virtuality gives rise to the restoration and intensification 
of the materiality and spectacle of visual images beyond realistic narrative, Leon 
Guretvitch argues that digital technology contributes to the complex fusion between 
narrative and spectacle. In particular, he indicates that the attraction of computer graphic 
images goes beyond the boundary between filmic narrative and advertising spectacle. He 
describes digital attraction in terms of exchangeable transactions and the crossover 
between a variety of images and media. According to Gurevitch, the attraction of cinema 
is caused by the aesthetics of ‘digital transaction’266 in the age of cybernetics:  
 
This article seeks to map out a new way of seeing digitally constituted audiovisual 
attractions as integrated components of a broader promotional tendency toward 
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what I shall call a “cinema of transactions.” The cinema of transactions describes 
a system in which the computer-generated (CG) attraction is the audiovisual form 
both promoted by and promoting whatever textual form it is embedded within. 
For this reason I have grammatically constructed the phrase “cinemas of 
transactions” in the plural. It is not one singular, textually unified, site-specific 
cinema but a multiplicity of cinemas that have emerged, and are continuing to 
emerge, as the CG attraction continues to develop in new domains.267 
 
Gurevitch thus argues that the opposition between narrative and spectacle in film and 
advertising was created in the spread of digital media and images.268 While the spectacle 
of advertising images combined with filmic narrative, the narrative cinema in Hollywood 
mixed with advertising spectacle images in other media, such as TV and music videos. In 
particular, he points to Apple’s advertisement 1984 and Chanel’s No. 5, The Film. His 
point is that the complex mixture of narrative and spectacle takes place widely in the age 
of cybernetic images. For him, digital attraction is digital transaction. He points out the 
significance of a broad range of transactions between different media and images in film, 
TV, video, computer games, and the Internet. He also accentuates the hybrid and multiple 
interrelated system of textual, technological, aesthetic and economic developments 
whereby digitally distributed attractions and promotional practices span many media and 
textual forms. He concludes that the aesthetics of digital attraction proceeds to the 
transaction of computer-generated images beyond the dichotomy of narrative and 
spectacle. 
 
Here I turn to the issue of the spectator’s sense and perception in digital cinema. Digital 
attraction has to do with the material traits of computer images and the sensuous, bodily 
feeling and role of spectators in the reception of images. While the attraction of digital 
spectacle beyond realistic narrative is associated with the technological nature of 
computer-generated virtual images, digital 3-D cinema provokes a different mode of 
watching movies and a change in the spectator’s sense and perception. Gurevitch 
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demonstrates that the attraction of digital cinema is related to the re-appearance of 3-D 
cinema in James Cameron’s stereoscopic movie Avatar (2009).269 He asserts that Avatar 
(2009) is the birth of a stereoscopic nation, re-appropriating Griffith’s famous film title of 
The Birth of a Nation (1915). Although the history of stereoscopy began with the 
invention of Charles Wheatstone’s hand-drawn 3-D images in 1838 and David 
Brewster’s photographic version of the stereoscope in 1835, stereography could not 
function adequately within the nineteenth-century structures of vision.270 This is because 
dioramas and stereographs highlighted ‘the body’s role in vision’, while photography in 
contrast buried this knowledge beneath the seamless surface of purely mechanistic 
technique. In the early history of cinema, photography defeated the stereoscope as a 
mode of visual consumption because it recreated and perpetuated the fiction that the 
objective vision of the camera obscura was still possible.271 However, Gurevitch states 
that, in the early twenty-first century, the development of computer technology and 3-D 
cinema resulted in the possibility that the attraction of the stereoscope is realized beyond 
photography’s fiction of objective vision. He argues that digital 3-D movies suggest the 
possibility of the combination of the technological and aesthetic between the indexical 
reality of photography and the bodily immersion of stereoscopy. Based on subjective 
action and bodily sensation beyond the fiction of the photographic image, digital 3-D 
cinema proceeds to the stereoscopic cinema. He considers the successful 3-D movie 
Avatar a turning point in the birth of the stereoscopic ‘nation’ in the age of cybernetic 
images. Gurevitch uses the term ‘cybernetic attraction’ to explain the difference from the 
photographic attraction of film. For him, the cybernetic attraction of stereoscopic cinema 
originates in bodily experience and subjective participation beyond the objective vision 
of photography. Similarly, Gurevitch asserts that cybernetic attraction is the emergence 
of a new scopic regime that relies on computer simulation and an information networks. 
He also argues that stereoscopic cinema suggests new ways of thinking about ourselves 
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and our environment, that is, new ways of constructing virtual images of the human 
experience of the world as simulated by computers.272 
 
Therefore, Gurevitch claims that as a successful computer-generated stereoscopic movie, 
Avatar represents the new, emergent mode of cybernetic production and consumption. 
For him, Avatar negotiates a turning point in the contemporary audio-visual attraction of 
cinema, as The Birth of a Nation did a century earlier. While the latter opened new 
chapter of Hollywood narrative cinema, the former created the new prototype of 
contemporary digital attraction based on computer simulation and synthesis. Avatar 
restores the new potentials of cinematic attraction and spectacle that went to the 
‘underground’ of an avant-garde cinema practice and a component of narrative films 
since the early cinema.273 Gurevitch claims that Avatar creates a new tension between 
spectacle and narrative by stereoscopic 3-D images and spectator’s bodily experience.274 
Although he tends to exaggerate the historical significance of the digital 3-D movie 
Avatar, his theoretical point that stereoscopic cinema subsists in the bodily sensation and 
subjective negotiation to the objective world has merit. The materiality and attraction of 
digital images are realized by the physical sensation and subjective interaction of 
spectators in stereoscopic cinema. It proceeds to the active impression and immersion of 
physical reality beyond the representative and passive reality of photographic film 
technology. 
 
In contrast to Gurevitch’s assertion, which highlights the cybernetic attraction of 
stereoscopic cinema, John Belton denies the attraction and novelty of digital 3-D 
cinema.275 He opposes the view that digital cinema is a radical project for a new form of 
cinema. Philip Rosen asserts in Change Mummified, digital technology is not ‘a radical 
break’ from analogue technology, whereas Belton stresses the limitation and delay of 
‘digital novelty’. First, he points out that ‘the novelty value’ of digital cinema is 
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undermined because of the fact that digital technology is based on the simulation of older 
analogue technology: 
 
The link between digital film technology and its analog predecessor can be seen at 
every level of the film chain in terms of contemporary practices involved in 
production, postproduction, and exhibition. In each of these areas, digital 
technology has deliberately taken on the characteristics of the analog technology 
that it has replaced. Underlying claims for digital technology’s radical novelty are 
discourses that make it clear that the chief goal of digital technology in film is to 
simulate older analog technologies. Six- track digital sound, whether Dolby 
Digital or DTS, does digitally what six-track magnetic sound did for Dolby 70mm 
back in the 1970s and 1980s, or for what other 70mm formats, from Todd-AO to 
Super Panavision, did in the 1950s and 1960s. Digital 3D duplicates the 
experience of Natural Vision of the 1950s, StereoVision of the 1960s and 1970s, 
and ArriVision of the 1980s – not to mention IMAX 3D.276   
 
For Belton, digital technology is nothing but the technological transformation of analogue 
technology. He asserts that digital technology is not a new form of novelty compared 
with analogue technology in the whole process of production, postproduction, and 
exhibition. For him, the digital camera is only an attempt to duplicate the depth of field 
achieved in film stock. Digital intermediate in post-production is also no more than the 
process of imitating photochemical cinematography. In the field of theatrical exhibition, 
the goal of the development of digital projection technology has equalled 35 mm 
projection in the look figured by both the resolution and reliability calculated by the 
failure rate. Belton claims that the development of digital cinema is driven by its desire to 
simulate normative practices. Accordingly, he claims that digital technology has no 
desire to foreground itself as spectacle or to develop its potential as a novelty. 
 
In addition, Belton argues that digital 3-D cinema is not a genuine novelty, because 3-D 
technology is not new, but has existed since the invention of stereophotography in 1838, 
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the motion pictures by William Friese-Greene in the 1890s, and the 3-D films in 
Cinemascope of Twentieth Century Fox in the 1950s.277 Belton also points out the 
technological limits of digital 3-D cinema, such as the dimness of the 3-D bandwagon 
and the light loss in the digital projector and screen illumination, which resulted in the 
decline in revenue. For example, Toy Story 3 (Lee Unkrich, 2010) earned 5 per cent more 
in 2-D than it did in 3-D. He argues that the bubble of digital 3-D cinema since the 
phenomenological success of Avatar in 2009 has been deflated by its technological and 
financial limitations. 
 
Finally, Belton considers that digital 3-D stereoscopic cinema will never become a norm 
because it is essentially an avant-garde technology, which makes audiences regard it as 
an intrusive instead of an immersive experience. In this sense, he concludes that digital 3-
D cinema may have missed its novelty phase and lost its innovation and diffusion by 
violating the segregation of spaces created in classical cinema.278 
 
Even though Belton disapproves of the technological and aesthetic attraction and novelty 
of digital cinema, many theorists attend to the restoration of cinematic spectacle and the 
new form of sensuous perception. Gunning states that the visual movement of material 
images and the attraction of spectators build ‘a strong bridge between cinema and the 
new media’.279 Darley claims that the surface play of computer simulation in the new 
digital culture intensifies the visual spectacle of cinema beyond filmic narrative.280 
Gurevitch argues that the ‘cybernetic attraction’ of stereoscopic cinema relies on bodily 
action and information network, creating a new form of thinking and subjectivity of 
humans and their experience of the world.281 In addition, Thomas Elsaesser and Malte 
Hagener sensibly point out that the digital image no longer sees and hears, but touches; 
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thus, it is haptic. It therefore goes beyond the territory of visual contemplation and 
representation: 
 
On the other hand, the “return’ to theories of empathy and embodiment may 
well have its ideological corollary and materialist base in the particular 
qualities of the digital image, when compared to the photographic image, a 
possibility we shall explore and address in the Conclusion. One of the key 
questions will be the extent to which the digital image can be said to be optical-
perceptual at all, or belongs into a different register of perception, one that is 
only inadequately described as either “embodied” or “haptic”. Just as in 
Chion’s theory of sound perception, the term he chose for describing the new 
digital sound was “rendered” rather than “heard”, the metaphors relevant for 
the digital image may not be taken from sight and the eye, but instead derive 
from substances like putty and wax, or recall liquids of difference viscosity, 
like oil or water, setting up frames of reference within which the optical and the 
visual appear merely as “effects” of this new materiality that “ touches” the eye 
but does not give it anything to “see”. The digital image would then be cast as a 
kind of material challenge for representation, joining at the level of technology 
and practice the critique of visual representation that this study has been 
conducting at the theoretical level.282  
 
Here I raise a practical issue regarding the materiality of digital cinema. It is clear that the 
new aesthetics of cinema is associated with the materiality of cinema. Because of the 
separation of the image and photographic causality, the digitalisation of cinema both 
optimizes and maximizes the living nature and sensibility of the image through the 
intensification of imagination, illusion and phantasm. Digital cinema becomes the 
technological reorganization of image elements and the surface play of fantastic 
spectacle. It radicalizes the physicality and sensibility of cinema on the immanent plane 
of simulacra and digital virtuality. However, because of the technological attraction and 
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sensuous perception of digital cinema, it inevitably raises practical issues, such as 
technological determination, fetishism, and commercialism. Digital cinema induces the 
fantasy of technological determinism and the fetishism of capitalism by its computer-
simulated images and bodily sensation. Hence, the transformation of cinema by digital 
technology could lead to the intensification of fetishism as an ideological corollary. Thus, 
digital cinema wanders between the spectacular attraction and the capitalistic fetishism of 
the image. 
 
The aesthetics of digital virtualism affirms the materialism of the image in the evolution 
of technology, which means that digital technology expands the physicality and 
sensibility of cinema. It leaves behind the aesthetics of visual representation and passive 
observation based on seeing and hearing and pursues the aesthetics of sensuous feeling 
and positive operation conducted by all the sensory organs in the body. The aesthetics of 
digital virtualism corresponds to the sensuous change in the physical basis and 
infrastructure of contemporary cinema. It also means the simultaneous confrontation of 
the fetishism of capitalism, causing the commercialization of the image and the 
devastation of cinema as the apparatuses of dominant ideology. Karl Marx pointed out 
that the mechanisms of production and reproduction in capitalism serve to exploit surplus 
value, giving rise to fetishism as the extreme culture of commodity consumption: 
As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of 
labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical 
nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing 
but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for 
them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find 
an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the 
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of 
their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human 
race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call 
this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they 
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are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities.283  
 Similarly, Benjamin indicates that consumer capitalism uses visual appeal and exhibition 
to promote the sale of commodities. It also commercializes and commodifies mass 
culture and the arts.284 By the same token, Elsaesser and Hagener grasp the profound 
influence of digital capitalism on the world of cinema, in which the visual appeal of 
consumer capitalism is transformed to the ‘embodied perception something like the 
ideology of “late” capitalism’, as it extends the sensory potential of visual experience in 
order to “commodify” it'.285 The neoliberal and global capitalism of digital and computer 
technology expands the visual appeal of the image, which transforms to the new form of 
embodied perception. In the age of postmodern capitalism, 286  digital technology 
maximizes and radicalizes the fetishism of cinema.  
 
In this context, there is a great demand for the practical aspect of the digital arts. Frank 
Popper asserts that virtualism should be contemplated in terms of ‘the humanizing of 
technology’. 287 He points out that ‘techno-aesthetic virtualism’ is the interrelation of 
technological and aesthetic change, which has been central in the emergence of virtual 
arts on the computer and the Internet since the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, Popper claims 
that the essence of the techno-aesthetic is ‘the humanization of technology’ through the 
artistic imagination. Moreover, the aesthetics of digital virtualism simultaneously 
opposes technological determinism and capitalistic commercialism. Digital virtualism is 
both the new aesthetics and the strategy for developing the humanistic materialism of 
cinema against the cold fetishism of digital capitalism. Digital virtualism affirms the 
physicality of the image, that is, the aesthetics of body and sense. However, it also 
opposes the capitalistic fetishism of cinema. It tries to achieve the redemption of cinema 
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from the commercialization and fetishism of capitalism. Thus, digital virtualism is a 
contradictory pursuit to recuperate the humanization of technology from the capitalistic 
materialism in the new age of digital cinema. 
 
 
2-4. The Aesthetics of Information 
 
In this section, I demonstrate that the aesthetics of digital virtualism is closely related to 
the informational traits of the image. The informational nature of digital cinema derives 
from the technological, immaterial, and virtual characteristics of the image. Digital 
cinema is related to the numerical and algorithmic structure and system of images. After 
describing the informational nature of digital cinema originated in the symbolic and 
virtual images of computer simulation, I will move to a discussion of two different issues 
regarding the informational images of digital cinema; the contradictory combination of 
convergence and divergence, and the conceptual shift of cinema. Regarding the issue of 
convergence, I explore internal aspects regarding the convergence of a variety of 
cinematic images the external aspects with regard to the convergence of different media 
and art forms. While the former means the compositing and collage of images, the latter 
indicates the tendency of multimedia and transmedia. I also deal with the concept of 
divergence because the digitalisation of cinema coexists in the process of both 
convergence and divergence. I assert that convergence is a contradictory process both 
imbricating and conflicting with the tendency of divergence. Furthermore, I argue for the 
conceptual change of cinema in the age of digital images. The trend of the transcode and 
transmedia in the homogeneous format of digital images has brought about the 
conceptual transformation of traditional film in terms of the change in the media 
environment. Although there have been many attempts to redefine the concept of cinema 
in the digital age, they have not achieved consent. The re-conceptualization of cinema is a 
historical process aligned with the evolutional process of digital cinema. This section 
examines a diversity of redefinitions of cinema in terms of the aesthetic frame of digital 
virtualism.  
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Before dealing with the issue of convergence and divergence, I describe the informational 
nature of digital cinema in terms of the ontology of images. First, the term ‘information’ 
is derived from the Latin verb informare, which means to give form or to form an idea. 
The term generally means the communication or reception of knowledge concerning a 
particular fact or circumstance. According to Norbert Wiener’s theory of cybernetics, 
information is ‘the amount of entropy’ in a system and organisation.288 The concept of 
information varies according to different approaches and contexts. In semiotics, the term 
information is related to the concept of signs or signals, which consists of pragmatics, 
semantics, and syntax. Beynon-Davies explains the multi-faceted concept of information 
in terms of signs and signal-sign systems.289 In media sociology, information is associated 
with the message and communication of a variety of media. Manuel Castells analyses the 
social, economic, and cultural dimensions of the information age, in terms of the complex 
networks of capital, commodity, human, knowledge, and information flow.290 He claims 
that the information society is characterized by the virtual flow of space and time by 
computer networks and digital media. For Michael. E. Hobart and Zachary. S. Schiffman, 
information is the complex interaction between technology and culture instead of the 
product of technology and media. They refer to classical, modern, and contemporary 
information ages to include the socio-cultural meaning of each:  
 
The fundamental fact of information's historicity liberates us from the conceit that 
ours is the information age, a conceit that underlies Kauffmanesque inferences 
from "computer-simulation movies" to history. It allows us to stand outside our 
contemporary information idiom, to see where it comes from, what it does, and 
how it shapes our thought.291 
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Following Castells, Hobart, and Schiffman, I extrapolate that the informational nature of 
images is connected with their immaterial and virtual characteristics in the age of 
computer networks and digital culture. I point out that the informational nature of the 
image has a closer relation to the digital than it does to the filmic. In this sense, Flusser’s 
assertion is slightly inadequate because it does not distinguish the ontological difference 
between film and digital images in view of information. According to Flusser, in the 
informational characteristics of the technical images of both analogue and digital media, 
the real, material and thing-like traits of archaic photographs on paper have disappeared:  
 
Electromagnetic photographs, films and television images do not illustrate the 
devaluation of the material things nearly as well as photographs attached to paper 
in the old-fashioned way. If, in the case of such advanced images, the material 
basis of information has completely disappeared and electromagnetic photographs 
can be created artificially at will and processed by the receiver as pure 
information (i.e. the 'pure information society'), in the case of photographs of the 
old-fashioned type, one still holds something material, flyer-like, in one's hands; 
this something is without value, treated with contempt - and is becoming less and 
less valuable and treated with more and more contempt. In the case of classical 
photographs, there are still valuable bromide prints - even today the last vestiges 
of value attach to the 'original photograph' making it more valuable than a 
reproduction in a newspaper. But the photograph bound to paper nevertheless 
indicates the first step on the road to the devaluation of the material thing and 
valuation of information.292 
 
Although his philosophy maintains a vital intuition about the informational and 
immaterial characteristics of technical images, such as film, TV, and digital images, 
Flusser does not distinguish precisely between film and digital images. Although he 
divides the age of technical images from the age of writing and texts, he overlooks the 
difference between filmic and digital images. Even if all technical images including film 
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and digital have the characteristics of information, this is clearly revealed by the digital 
image because film mainly depends on the causality and indexicality of physical reality. 
In other words, the digital image facilitates and expands the possibility of synthetic 
transformation of information images. In this sense, the immateriality and informational 
characteristic of the technical image are closer to digital art than to analogue arts, such as 
film. As I have already discussed, digital technology depends on the numerical, 
computational, fluid, gaseous manipulation and transformation of digits and pixels. The 
process is symbolic and abstract, achieving the possibility of composition and synthesis, 
whereas the filmic process is physical, concrete, solid, and stable, retaining the physical 
homogeneity of objects. 
 
Therefore, because of the ontological difference between them, the digital image should 
be distinguished from the photographic image. Although both film and digital images are 
technical, as Flusser states, and have the virtual, immaterial, and informational nature of 
images, it is also clear that digital images have more to do with the informational traits of 
images than do photographic and representative images of film. This is because digital 
images significantly depend on numerical manipulation and computer simulation. The 
minimum unit of the digital image comprises digits and pixels. Unlike the analogue 
image, it does not have stable physicality and indexicality in the movement from place to 
place and inter-image communication. In the new age of digital art, the image has 
become information:  
 
Computer-generated images, alternatively, are wholly created from algorithmic 
functions. Analogy exists as a function of spatial recognition, of course, but it 
has loosed its anchors from both substance and indexicality. And it is not 
simply that visuality has been given a new mobility wherein any pixel in the 
electronic image can be moved or its value changed at will. Because the digital 
arts are without substance and therefore not easily identified as objects, no 
medium-specific ontology can fix them in place. The digital arts render all 
expressions as identical since they are all ultimately reducible to the same 
computational notation. The basis of all representation is virtuality: 
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mathematical abstractions that render all signs as equivalent regardless of their 
output medium. Digital media are neither visual, nor textual, nor musical—they 
are simulations.293 
 
Because the computer-generated image has immaterial virtuality and unlimited mobility, 
cinema has moved towards a new phase of convergence and divergence of media and the 
arts. The digital format mixes and exchanges all images, arts and media. The computer 
ignores their physical differences and translates them to a uniform number, either 0 or 1, 
in a binary system. Because they have the same format in either digits or pixels, they can 
be added and deducted freely. Although there are many different data formats and a 
diversity of studios using proprietary softwares, digital images are compatible and 
exchangeable by a variety of the methods of transcoding, converting, and optimizing 
based on encoding, decoding, and compression.294 Even if production teams have to work 
hard to make digital formats compatible, such as metadata loss or data degradation, 
digital images essentially have the hybrid and complex characteristics of datamoshing 
and changeability.295 In this way, digital technology converges and diverges all fields of 
arts—literature, painting, music, photograph, and film. They are bound in the same 
category under the name of digital arts: digital writing, digital music, digital picture, 
digital photo, digital cinema, and so on.  
 
Regarding the internal aspect of convergence, digital cinema is the hybrid combination of 
a diversity of images, such as live-action images, computer-generated images, still 
photographic images, paintings, and even texts and signs. The computational synthesis of 
various images is connected to the crossover and fusion between different genres and 
techniques. Because digital cinema depends on the immaterial image, that is, the 
informational image, it is closely related to the new composite aesthetics of the image. 
While film is the art of editing, digital cinema is the art of synthesis and composition 
using computer graphics. The montage of film is replaced by the unlimited 
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transformation and manipulation of digital pixels by computer software. Cinema does not 
focus on honest reproduction and imitation, but on the imaginary transformation of 
reality. This is the reason that a large number of dominant genres now intensify the 
characteristics of magic, fantasy, adventure, science fiction, and spectacle in today’s 
cinema. 
 
Therefore, the new aesthetics of cinema is associated with the virtual fusion and 
combination of immaterial and informational images instead of the aesthetics of 
indexicality and physical reality. This requires the collage, pastiche, and intertextuality of 
cinematic images and the complexity and hybridity of texts and paintings, visuals and 
sounds, narrative and spectacle, cell animation and 3-D animation, live-action and 
virtuality, and film strips and computer graphics. Manovich terms the new phenomenon 
of image synthesis ‘digital collage,’ distinguishing it from filmic montage.296 Gurevitch 
suggests the concept of ‘digital transaction’ with regard to the nature of exchangeable 
images. 297  William Brown presents the concept of ‘cinematic monstrosity’ in the 
complexity of humanity and non-humanity.298 Wood examines the expressive styles of 
cinema in the crossover between narrative and spectacle in the concept of ‘timespace’.299 
 
In terms of the external aspects of convergence, the informational nature of digital 
cinema goes beyond the territory of cinema. While the immateriality and informational 
characteristics of the digital image lead to the composite aesthetics of cinema internally, 
they also give rise to the tendency of the media and arts to converge externally. In light of 
the external relationship between cinema and other media, cinema gradually becomes a 
hybrid genre and multi-media because of the characteristics of information, that is, 
immaterial virtuality and unlimited mobility. We now watch movies on the computer and 
via the Internet as well as in the theatre. Before too long, many companies in the 
information telecommunication industry, such as Microsoft, Google, and Apple, will 
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develop combinations of television, computers, and mobile phones. The diversification of 
media means the extension of templates for watching movies. If we have a computer 
cinema file, we can enjoy movies anywhere at any time, which is the so-called new world 
of ‘one source and multi-use’. The cinema of today is not a static celluloid strip, but a 
mobile computer file and has become comprised of informational images and content in 
various templates, such as television, laptops, I-pads, and smart phones. Thus, digital 
cinema enters the ocean of information beyond the threshold of theatre. In this sense, 
Henry Jenkins defines the concept of convergence as the flow of multimedia: 
Convergence: a word that describes technological, industrial, cultural, and social 
changes in the ways media circulates within our culture. Some common ideas 
referenced by the term include the flow of content across multiple media 
platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, the search for new 
structures of media financing that fall at the interstices between old and new 
media, and the migratory behavior of media audiences who would go almost 
anywhere in search of the kind of entertainment experiences they want. Perhaps 
most broadly, media convergence refers to a situation in which multiple media 
systems coexist and where media content flows fluidly across them. Convergence 
is understood here as an ongoing process or series of intersections between 
different media systems, not a fixed relationship.300  
Jenkins stresses two core features of convergence: the tendency of multimedia and 
convergence as ongoing process. Convergence is a consistently historical process of 
media-mix, which takes place in an exchangeable intersection between new and old 
media. In this context, Jenkins states that ‘transmedia’ is the heart of the concept of 
convergence.301 He asserts the concept of transmedia in terms of media connection and 
communication, that is, media intertextuality: 
Transmedia, used by itself, simply means “across media.” Transmedia, at this 
level, is one way of talking about convergence as a set of cultural practices. Keep 
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in mind that Marsha Kinder in Playing with Power wrote about “transmedia 
intertextuality”, while I was one of the first to popularize the term, transmedia 
storytelling. Transmedia storytelling describes one logic for thinking about the 
flow of content across media. We might also think about transmedia branding, 
transmedia performance, transmedia ritual, transmedia play, transmedia activism, 
and transmedia spectacle, as other logics. The same text might fit within multiple 
logics.302 
In this context, Jenkins analyses the franchise movie The Matrix and the TV series Glee 
as examples of the concept of ‘transmedia storytelling’ and ‘transmedia narrative’. For 
Jenkins, The Matrix exemplifies a new type of storytelling across a variety of 
entertainment media and art forms.303 While computer games reconfigure film narrative, 
animated shorts provide computer games with a background story. They need to be 
downloaded from the web or watched in a separate DVD. Fans race, dazed and confused, 
from theatres to the Internet, and every detail of the movie is dissected and debated 
according to every reinterpretation. 304 Glee also provides an example of transmedia 
narrative, in which the audience follows the characters and situations across media. 
Glee’s transmedia strategies emphasize transmedia performance, with songs accessible 
on YouTube, iTunes, live performances, and so on, in a variety of media that the 
audience interprets to make sense of the larger Glee phenomenon.305 Jenkins demonstrates 
that The Matrix and Glee are prototypes of transmedia storytelling and narrative, in which 
the masses as the consumers of cultural products both communicate and play with the 
information in the context of the information society.306 
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Similarly, Wood points out that the combination of cinema and game is also a main trend 
related to convergence.307 She states that game engines are not only used in the games 
industry but also are shared across a range of media platforms, particularly popular 
cinema. This tendency of ‘machinima’ has proliferated in Hollywood’s cultural industry 
since the late 1990s. She uses the example of the digital fx company, Pixel Liberation 
Front, which exploits and shares game engines and artists to create computer-animated 
cinema, such as Superman Returns (2006), Dreamgirls (2006) and Spider-Man 3 (2007). 
Instead of static storyboards, moving animatics are created, and the game engine allows 
different lighting, framing, and lens set-ups to be explored. The franchise and circularity 
of these popular cinemas and games represents the tendency of transmedia and 
remediation in the convergence culture of digital media and art forms. 
Bolter and Grusin also suggest the concept of remediation among different media, 
asserting that ‘all mediation is remediation’.308 In particular, they point out that new 
media are the remediation of old media and that old media are simultaneously 
transformed by the influence of new media: 
We call the representation of one medium in another remediation and we will 
argue that remediation is the defining characteristic of the new digital media. 
What might seem at first to be an esoteric practice is so widespread that we can 
identify a spectrum of different ways in which digital media remediate their 
predecessors, a spectrum depending on the degree of perceived competition or 
rivalry between the new media and the old.309  
Bolter describes the new relationship between digital media and film narrative in terms of 
the remediation of the new and old media.310 While film narrative depends on linearity, 
the narrative of games is circular and interactive. The remediation of cinema and games 
induces the interrelation and exchangeability of narrative forms. While film imitates 
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interactive narrative and ceaseless spectacle, games also adopt filmic storytelling and 
verisimilitude. Film and new media reciprocally cooperate, conflict, and compete in order 
to persist in their own survival and sustainability. 
In a similar context, Rodowick also highlights that the coexistence and conflict between 
film and digital media is inevitably a historical process. Indeed, the so-called new media 
may not be new for a number of reasons. First, the definition of new media encompasses 
too wide a variety of computationally processed artefacts, from CD-ROMs to computer 
games. In addition, the point of view that new media radically breaks with old media is 
based on the presumption that linear chronology disavows the relationship with the 
analogical past. Finally, digital cinema is a large-scale historical process instead of the 
creation of a new medium, by which existing old media are transcoded into the digital 
form.311 Therefore, Rodowick insists that the task of a new theory of cinema is to place 
the familiar questions posed by classical film theories into a new context. That is to say, 
the new aesthetics of digital cinema should be estimated by the historical and theoretical 
relationship with the old aesthetics of film, which include the indexicality of the 
cinematic image, the paradox of perceptual realism, and the new automatism of computer 
simulation, and information processing. According to Rodowick, the analogical arts are 
not replaced by the digital arts, and the ideas of old media remain in the new media. 
Hence, the theory of film persists in the new art form of digital cinema. Consequently, the 
art of cinema gradually integrates the creative characteristics of digital processes within 
the aesthetics of film, although the process of digitalisation deviates more and more from 
the aesthetics of film. As Rodowick asserts, this process is not one of linear creation. 
Neither is it a unilateral invention and an apocalyptic prophecy. Instead, it takes place on 
a long-term, historical and contradictory path of the convergence and divergence of 
media and the arts. It is an intense and tremendous struggle between old and new arts, 
that is, of film and digital cinema. 
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Likewise, Giovana Fossati notes that convergence is a historical moment of ‘transition’.312 
As Philip Rosen properly indicates, in the risk of ‘the historiography of conquest’ 
proposed in the ideal of ‘digital utopia’313, the concept of convergence should not be 
understood as the conquest and emancipation of old media by new media. It is not a 
process in which digital technology conquers all media in the name of liberation from 
obsolete constraints. It is not a process of prophetic destiny, but a process of historical 
conflicts. In this sense, Fossati asserts the concept of transition, which is a historical 
moment and presence in ‘the aesthetics of film archive’:  
 
Kittler and other theorists of (this kind of) convergence are in my view missing 
the importance of this transitional moment. It is here and now that things are 
happening. Transition is the media of today with its hybridizations of analog and 
digital. It is the in-betweenness that is meaningful in itself, and not a step towards 
digital purity that may occur someday. Reading this transition through the glasses 
of a future that is (perpetually) “not yet”, is at risk of prophetism, that will lead 
convergence as an idea to lose even more credibility…314 
 
For Fossati, media convergence is the moment of historical transition. It is not the 
prophecy of digital utopia, but the current process of filmic archival practice. Therefore, 
she anticipates the concept of divergence in order to grasp the momentum of the complex, 
practical process of archiving film. She proposes the concept of divergence to avoid 
misunderstandings of the meaning of convergence and to clarify the concept of 
convergence in light of the practical meaning of media transition as both historical and 
current moments: 
 
I propose to add its antonym to the concept: divergence. Convergence/divergence 
are two inversely related concepts. They constantly remind of the dynamics of 
change and differentiation and, therefore, their use in combination best defines the 
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transition in the media environment. In the case of archival practice, 
convergence/divergence describe what is happening in a field stretched between 
two forces, one heading towards convergence of technology, standards, and 
means, and the other heading towards diversification of means, multi-
specialization and, literally, divergence.315 
 
Regarding the complex process of convergence and divergence, I recall the Deleuzian 
concepts of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’316 in the field of media and 
cinema art, in which digital technology adjusts the borders and territories of existing 
media and the arts. This process encourages all the arts to re-examine and reorganize 
their old aesthetics, new content, and changing art forms. Hence, digital technology 
promotes a new classification of media and the arts. The category of the digital arts could 
be subdivided according to the diversity of genres, forms, and innate automatisms, thus 
discovering new territories transformed by digital technology. The obsolete forms of arts 
would then disappear and new concepts of art emerge in a whirling vortex of changing 
media in a transitory period in which media and the arts are newly diverged by digital 
technology. In the trend towards convergence and divergence, it is unavoidable that the 
cinema in the digital age communicates and exchanges competitively with adjacent 
media and arts in terms of content and form. 
 
In the age of digital convergence and divergence, many theorists debate the 
reconfiguration of the concept of cinema. In this regard, Carroll’s appellation, ‘moving 
images’ as the new definition of cinema is appropriate and practical, although the concept 
is comprehensive and general. He begins with a definition of art in order to reach the 
concept of cinema. According to Carroll, ‘medium-essentialism’ is the flawed doctrine 
that each art form is its own distinctive medium.317 This is because an art form is not a 
single material or implement. For example, many different materials or implements, such 
as film, flicker film, video, DVD, and digital cinema are in the same category of the art of 
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cinema. In addition, the use of multiple media in an art form is variable and flexible, not 
static and fixed. Over time, different kinds of media and a diversity of artistic genres are 
added and deducted according to social purposes and artistic intention. Artists can 
overcome their limitation of tools to expand their territories, styles, and expressions.318 
For these reasons, Carroll opposes Bazin’s media-essentialism in which the essence of 
cinema is rooted in photographic transparency and realistic representation of filmic 
medium. Furthermore, he suggests the concept of the ‘moving image’ to define the art of 
cinema, particularly in the age of digitalisation, because he believes that in the near future 
cinema will comprise a diversity of media of moving images, such as film, television, 
CD-Rom, DVD, video, and computer media.319 On one hand, his concept of the moving 
image captures the contemporary trend of cinema in which a diversity of media related to 
cinema is integrated by computer technology. His concept demonstrates the general 
phenomenon of convergence and divergence of different media and the arts. 
 
However, as Rodowick properly points out, the concept of the moving image is too broad 
to serve as a definition of the art of the cinema.320 Although the concept of the moving 
image encompasses the universal traits of a variety of movement images, the images of 
television, computers, and mobile phones differ markedly from the cinematic image. As I 
have already stated, the essence of the arts depends on physical traits and inherent forms. 
Television images, such as news, events, and entertainment, are different from the artistic 
images of the cinema in terms of the essences of art forms, even though their appearances 
and homomorphoses are similar to those of the moving image. Therefore, it is better that 
the concept of cinema is redefined by the aesthetic characteristics of cinema, particularly 
the aesthetics of digital cinema, not the general concept of the moving image.  
 
In contrast to Carroll’s general conceptualisation, Peter Kiwitt considers the new concept 
of cinema the divergence of media and art forms in the digital age.321 In his perspective, 
cinema should be distinguished from TV and the new media in terms of production 
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practice. According to Kiwitt, although the convergence of moving images is spreading 
in terms of exhibition media, cinema remains cinema in terms of its form of production.322 
First, he notes the conceptual distinctions among technology, media, and forms. While in 
Caroll’s definition, the concept of medium is vague, referring to ‘implements’, 
‘materials’, and ‘formal elements’,323 Kiwiit distinguishes the concepts of technology, 
media, and forms. He asserts that the term technology includes the materials and devices 
used for creating, storing, transmitting, or displaying expression. He also claims that the 
term, form, matches the way of production, as in a mode of expression, such as an art 
form, and that the term, medium, corresponds with the method of exhibition in the sense 
of communication studies. In addition, he explains that, from a production perspective, 
form is defined by how we create expression (instead of what we create), and medium is 
defined by how we present expression (instead of what we create). For him, cinema is a 
form of production and a medium of exhibition, neither of which is bound to the 
technology of film stock.324 Based on the conceptual distinction between the form of 
production and the medium of exhibition, he distinguishes cinema form from TV form 
and new media form:  
 
Cinema defined broadly by production practice is a form of expression composed 
of edited live-action moving images, ideally emphasizing artistic form or content. 
Form, as used in this definition of cinema, is the production of expression, the 
first realization of content. Production is used broadly in this sense, covering the 
entire process from speculation/development to postproduction. Content must also 
be realized in the sense of exhibition, referred to as medium herein. (Kiwitt’s 
emphasis)325 
 
According to Kiwitt, TV is ‘a form of expression composed of switched live-action 
moving images as well as edited live-action moving images emphasizing communication’. 
He asserts that in their modes of production, cinema is an artistic form, whereas TV is a 
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communicative form. In addition, they have a variety of channels and formats as 
exhibition media. Kiwitt finally asserts that cinema should be distinguished from TV in 
terms of artistic form, regardless of the convergence of technology and exhibition media 
relying on digital technology. He states that technology should converge, but its forms 
should diverge. Furthermore, because the convergence of technology and exhibition 
media does not redefine cinema as an art form, cinema should not be confused with the 
forms of new media. He concludes that cinema remains distinct from the forms of 
communicative and interactive TV and computer games.326 
 
Although Kiwitt strictly distinguishes the difference between cinema and new media in 
terms of the form of production, there is no reason to hold that art forms are perpetually 
static and fixed in either production or exhibition. It is better to accept that the boundaries 
among art forms are consistently changing in the historical process of convergence and 
divergence, as in Fossati’s assertion of historical ‘transition’ and film practice. 
 
Moreover, many useful conceptualisations explain the new phenomenon of digital 
cinema. These include Manovich’s ‘database cinema’, Mitchell’s ‘biocybernetic cinema’, 
Brown’s ‘monstrous supercinema’, Gurevitch’s ‘the cinema of transaction’, and Cubitt’s 
‘transnational cinema’.327 In the context of these new conceptualisations of digital cinema, 
this thesis suggests the aesthetics of digital virtualism. Before delineating a perfect 
concept of new cinema, I present the essence and tendency of digital aesthetics through 
the concept of historical hybridity and aesthetic complexity, computer simulation and 
synthesis, the materiality and attraction of digital cinema, and the convergence and 
divergence of informational images. This thesis holds that the new concept of cinema has 
spread through both the historical tendency and the aesthetic practice of digital virtualism. 
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3. Film Aesthetics and Digital Virtualism 
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In the preceding chapter, I defined digital virtualism as the aesthetics of historical 
hybridity and aesthetic complexity. I also postulated that digital aesthetics is intimately 
connected with the historicity and theories of film. In this chapter, I will examine the 
transformation and evolution of film theories in the digital age. In particular, I 
concentrate on realism, modernism, postmodernism, and digital aesthetics after 
postmodernism. This is because digital virtualism is closely related to the aesthetic 
implication of filmic reality and the imagination. I demonstrate the aesthetics of realism, 
modernism, postmodernism in the context of the ontology and epistemology of reality 
and illusion. I extrapolate the new aesthetics of digital cinema from the historicity of a 
diversity of film aesthetics.  
 
In particular, I recount André Bazin’s concept of filmic reality, Metz’s impression of 
reality, Baudrillard’s hyperreality and simulation, and digital aesthetics beyond 
postmodernism. Bazin’s realist aesthetics focuses on the photographic ontology of film in 
time and space, although he does not miss the importance of filmic styles and 
subjectivity. I deal critically with the new perspectives of several researchers on the 
material image of film, which is also connected to the debate about the indexicality of 
digital cinema. Second, I investigate Christian Metz’s concept of the imaginary in light of 
the significance of filmic fantasy and illusion. Although Metz’s film semiotics seeks to 
replace the material nature of the filmic image with concepts of linguistics and 
psychoanalysis, I reappraise his complex position regarding the relation between filmic 
reality and the imaginary. Third, I deal with Jean Baudrillard’s postmodern aesthetics in 
terms of the ontology of filmic reality and image. Despite his negative vision of 
hyperreality and simulation, I attend to his complex viewpoint of filmic ‘white magic’ 
and digital virtuality. Finally, I explore the new trend of digital aesthetics beyond 
postmodernism. The aesthetics of computer simulation and interactivity suggests the new 
possibility of image configuration and digital hybridity.  
 
Consequently, through re-evaluating the main theories of film aesthetics in relation to the 
reality and the imagination, I conclude that it is necessary to theorise the new aesthetics 
of digital cinema in terms of the complex and hybrid reconfiguration of physical 
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indexicality and imaginary illusion. Thus, the aesthetics of digital virtualism presupposes 
the inextricable fusion between the actual and the potential, and reality and the 
imagination in the history of and disputes in film theory. In this context, this chapter 
connects to the next chapter, which argues the Deleuzian aesthetics of cinematic reality 
and creative virtuality. 
 
 
3-1. Realism: Bazin and Indexicality 
 
In this section, I deal with the issue of digital realism, which is confused with the 
traditional concept of realism based on Platonism. In the context of the ontological 
relationship between reality and the image, while traditional realism extrapolates the 
nature of image arts from the model of reality, digital realism raises fundamental 
questions of representative images. 328 This is inevitable because digital images depend on 
computer simulation and synthesis. Therefore, this section will deal first with the dispute 
on ‘filmic indexicality’: Does cinema have indexical traces of reality? How can the new 
concept of realism move beyond the dispute surrounding indexicality? Furthermore, I 
move toward the issue of new concepts of realism in the age of digital cinema, such as 
Philip Rosen’s ‘digital mimicry’, Darley’s ‘second-order realism’, Manovich’s ‘synthetic 
realism’, Bordwell’s ‘intensified continuity’, Gunning’s ‘cinematic motion’, Franco 
Cassetti's ‘sutured realism’, Hal Foster’s ‘traumatic realism’, Gerald Gaylard’s ‘new 
reality’, Brown’s ‘monstrosity’, Markos Hadjioannou’s ‘lost reality’, ‘Richard Rushton’s 
‘more reality’, and so on. By examining a variety of conceptualisations of digital realism, 
I suggest that digital virtualism is the new form of cinematic realism in terms of the 
contradictory combination of reality and the image. Digital realism is then considered a 
blurred boundary, making the actual and the virtual indiscernible. In view of digital 
virtualism, the new concept of realism has to do with the historical hybridity and 
aesthetic complexity of the indexical traces of physical reality and the imaginational 
attraction of the fictional image.  
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In the history of film theory, no one is better than Bazin to consider the ontology of 
cinema in terms of realism. Although there are many different opinions regarding his 
realist aesthetics, it is clear that he is considered one of the most prominent critics of film 
realism. In fact, he views the realism of film in the complex context of photographic 
ontology and aesthetic styles.329 This section explores the linkage of Bazin’s complex 
viewpoints with the new concept of realism in digital cinema. Bazin’s photographic 
ontology needs reinterpretation in terms of a more profound perspective on realism, one 
that moves beyond indexicality. It is important to draw the viable interference of digital 
realism from Bazin’s ontology of cinema. 
 
Bazin’s argument is important for digital realism because he approaches the ontology of 
cinema in terms of the complex relation of technological development and aesthetic 
desire. On one hand, it is related to the contradiction between photographic imitation and 
artistic expression. Cinema has aspects of both technological reproduction and aesthetic 
reconfiguration. In this sense, Bazin’s realism can be illuminated by both cinematic 
objectivity and cinematic subjectivity. On the other hand, it is associated with the 
aesthetics of time and space. Because cinema is a technical and virtual image in the time 
and space of reality, I investigate Bazin’s realism in terms of cinematic space and time. 
 
First, let me investigate Bazin’s realism in terms of the relation between the objectivity 
and subjectivity of cinematic images. In general, Bazin’s realism has been considered 
‘objective’ realism. Here the term objective realism indicates the aesthetic tendency to 
focus on photographic reality and indexical traces instead of the subjective aspects of 
images. In fact, Bazin provides a crucial interpretation of the ontology of realism. He 
demonstrates the technological and photographic ability of a credible resemblance. For 
him, cinema is one of the most vital and viable tools available to accomplish the human 
aesthetic desire for imitation and representation. For Bazin, the history of art is none 
other than the history of resemblance, that is, the history of realism, which means that the 
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essence of humanistic art is a psychological and aesthetic desire for the imitation and 
reproduction of the external world.330 The artistic will to imitate nature ultimately is 
expressed in ‘the myth of total cinema’ in the age of the photograph and film via the 
stage of painting. While photographic art antisepticises time by the intervention of cold-
blooded apparatuses, cinema achieves the emancipation of art from the limitations of 
space and time by adding movement to the art of static time. Hence, cinema is both the 
‘mummy of change’ and ‘change mummified’. In other words, cinema reproduces and 
transcends time and space and creates the myth of the total imitation of nature. Hence, the 
total imitation of nature is the essence of cinematic art:  
 
The primacy of the image is both historically and technically accidental. The 
nostalgia that some still feel for the silent screen does not go far enough back into 
the childhood of the seventh art. The real primitives of the cinema, existing only 
in the imaginations of a few men of the nineteenth century, are in complete 
imitation of nature. Every new development added to the cinema must, 
paradoxically, take it nearer and nearer to its origins. In short, cinema has not yet 
been invented!331 
 
However, theorists of ‘political modernism’ raise the fundamental criticism of Bazin’s 
theory of realism. They criticize Bazin’s ontology of cinema in view of the ideology and 
subjectivity of film. Jean Louis Baudry and Jean Louis Comolli argue that the camera 
lens is always subjective. The succession of images on the screen forces us to accept the 
ideological meaning ascribed by filmmakers. 332  The cinematic apparatus implies a 
subjective vision that reflects the worldview and opinions of the subject, both 
technologically and ideologically. Thus, according to Baudry and Comolli, Bazin’s 
argument is one-sided. They argue that Bazin misses the point that cinema has the 
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characteristics of fiction and illusion in addition to the imitation and reproduction of real 
world.  
 
Moreover, Peter Wollen reinterprets Bazin’s photographic ontology by means of Pierce’s 
semiology: 
 
Bazin’s starting point is an ontology of the photographic image. His conclusions 
are remarkably close to those of Peirce. Time and again Bazin speaks of 
photography in terms of a mould, a death-mask, a Veronica, the Holy Shroud of 
Turin, a relic, an imprint… Thus Bazin repeatedly stresses the existential bond 
between sign and object, which, for Peirce, was the determining characteristic of 
the indexical sign. But whereas Peirce made his observation in order to found a 
logic. Bazin wished to found an aesthetic. ‘Photography affects us like a 
phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly 
origins are an inseparable part of their beauty.’ Bazin’s aesthetic asserted the 
primacy of the object over the image, the primacy of the natural world over the 
world of signs. ‘Nature is always photogenic’: this was Bazin’s watchword.333  
 
For Wollen, Bazin’s photographic realism posits the relation between object and the 
indexical sign. Wollen contemplates Bazin’s ontology of cinema on the grounds of the 
dualism of the object and the image. From Bazin’s photographic realism, he extrapolates 
the ontological separation and hierarchy of the reality and cinematic images. Wollen’s 
point is that Bazin’ realism presupposes ‘the primacy of the object over the image.’ 
According to Wollen, Bazin asserts that physical reality is superior to the image, and 
cinema is comprised of indexical signs of the natural world. Gunning opposes the 
dualistic understanding of Bazin’s realism, which is based on Pierce’s semiotic concept 
of indexicality. On one hand, reading Bazin’s realism in terms of indexicality causes 
confusion about Pierce’s semiotics, which is because Pierce’s indexicality should be 
understandable according to the organic tripod system of sign, index, and icon. On the 
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other hand, the indexical interpretation of Bazin’s realism can miss the complexity of 
Bazin’s realism regarding physical reality and cinematic images. Gunning claims that 
Bazin’s ontology of the photographic image should not be delimited by the theory of 
objective realism, which relies on the indexical traces of physical reality. He points out 
that Bazin’s descriptions of the photographic image are both evocative and elusive, 
beyond the boundary of representative realism. Gunning argues that Bazin’s realism 
helps to understand and expand the complex concept of realism beyond indexicality: 
 
While it would be foolish to claim that a photograph cannot be a sign of 
something (it frequently does perform this function), I would claim that 
signification does not form the basis of Bazin’s understanding of the ontology of 
the photographic image and that his theory of cinematic realism depends on a 
more complex (and less logical) process of spectator involvement. Bazin 
describes the realism of the photograph as an “irrational power to bear away our 
faith” (“Ontology” 14). This “magical” understanding of photographic ontology is 
clearly very different from a logic of signs. In Peirce’s semiotics, the indexical 
relation falls entirely into the rational realm.334 
 
Similarly, Rosen also claims the complexity of Bazin’s realism. Rosen argues that Bazin 
highlights ‘a subject-based realism,’ although political modernists in the 1970s 
considered him an idealist of objective realism.335 Rosen points out that Bazin emphasizes 
the significance of the stylistic response of individual artists as well as the credibility and 
indexicality of photographic images. He also notes the complex and multifaceted aspects 
of Bazin’s realism. Rosen describes the complicated relation between objectivity and 
subjectivity in Bazin’s realism: 
 
Thus, if we read Bazin in terms of the subject-object opposition, there is a 
fundamental move that must always be kept in mind: the ‘no more cinema’ is by 
and for the subject. Bazin generally assumes a ‘subjective’ assigning of 
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significance to the concrete real, an activity that is abstract, but inevitable with 
respect to the concrete. But the opposite term of this abstraction from the real is 
not an absolute concrete objectivity that cinema can somehow make immediately 
available. It is rather a subjective striving, a subjective investment in the image 
precisely as ‘objectivity.’ This subjective projection is what serves Bazin’s 
ontology in defining a cinematically specific phenomenological intentionality; 
and it is the stake of his analyses and his history of filmic style. It is a premise that 
can help maintain the complex interest of his work even after 1970s film theory.336  
 
Rosen demonstrates that Bazin’s objective realism is entangled with a special 
phenomenological intentionality. Rosen’s view differs slightly from Gunning’s. While 
the latter stresses the magic and attraction of cinema related to ‘a more complex and a 
less logical process’ of spectator involvement, Rosen emphasises the fact that Bazin’s 
realism has a complex relation with artists’ subjective intention and intervention in the 
ground of objective realism. Whilst Gunning goes beyond the semiotic logic of the sign 
and the theoretical frame of indexicality, Rosen maintains the theoretical significance of 
indexicality in Bazin’s realism. Nevertheless, their concepts correspond in highlighting 
the complexity of Bazin’s realism. In fact, it is clear that Bazin does not confine his 
realism within the boundary of indexicality and photographic reproduction: 
 
Reality is not to be taken quantitatively. The same event, the same object, can be 
represented in various ways. Each representation discards or retains various of the 
qualities that permit us to recognize the object on the screen. Each introduces, for 
didactic or aesthetic reasons, abstractions that operate more or less corrosively 
and thus do not permit the original to subsist in its entirely. At the conclusion of 
this inevitable and necessary ‘chemical’ action, for the initial reality there has 
been substituted an illusion of reality composed of a complex of abstraction 
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(black and white, plane surface), of conventions (the rules of montage, for 
example), and of authentic reality. It is a necessary illusion.337 
 
In this sense, Daniel Morgan argues that Bazin’s realism implies a new perspective on 
realism. Morgan claims that Bazin denies the ontological dualism between the image and 
the object. Bazin’s realism rejects the ontological identity of the cinematic image with 
physical reality. In other words, Bazin’s photographic image does not mean the aesthetics 
of technological reproduction and imitation, but different realities beyond the 
resemblance and indexicality of physical reality. Morgan claims that Bazin’s realism is 
based on the ontological monistic view that the image and the object exist in the same 
plane of immanence. For him, Bazin’s photographic image is not the resemblance and 
representation of the object, but the object itself and thus a different reality. Therefore, he 
takes note of Bazin’s statement of the relationship between the photographic image and 
physical reality: 
 
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from temporal 
contingencies. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how 
lacking in documentary value the image may be, it proceeds, by virtue of its 
genesis, from the ontology of the model; it is the model.338 
 
Bazin does not give an obvious and absolute definition of his realism, and his view is 
mythical and metaphoric. However, Morgan claims that the core of Bazin’s realism does 
not reside in the indexical traces of physical reality that rely on the separation between 
the model and the image, but in an aesthetics of complex reality that considers the image 
a different reality. According to Bazin (via Morgan), the cinematic image is not identical 
with the model; it is not an indexical sign of the model, but the model itself. Hence, the 
image is the object, and the model is an image. Bazin defines the photographic image of 
cinema in terms of the contingency and ambiguity of the material image (in Gunning’s 
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words, ‘the magic of cinema,’ or in Deleuze’s terminology, ‘the indiscernibility between 
the actual and the virtual’), instead of the logic of signs or perceptual realism. Morgan 
tries to restore the sensation and materiality of cinematic images from Bazin’s realism:  
 
There are two basic objections to perceptual realism. First, Bazin does not 
describe the films of Renoir or neorealism as realist on grounds that they resemble 
the experience of reality. He not only rejects verisimilitude as an essential 
component of realism, at various points coming close to directly opposing it to 
realism. He is also explicit that perceptual or psychological realism is an 
inadequate criterion for realism. Second, Bazin describes as realist a large number 
of films that have little to do with resemblance predicated on the contingency, 
flux, and ambiguity of reality.339 
  
According to Morgan, because Bazin stresses the historicity and temporality of cinema, 
Bazin’s realism is distinguished from the aesthetics of spatial resemblance. The ontology 
of the cinematic image is ‘change mummified’ and ‘the mummy of change.’340 Morgan 
grasps Bazin’s statement that the film image is freed from ‘temporal contingencies.’341 He 
asserts that Bazin degrades the spatial similarity of the image with the object. This is 
because Bazin considers that spatial resemblance is contingent and unstable, like the 
‘usher’s flashlight’, in terms of the connection to a world outside the frame. In addition, 
he holds that film can give us new associations or different relationships with the object 
beyond spatial resemblance. Morgan claims that Bazin’s realism is the aesthetics of 
temporal contingency and ambiguous reality.342  
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Similarly, Rosen stresses the historical and temporal aspects of Bazin’s realism. He 
postulates that Bazin’s realism depends on the indexical sign of reality.343 However, 
Rosen indicates that indexicality is not a spatial likeness but a trace of temporal 
existence. For him, realism is the impulse to control time and the correspondence of the 
object and the subject in historicity and temporality. Although the photographic image 
was at one time considered a spatial presence, it soon appears as an irrefutable past 
existence. Cinema is both the desire to make the ‘passing present’, and the pursuit of 
referential pastness. Thus, Rosen states that the indexicality of photographic images 
involves historicity and temporality from the past to the present. He redefines Bazin’s 
realism in terms of subjectivity and temporality. For him, Bazin’s realism is the desire of 
human subjectivity to oppose the temporal constraints of physical reality. It is the 
aesthetics of temporal indexicality and historical representation beyond spatial likeness.344 
 
In conclusion, Bazin’s realism needs revaluation according to the new perspective of 
realism. The photographic ontology of Bazin’s realism should not be understood in terms 
of indexical traces of physical reality. It is not enough and even inappropriate that the 
concept of realism is defined only as photographic indexicality. As Gunning states, Bazin 
goes beyond the concept of indexical signs that rely on a logic of semiotics, in which the 
cinematic image loses its magic and attraction. In addition, Rosen asserts that Bazin’s 
photographic ontology is a temporal and subjective aesthetics instead of spatial and 
objective realism. For Morgan, Bazin’s realism gives us a clue for moving toward a new 
concept of realism. He claims that Bazin’s ontology of the photographic image is not the 
aesthetics of resemblance and verisimilitude, but the aesthetics of the ambiguous image 
and contingent temporality.  
 
I consider that the reinterpretation of Bazin’s realism is connected with a new 
conceptualisation of realism in the age of the digital cinema. Traditional concepts of 
realism are based on the dualism of images and objects, which postulates the primacy of 
reality over the image. In the view of traditional realism, the cinematic image is none 
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other than the obsolete copy of original reality. However, when Bazin’s realism is 
effectively reinterpreted by the new perspectives, the new concept of realism goes 
beyond indexical signs and representative realism. Deleuze articulates the aesthetic 
significance of Bazin’s realism as a new type of image: a ‘fact-image’, or ‘purely optical 
and sound images’, which are fundamentally distinct from the sensory-motor situations of 
the action-image in the old realism.345 Deleuze accentuates that Bazin’s appraisal of neo-
realism presents the Bergsonian concept of matter-image, in which pure audio-visuals go 
beyond represented images. Furthermore, Deleuze considers Bazin’s realism the 
aesthetics of complex temporality and crystal-image. For him, Bazin’s emphasis of 
‘sequence shot’ and ‘a depth of field’ implies a direct time-image, which reverses ‘time’s 
subordination to movement’.346 Gunning suggests that the new concept of realism is 
explored by the complex concept of cinematic motion beyond indexicality.347 For him, the 
attraction of cinema is caused by the material and magic nature of cinematic movement. 
In addition, Rosen states the significance of ‘historical hybridity’ based on cinematic 
temporality and subjectivity.348 He stresses the complex combination of the indexicality 
and subjectivity of cinema. According to Morgan, Bazin’s realism is distinguishable from 
the traditional realism of resemblance and identification.349 Morgan proposes a new 
realism on the grounds that complex and ambiguous images are beyond indexical 
representation. For him, the cinematic image is not an imitation of physical reality, but a 
different kind of reality, that is, ‘more reality’.  
 
Similarly, Richard Rushton suggests that new realism is a ‘more’ and ‘truer’ real world.350 
For him, cinematic images are not the representation but the exhibition of the real world. 
They are not the imitation of a model, but offer a bigger and more profound world, that is 
to say, a creative new world. He argues that films are part of the reality we typically 
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inhabit as part of the world we live in and as part of our lives. Films help us to shape 
what we call ‘reality.’ In the context of the Deleuzian ontology of image, the image is the 
world. Deleuze accurately indicates that ‘cinema produces reality.’ 351  For Deleuze, 
cinema does not produce a replica of the world, but a different new world. Deleuze intuits 
creative aspects of the world in the ontology of cinematic images. He illuminates the 
ontology of the cinema with the monism of the immanent plane, in which cinematic 
images are entwined indiscernibly and inextricably with physical reality. In Deleuze’s 
intuition of the materiality of images, Rushton denies the rigid demarcation between 
considerations of the real and the non-real or illusion. For Rushton, the aesthetics of 
representation as related to a dichotomy between reality and cinematic illusion blocks a 
more important question: What can films do? Or what can we do with films?  
 
It is such questions of the truth or adequacy of filmic representations that the 
present book tries to repudiate. I am well aware that cinema is often regarded as 
being one of what is known as the ‘representational arts’ or ‘representational 
media’, but what I want to take issue with here is the question of why anyone 
would feel the need to declare that cinema re-presents anything. Rather, what I 
want to argue by way of filmic reality is that films do no re-present anything. 
Instead, they create thing; they create realities, they create possibilities, situations 
and events that have not had a previous existence; they give rise to objects and 
subjects whose reality is filmic.352 
 
Rushton argues that films do not produce something that is behind or beyond them; 
instead films are defined by what they produce. The reality of films does not lie behind 
them; instead, the reality of film is what films themselves are. Film is not a secondary but 
a primary material, that is, ‘signaletic’ material. In this sense, Rushton (via Deleuze) 
concedes Bazin’s complexity and contradiction between representation and images and 
indicates the limitations of political modernism based on the strict distinction between 
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reality and the image, indexicality and illusion, transparency and reflection, and 
objectivity and subjectivity. For Rushton, the cinematic image is a new territory of 
physical reality. He posits that filmic reality comprises filmic experiences, effects, 
influences, feelings, and thoughts of the real world: 
 
… films provide what might be called ‘reverential experiences’ that help us to 
flesh out our understanding of the world and our place in that world. Films make 
available concepts, feelings, and ways of seeing and relating to the world that 
contribute to what we understand as reality. What would our experience of reality 
be like without films? It would be entirely different, for films have changed the 
nature of reality itself. Films have given us new ways to dream, but those dreams 
have also made available new domains of reality.353 
 
Hence, Rushton (via Deleuze) suggests a new concept of filmic reality. Cinematic realism 
proceeds to the new concept of creative realities beyond the boundary of representation 
and indexicality. As Bazin demonstrates, the concept of realism is multiple and creative. 
It is more and different reality, as it were, the aesthetics of virtualism: 
 
The word “realism” as it is commonly used does not have an absolute and clear 
meaning, so much as it indicates a certain tendency toward the faithful rendering 
of reality on film. Given the fact that this movement toward the real can take a 
thousand different routes, the apologia for “realism” per se, strictly speaking, 
means nothing at all. The movement is valuable only insofar as it brings increased 
meaning (itself an abstraction) to what is created.354 
 
Consequently, I define this new realism as virtualism. The new realism is the imbrication 
and indiscernibility of the actual and the virtual, the reality and the image, the past and 
the present, and life and the cinema. Many researchers have studied the new concept of 
realism in the age of digital cinema. As Gunning proposes, filmic reality has to do with 
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the motion of cinema and the attraction of spectator beyond indexicality. Digital reality 
also includes Rosen’s concept of ‘historical hybridity.’ Furthermore, the realism of the 
cinema implies the material ambiguity and temporal contingency of images, as Morgan 
indicates. Rushton’s concept of ‘new reality’ helps us consider the filmic image as a new 
reality instead of mimesis and representation. Franco Cassetti proposes the concept of 
‘sutured realism’, which reconceptualises the illusion and subjectivity of cinema.355 Hal 
Foster suggests ‘the return of the real’ in the postmodern age in the concept of ‘traumatic 
realism.’356  
 
In this thesis, by exploring concepts of the new realism, I put forward the concept of 
virtualism, which implies ‘the virtual conjunction’ 357  between physical reality and 
cinematic image. In the age of digital images, the new realism is connected to the 
aesthetics of virtualism. Digital virtualism is the bridge and interfaciality between 
actuality and virtuality, indexicality and imagination, physical reality and cinematic 
illusion, objectivity and subjectivity, and spatiality and temporality. Digital virtualism is 
the new realism, linking the indexical reality and the creative potential in the age of 
digital transition. As I have already described in a prior chapter, digital virtualism is 
based on computer simulation and synthesis in terms of technology and aesthetics. It also 
intensifies the materiality and bodily sensation of cinematic images. Digital virtualism 
embodies the convergent nature of informational images and proceeds to a new concept 
of cinema based on interactivity and networks. Therefore, digital virtualism is a new form 
of new realism. 
 
 
3-2. Modernism: Metz and the Imaginary 
 
In this section, I make two main points: one is the critique of Metz’s film semiotics in 
terms of virtualism; the other is the complexity of Metz’s concept of ‘the impression of 
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reality’. First, I will show that Metz’s film semiotics disparages the materiality of 
cinematic images. This is because the semiotic position of film images, in relying on 
linguistics and psychoanalysis, gets rid of the material reality of filmic ambiguity and 
attraction. Second, I will argue that in his early essays, Metz’s thought about the film 
image has to do with the dialectical attitude that the film image exists between reality and 
fantasy. Although this argument does not extrapolate to an untraversable river between 
the early and the late Metz, I will articulate the contradictory nature of film reality 
through the ambivalence of Metz’s semiotics. In terms of digital virtualism, the film 
image is the threshold between the actual and the virtual, indexicality and imagination, 
and materiality and immateriality. The virtuality of film images is both real and unreal. It 
is a complex hybridity between reality and illusion. Through Metz’s semiotics, I 
emphasise that the aesthetics of virtualism is an imbrication of reality and fantasy. 
 
First, I point out that Metz’s point focuses on the imaginary nature of film images, 
particularly the illusion and fantasy they produce in the spectators. In contrast to Bazin’s 
realism, which concentrates on the physical reality of photographic images, Metz’s 
semiotics focuses on the linguistic and psychological characteristics of film images. In 
fact, this position reflects the general perspective of political modernism in the 1960s and 
1970s. A number of political modernists, such as Peter Wollen, Barbara Klinger, Colin 
MacCabe, Jean Louis Baudry, Jean Louis Comolli, and Stephen Heath, accentuated the 
ideological and psychological nature of film images. They asserted that the realism of 
cinema is nothing but illusionism, in which the unconsciousness of the subject is 
represented by the identification and regression to the mirror stage. For them, the reality 
of film consists of false illusions and absent desires represented by filmic apparatuses. 
Political modernists claim that the film image is none other than the effects of mental 
state and subjectivity, not the objective and material. For them, the verisimilitude of 
realism is not ‘pure cinema’ or the transparent imitation of world, but the subjective 
effects of illusions and desires, in which physical reality of film images is replaced by the 
ideological and the subjective. In this context, Christian Metz suggests that linguistics 
and psychology are two vital sources of film semiotics:  
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Because linguistics and psychoanalysis are both sciences of the symbolic and 
are even, come to think of it, the only two sciences whose immediate and sole 
object is the fact of signification as such (obviously all sciences are concerned 
with it, but never so frontally or exclusively). To be slightly cavalier, 
linguistics-together with its close relations, notably modern symbolic logic-can 
be regarded as taking for its share the exploration of the secondary process, and 
psychoanalysis that of the primary process: that is to say, between them they 
cover the whole field of the signification-fact taken in itself. Linguistics and 
psychoanalysis are the two main ‘sources’ of semiology, the only disciplines 
that are semiotic through and through.358 
 
Metz draws linguistics and psychology into the theory of cinema because he thinks that 
the nature of the cinema depends on the meaning and impression of reality in the 
representative process of objective reality. Therefore, he argues that the disciplines are 
systematically able to explain the signification and the subjective effect of the cinema. 
Metz explains the image as sign and its structure as the science of cinematic semiotics, 
which reaches beyond the simple frame of impressionist criticism.  
 
As Barthes did before him, Metz designates the cinema as a language by borrowing from 
the structural linguistics of Saussure. He draws the signification of the cinema from the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. He distinguishes the cinema from 
natural language, and defines it as ‘language without langue’359 for three reasons. First, 
unlike natural language, cinema is not bilateral but unilateral communication. 
Furthermore, the cinematic relationship between signifier and signified is one of 
mechanical reproduction, while natural language has only an arbitrary relation between 
the signifier and the signified. That is, the meaning of the word ‘dog’ depends on 
arbitrary situations, but the image of a dog in the cinema is directly related to the 
reproductive image of the dog. 
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Finally, Metz maintains that double articulation is absent from cinema.360 Cinema lacks 
not only the first articulation by the combination of morphemes (words) but also the 
second articulation by the combination of phonemes (alphabet). It does not have a basic 
unit to reduce. The smallest unit in the cinema, the shot is closer to the sentence than the 
word because its meaning is unlike the phoneme, which does not have a meaning in 
itself. In this way, the signification of cinema does not operate in a paradigmatic relation, 
but in a syntagmatic relation. Therefore, narrative is more important than the image in 
cinema because a code cannot be derived from the image, whereas narrative makes 
meanings in a syntagmatic relation. Consequently, the semiotics of cinema becomes the 
science of studying the form and structure of narrative as apparatuses of the signification 
of the cinema. 
 
Metz thus demonstrates that the nature of language and story are followed by the cinema, 
and the action of the cinema is story telling. He emphasizes the priority of narrative in the 
semiotics of the cinema.361 It is no accident that Metz disparages the nature of spectacle in 
the early cinema and considers D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) an initiation 
of systematic film. He places a higher value on storytelling than on the cinematic image. 
The semiotics of cinema privileges the structure of signification over the system of 
narrative. In this context, Metz meets Freud. In other words, Metz meanders in his quest 
for the interpretation of cinematic language, much as Freud roamed in search of the 
interpretation of dreams. For Metz, cinema is a science of interpretation behind the 
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image, instead of the perception of the image in front of us. He thinks that truth exists not 
in front of us, but behind us. In his prominent book, The Imaginary Signifier, he centred 
on the issue of how the psychology of Freud has contributed to the scientific cognition of 
cinematic signification:  
 
The ‘other scene’, which is precisely not so called, is the cinematic screen 
(closer to phantasy from the outset): what unfolds there may, as before, be 
more or less fictional, but the unfolding itself is fictive: the actor, the ‘decor’, 
the words one hears are all absent, everything is recoded (as a memory trace 
which is immediately so, without having been something else before), and this 
is still true if what is recorded is not a ‘story’ and does not aim for the fictional 
illusion proper. For it is the signifier itself, and as a whole, that is recorded, that 
is absence: a little rolled up perforated strip which ‘contains’ vast landscapes, 
fixed battles, the melting of the ice on the River Neva, and whole life-times, 
and yet can be enclosed in the familiar round mental tin, of modest dimensions, 
clear proof that it does not ‘really’ contain all that.362 
 
For Metz, cinema is a fantasy, a fictional illusion, and a signifier, whereas, for Bazin, 
cinema is a copycat, imitation, and reproduction of reality. When the signifier of cinema 
symbolizes an absent object and becomes a sign of signification, how then does the 
absent object return? It returns into the unconscious desire of the audience, which, alone 
in a dark theatre, imagines absent objects like voyeurs gazing through the dim keyhole 
called the screen. Metz’s scopic regime of the cinema is the combination of two 
processes: shooting as the absence of the spectator and projection as the absence of the 
actor; and the absence of the object and the codification of the absent object. According 
to Metz’s terminology, the scopic regime of cinema represents absent objects that exist at 
a distance but are sought through voyeurism and visual impulse, which are related to 
perceptional passion. Through fetishism, the spectator gratifies his unconscious desire by 
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identification with the absent object. Hence, the cause is something that does not exist, 
and the semiologist is a person who rediscovers absent things.  
 
The semiotics of Metz indicates the unconscious desire of the spectator behind cinematic 
signification. It consciously explores the operational method of the unconsciousness in 
the structure of the cinematic signifier and the system of narrative. However, aside from 
the theory of cinematographic apparatuses, the semiotics of cinema is not able to save the 
subjectivity and activity of the spectator from the unconsciousness of the subject-
spectator because unconscious desire is a dominant element in cinematic signification. 
Metz considers spectators an existence captivated by the unconscious desire of 
identification and fetishism through the scopic regime of cinema. 
 
Meanwhile, following Metz (or Barthes and Stephan Heath), we ask the following: Is the 
signification of cinema reasonably defined by the activity of language? In the light of the 
validity of cinematic signification, is the opinion of Peter Wollen, which is based on the 
semiotics of Peirce, more feasible than that of Metz, which is based on the semiology of 
Saussure? Peter Wollen suggests that cinema should be understood as a complex of three 
aspects: index, icon, and symbol:  
 
More than anybody else Godard has realised the fantastic possibilities of the 
cinema as a medium of communication and expression. In his hands, as in 
Peirce’s perfect sign, the cinema has become an almost equal amalgam of the 
symbolic, the iconic and the indexical. His films have conceptual meaning, 
Pictorial beauty and documentary truth.363 
 
In contrast to Bazin, Metz’s reliance on the linguistics of Saussure and the psychoanalysis 
of Lacan is an important disadvantage. It is impossible to replace the representative 
system of the cinema with the syntagmatic analysis of narrative because the materiality of 
the image as the nature of the cinema cannot be reduced to ‘language’. As image, the 
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cinema has innate characteristics, such as colours, sounds, depth, duration, and various 
material traces. It thus surpasses the limits of language and interpretation.  
 
Consequently, I claim that Metz’s overall assertion of film semiotics is one sided because 
it overlooks the material traits of film images. In terms of the virtuality of the cinema, the 
film image should be defined as the complex relation between material reality and 
imaginary illusion. The film image should not be reduced to the scientific logic of 
linguistics and psychology because it would lose the ambiguity and sensation of material 
images. There is no doubt that the material immediacy of the cinema cannot be translated 
to the logic of language. The stream of audio and visual images in the spectacle of 
cinema precedes the representative system of narrative. It also promotes sensuous feeling 
over scientific analysis. For this reason, Gilles Deleuze intuits the ontology of cinema as 
image in his influential books on aesthetics, The Logic of Sense and Cinema 1 & 2, in 
which he argues that sensibility takes priority over reason:  
 
Peirce’s strength, when he invented semiotics, was to conceive of signs on the 
basis of images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which 
were already linguistic. This led him to the most extraordinary classification of 
images and signs….. the sign in Peirce apparently combines the three kinds of 
image, but not in any kind of way: the sign is an image which stands for 
another image (its object), through the relation of a third image which 
constitutes ‘its interpretant’, this in turn being a sign, and so on to infinity.364 
 
Deleuze maintains that the movement, that is, the material nature of the image would be 
removed if the image were replaced by the utterance of language. This is because 
cinematic narrative is the result of the combination of images. He condemns Metz’s 
subjective idealism because the latter deletes the movement of objects, that is, the 
modulation of objects. In contrast, Deleuze praises Pierce because he theorizes that a sign 
is not the function of language determinants, but the combination of images. In this 
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context, Deleuze develops his creative theory of the cinema in terms of materialism and 
non-linguistic semiotics, in which movement as matter, and time as the interval of 
movement, encounters the audio-visual sense and signs.  
 
With this in mind, let us move to the issue of recent reappraisals of Metz’s early essay, 
On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema (1965). Gunning raises the issue that Metz 
has a slightly different perspective on the nature of film images in this early essay, 
whereas Metz in later writings considers filmic realism ‘a dangerous ideological illusion’, 
as later apparatus theorists do.365 Gunning claims that Metz’s early essay simply attempts 
to give a psychological effect based film phenomenology. Gunning accentuates that ‘the 
impression of reality’ derives from the movement of film images, which requires the 
phenomenological perception and participation of spectators on the screen: 
 
Metz locates the realistic effect of cinematic motion in its “participatory” effect. 
“Participation” seems to be a magic word in theories of realism that seek to 
overcome the dead ends encountered by correspondence theories of cinema. For 
Bazin, participation describes the relation between the photographic image and its 
object. Likewise, his description of the spectator’s active role in the cinematic 
style that makes use of depth-of-field composition (“it is from [the spectator’s] 
attention and his will that the meaning of the image in part derives” [Bazin’s The 
Evolution of the Language of Cinema, p.36]) indicates an active participation by 
the viewer. For Metz, similarly, participation in the cinematic image is both 
“affective and perceptual,” engendering “a very direct hold on perception,” “an 
appeal of a presence and proximity” (Metz’s On the impression of Reality in the 
Cinema, p.4).366 
 
Through the re-evaluation of Metz’s early essay, Gunning asserts that the reality of film 
depends on cinematic motions and the spectator’s perceptional participation, going 
beyond indexical traces of photographic images. In fact, Metz firmly states that the 
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phenomenological presence of visual appearances on the screen begets the reality of 
impression, that is, the psychological effects of cinematic movement.367 For Metz, the 
cinematic motion is one of the most important causes of the spectator’s impression of 
reality beyond the indexicality of photography: 
 
The strict distinction between object and copy, however, dissolves on the 
threshold of motion. Because movement is never material but is always visual, to 
reproduce its appearance is to duplicate its reality. In truth, one cannot even 
“reproduce” a movement; one can only re-produce it in a second production 
belonging to the same order of reality, for the spectator as the first. It is not 
sufficient to say that film is more “living,” more “animated” than still 
photography, or even that filmed objects are more “materialized.” In the cinema 
the impression of reality is also the reality of the impression, the real presence of 
motion.368 
 
In particular, Metz argues that the reality of the impression is also unreal because it 
consists of nothing but the spectator’s illusion and fantasy, which is immaterial and 
impalpable. However, Metz emphasizes that the cinematic motion combines with the 
spectator’s sensation and perceptive reception of visual images. In this sense, Gunning 
terms the projected moving image of cinema ‘perceiving motion’.369 As Gunning points 
out, Metz claims that the impression of reality is produced by not only the visual 
appearance of film images but also the spectator’s physical and perceptive participation: 
 
Thus, the sum of the spectator's impressions, during a film's projection, is divided 
into two entirely separate "series": according to Henri Wallon’s the "visual series" 
(that is to say, the film, the diegesis) and the "proprioceptive series" (one's sense 
of one's own body) and, therefore, of the real world, which continues to be a 
factor, though weakened, as when one shifts around in one's seat for a more 
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comfortable position. It is because the world does not intrude upon the fiction and 
constantly deny its claim to reality as happens in the theater that a film's diegesis 
can yield the peculiar and well-known impression of reality that we are trying to 
understand here.370 
 
Metz indicates the double status of spectators in the process of film screening. He states 
that the spectator is disconnected from the real world within the space of filmic diegesis 
but that he also is connected with the real world in the space of a real theatre. Particularly, 
Metz emphasises that the perceptual participation of the spectator takes place in the space 
of a real theatre. He demonstrates that the ‘transference’ of theatrical reality invokes the 
spectator’s ‘affective, perceptual, and intellective activity’. Therefore, for Metz, the 
impression of filmic reality is the combination and interaction between the fictional space 
of filmic diegesis and the real space of spectator’s perceptual participation: 
 
All arguments of this kind show that a much clearer distinction is needed even in 
terminology, where the word "real" is forever playing tricks on us between two 
different problems: on the one hand, the impression of reality produced by the 
diegesis, the universe of fiction, what is represented by each art, and, on the other 
hand, the reality of the vehicle of the representation in each art. On the one hand, 
there is the impression of reality; on the other, the perception of reality, that is to 
say, the whole question of the degree of reality contained in the material available 
to each of the representative arts. It is indeed because the art of theater is based on 
means that are too real that the belief in the reality of the diegesis finds itself 
compromised.371 
 
Gunning draws the phenomenological importance of cinematic motion and spectator’s 
sensation from Metz’s concept of ‘the impression of reality’. He claims that the 
‘mercurial’, ‘protean’, and ‘mobile’ nature of cinematic motion can provide an aesthetic 
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analysis of a diversity of film styles with an important tool beyond the proscriptive nature 
of classical films theories.372 In addition, Gunning proposes that the movement of film 
images and the spectator’s sensual attraction can provide a meaningful connection 
between cinema and the new media.373 For him, cinema has an affinity with the new 
media as an art of motion relying on the spectator’s perceptive participation and sensual 
attraction, which goes beyond filmic indexicality. 
 
While Gunning takes note of the relation between the ‘impression of reality’ and the 
‘perceiving motion’ of cinema, Rushton elicits the complexity of filmic reality from 
Metz’s assertion. He pays attention to Metz’s definition of the film image as the 
‘imaginary signifier’. 374  Rushton asks whether Metz’s definition depends on the 
opposition between reality and the imagination. Instead, Rushton extrapolates that Metz 
accurately defines the complex nature of film reality. He asserts that Metz properly 
grasps ‘the reality of the imaginary’, as well as ‘the imagination of reality’. In other 
words, for Rushton, Metz’s assertion shows both the dialectic tension between and 
imbrication of the material reality and the immaterial imagination of cinema. In this 
context, Rushton claims that Metz’s concept of ‘the imaginary’ is different from that of 
illusion or a fantasy. As Silverman points out,375 Rushton separates Metz from both Freud 
and Lacan. For Metz (via Rushton), the cinematic imagination is not Lacanian fetishism 
or hallucination, but is the reality of the film image: 
 
But what is imaginary there, in Metz’s essay, is not necessarily an illusion. Rather, 
on way of drawing the contours of the reality we call cinema is by way of the 
imaginary: ‘imagining’ what the world is like by way of our cinematic experience 
is part and parcel of working out and experiencing that world and its reality.376 
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Based on the ontological ambivalence of film images, Rushton explains that Metz’s 
concept of the imaginary indicates the contradictory nature of reality and the imagination. 
For Metz, the definition of filmic reality is the imaginary; simultaneously, the imaginary 
is not necessarily fetishistic fantasy, but a different and new reality consisting of 
cinematic experience and reality.  
 
Moreover, Metz points out that the imaginary experience of filmic reality is two-fold: a 
visual reality on the screen and a participatory reality of theatrical installation. Metz 
states that the double process of filmic reality designates the imaginary nature of cinema: 
the primary identification (with apparatuses, installation) and the secondary identification 
(with diegetic space). He asks, “What is characteristic of the cinema is not the imaginary 
it may happen to represent, but that imaginary that it is from the start.”377 
 
According to Rushton, Metz denies the distinction between reality and illusion by 
defining the filmic reality as the imaginary. When Metz defines the reality of film as the 
imaginary, he asks whether the imaginary nature of film reality is good or bad. For 
Rushton, Metz’s concept of the imaginary goes beyond fetishistic fantasy and illusion. 
Rushton explains that Metz’s ‘the imaginary’ has nothing to do with a ‘bad’ and 
‘dangerous’ hallucination of film images. Instead, it is both good and bad or it is neither 
good nor bad. The imaginary nature of film is cinematic reality beyond moral judgment. 
In this sense, Rushton asserts that defining the reality of film as imaginary does not 
disparage the cinema as illusion or pretension. Instead, the imaginary reality of film is, 
for Metz, its most innate and essential attribute. 378 Rushton concludes that the cinema is 
imaginary reality beyond fetishistic illusion and fantasy: 
 
Beyond Freud, we might even consider that Metz’s position inherits Edgar 
Morin’s marvellous theses on cinema’s ‘imaginary man’: ‘The cinema is the 
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dialectical unity of the real and the unreal’. By way of cinema’s imaginary 
illusions, humans have the capacity to remake themselves, to reinvent themselves: 
‘[Films] come back upon our waking life to mold it, to teach us how to live or not 
to live… We must try to question them - that is, to reintegrate the imaginary in the 
reality of man’379 
 
According to Rushton’s reappraisal of Metz’s concept, the reality of film is the 
imaginary, and the imaginary reality of film goes beyond the threshold of passive illusion 
and fantasy. In terms of filmic virtualism, Rushton’s argument is useful in establishing 
the new concept of filmic reality between indexicality and the imagination. This is 
because, as I have consistently argued in this thesis, digital virtualism is based on the 
hybrid combination and virtual conjunction between the actual and the virtual, the 
material and the immaterial, and physical reality and the imagination. Hence, I suggest 
that the aesthetics of virtualism can be a useful tool in theorising the ambivalence and 
contradiction of the cinema between the real and the imaginary. 
 
Similarly, Francesco Casetti’s concept of ‘sutured reality’ can provide clues to theorise 
the complexity of film reality. Casetti demonstrates that the concept of reality has always 
occupied a ‘double position’ in film theory.380 He states that physical indexicality as the 
source of the image is linked to the phenomenological and psychological effect of the 
image. For him, the filmic reality is both a precondition and a construction of the image. 
From this point of view, Cassetti proposes the concept of ‘sutured reality’: 
 
Resurrecting an old and unfashionable word, I suggest that these cues must 
provide a “suture.” Not every “sutured” discourse is necessarily “realistic”—
scientific discourses may be sutured too, even if in a different way. Nevertheless, 
my argument is that an impression of reality is generated in film through the 
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establishment of a link that simultaneously provides an imaginary discursive 
coherence and an apparent re-establishment of reality.381 
 
Borrowing the concept from Lacan’s work,382 he claims that the term ‘suture’ indicates 
the very moment in which the structure of the discourse is ‘sealed,’ an instance of 
cohesion is established, and the density of reality is restored. Through the concept of 
‘sutured reality’ as the linkage between the indexical and the imaginary, he emphasises 
the interactive cohesion and density of a wide range of filmic components and 
elements.383  
 
Furthermore, Cassetti asserts that the concept of ‘sutured reality’ can contribute to 
illuminating digital aesthetics in terms of the combination of photographic indexicality 
and computer animation. For him, the end of photographic film implies not the end of a 
realistic attitude, but a new transformation of it. Digital cinema is associated with the new 
reality of computer animation. Cassetti argues that the aesthetics of digital cinema relies 
not simply on the material reality of film, but ‘on the sum of its discursive practices.’384 In 
his view, digital reality is the practical linkage and contradictory negotiation between 
physical indexicality and the imaginary impression of cinema: 
 
Digital realism is a field in need of much more inquiry. What I want to make clear 
is that the satisfaction of the basic “claim for the real” that cinema expresses is 
never fulfilled by a single element—even if it is the apparently fundamental 
indexicality of the signifier or the “transparency” of the representation. This issue 
is taken up in a recent book by Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!—a sort of 
manifesto praising film as an essentially realistic art. I would add that realism is 
produced by a negotiation between contradictory elements—a negotiation capable 
of providing a “suturing point.” It is the presence of these “sutures”—always 
                                                
381 Ibid, p.96. 
382 Jacques-Alain Miller, Suture: Elements of the Logic of the Signifier, Screen 18(4), Winter 1977/78, 
pp.4-30. 
383 Franco Cassetti, Sutured Reality: Film, from Photographic to Digital, October 138, Fall 2011, p.104. 
384 Ibid, p.96. 
 159 
provisional, always fragile—that connects the digital to the realm of reality rather 
than to the realm of animation.385 
 
In summary, in this section I explicated the complex traits of Metz’s semiotics. On one 
hand, in his semiotics the reality of film, relying on linguistics and psychoanalysis, falls 
into the realm of scientific logics and rationality by which the vivid material nature of 
film images is degraded. On the other hand, Metz’s concept of the impression of image 
indicates that the reality of film has a close relation to the imaginary nature of film. As 
Gunning points out in his re-evaluation of Metz’s theory, the impression of reality is 
associated with cinematic motion and the spectator’s perceptive participation. In addition, 
the reality of film, as Rushton refers, combines with the imaginary nature of film beyond 
a fetishistic illusion and hallucination. The physical reality of film cannot be separated 
from the imaginary nature of cinema. As Cassetti indicates, it should be ‘sutured’ by a 
variety of filmic elements and practices. It also evokes the importance of filmic styles and 
sensual perception, as Gunning states. 
 
In this context, I contribute the concept of filmic virtualism. The reality of cinema, either 
photographic or digital, is the dialectical combination of indexical materiality and 
imaginary immateriality, which raises the issue of the importance of cinematic movement 
and the spectator’s sense in the age of digital cinema. This is because digital cinema 
presents the ‘new and enhanced’ contradiction between reality and the imaginary. As I 
already examined in the preceding chapters, the hybrid concept of virtualism as the 
aesthetics of digital virtualism is a theoretical attempt to designate the nature of cinema in 
terms of the complexity of filmic reality and imagination. In the next section, I expand 
this theoretical attempt by critically examining of postmodern hyper-reality.  
 
 
3-3. Postmodernism: Baudrillard and Hyperreality 
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This section investigates Baudrillard’s thoughts of the cinematic image in relation to the 
aesthetics of digital virtuality. First, I deal with his concept of hyperreality and simulation 
in terms of the ontological relation between reality and the image. I claim that 
Baudrillard’s concepts are based on the primacy of the hyper-real image over physical 
reality, which beckons toward the aesthetical nihilism of the distinction between the 
actual and the virtual, the material and the immaterial, and the real and the imaginary. 
Second, I argue his contradictory complexity of the force of cinema in contemporary 
postmodern culture. Although he consistently degrades the capacity and effect of cinema 
by the concept of hyperreality and simulation, he concedes the importance and 
potentiality of film as ‘white magic’ and ‘seduction’. Finally, I examine his negative 
perspectives on the proliferation of digital virtuality. He claims that digital virtuality 
results in the annihilation of reality by the pursuit of ‘technological perfect’ and ‘integral 
reality’. By recounting Baudrillard’s postmodern aesthetics, I explore the ontological 
monism of filmic reality and the aesthetical positivity of digital virtualism. 
 
First, let me begin with Baudrillard’s viewpoint of the ontology of the image. Baudrillard 
defines the image as a special sign that is no longer real.386 For him, the image does not 
have the referent of material objects. Hence, he conceptualises the image as the 
‘hyperreal’ in relation to reality, which means the excess and loss of reality, 
simultaneously.387 For him, the hyperreality of the image goes beyond physical reality. It 
denies and destroys the material reality, instead of imitating and representing the real 
object and referent. By conceptualising ‘hyperreality’ beyond reality, Baudrillard 
describes the paradoxical status of the image in the postmodern view that the signs of the 
real substitute for the real: 
 
The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, 
models of control - and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from 
these. It no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures itself 
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against either an ideal or negative instance. It is no longer anything but 
operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary 
envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of 
combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere.388 
 
According to Nicholas Oberly, the conceptual crux of hyperreality is the simulation and 
simulacrum.389 He argues that simulation is characterized by a blending of reality and 
representation. Baudrillard classifies the image into four successive stages: the reflection 
of a basic reality, the perversion of a basic reality, the absence of a basic reality, and no 
relation to any reality whatever. In the last stage, the image transforms to its own pure 
simulacrum, 390  which is the perfect loss of the relation with reality and representation. 
For Baudrillard, the simulacrum of the image no longer represents reality. It is nothing 
but the hyperreal simulation of the real. Baudrillard mentions that simulation is no longer 
that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality: a hyper-real. 391  Thus, the image, for him, is both 
hyperreality and simulation, that is, the copy without an origin. The copy of the image no 
longer has an origin, a reality, an authenticity, analogy, and indexicality. Instead, it 
destructs and overturns the original of reality. For Baudrillard, the world of the image is 
the realm of the simulacrum, in which takes place the loss of both physical reality and the 
original. He raises the issue that the image cannot represent the authenticity of reality. For 
him, the simulation of the image presents the crisis and impossibility of representation: 
 
Such is simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation 
stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this 
equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, 
stems from the Utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation 
of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every 
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reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it 
as a false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation 
itself as a simulacrum.392 
 
Melanie Chan points out that Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra and simulation is based 
on contemporary capitalism since the 1960s, in which the separation between symbolic 
system and agency proliferated. 393 In his early book, The Consumer Society (1970), 
Baudrillard departs from Marxist thought, which explores the possibility of social 
innovation by the actual force of commodity production.394 Instead, he asserts that the 
consumer society is driven by symbolic systems and mediated agencies. Baudrillard 
claims that the actual production of the commodity is separate from the virtual process of 
its signs and signification. In consumer society, the actual object and referent are replaced 
by the symbolic system and images mediated by technological media.  
 
Accordingly, William Merrin argues that Baudrillard postulates the clear distinction 
between symbolic and semiotics and has a strong critical sympathy with the symbolic as 
a higher mode of existence.395 For Baudrillard, the transformation of capitalism from 
commodity production to symbolic signification brings about the primacy of the 
symbolic image over actual reality. In this regard, Merrin establishes a link between 
Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum and the ontology of technological media. In 
particular, Merrin contrasts Baudrillard’s pessimistic view to McLuhan’s optimistic view 
of the symbolic mediation of media and images: 
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Thus electronic media are one of the main sources of the sign's production and 
replacement of the symbolic, leading him to reverse McLuhan's conclusion that 
they lead to a direct, extended, real participation in the world. Instead, he argues, 
they offer a "filtered, fragmented world", "industrially processed" by the media 
"into sign material". "So we live", Baudrillard says, "sheltered by signs, in the 
denial of the real", safe in our absence from the world, whilst enjoying the alibi of 
participation provided by its semiotic simulacrum. The media, therefore, 
simultaneously actualise and spectacularly dramatise the real and de-actualise it, 
distancing us from it in the perfection of its simulation and its consumption in a 
safe, semiotic form.396 
 
According to Douglas Kellner, Baudrillard considers media, such as TV, photographs, 
film, and digital gadgets, ‘key simulation machines’ that reproduce images, signs, and 
codes constituting an autonomous realm of hyper-reality and the obliteration of the 
social.397 Baudrillard argues that the hyperreal image simulated by technological media 
gives rise to the ‘obscenity’ of the world and the ‘inertia’ of the mass caused by the 
meaninglessness of reality and the impossibility of representation.398 He describes that the 
excess and explosion of information and the image causes the ‘implosion’ of all 
meaning.399 The hyperreal image and simulated sign implode the meaning of reality and 
the subjectivity of the mass. Baudrillard’s nihilist vision of the hyperreal image is 
specifically revealed in his later essays. He sarcastically envisions the digitalisation of 
media and the virtualization of images in terms of ‘the desert of the real’: 
 
Illusion, dreams, passion, madness, drugs but also artifice and simulacrum were 
the natural predators of reality. All these have lost their energy as if they were 
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suffering from some incurable, surreptitious disease (that might very well be 
reality itself). One needs then to find an artificial equivalent for them. Otherwise, 
once it has reached a critical mass, reality will spontaneously destroy itself. It will 
implode by itself – which it is already doing now, making room for the Virtual in 
all its forms. The Virtual is the ultimate predator, the plunderer of reality.400 
 
Baudrillard’s ontology of the image, which is based on the unreal and falsity of the 
simulacrum and virtuality, certainly contrasts Deleuze’s concepts. Although they share 
the similar terminology of ‘simulacrum’, by comparing differences between Baudrillard 
and Deleuze, we arrive at a point opposite simulacrum. Above all, in terms of the 
aesthetical ontology of images, Baudrillard separates absolutely the simulacrum of the 
image from the material reality. For him, the hyperreal simulation is no longer the realm 
of physical reality; it loses the material object and referent. The ‘divine irreference of the 
image’401 is segregated from the real meaning of the physical world. For him, the image is 
never exchanged for the real. He considers that the image is only exchanged for itself. 
For Baudrillard, the image exists not in physical reality, but in the spectacle and play of 
symbolic images and signs. In this regard, Baudrillard articulates that the simulacra of the 
image and the sign are not in the realm of physical reality, but in the world of ‘symbolic 
exchange’, which breaks down the materiality and movement of the world.402   
 
In contrast, Deleuze argues for the material nature of the image. For Deleuze, simulacra 
are not contrary to physical reality, but are new forms of reality, which is not the unreal 
or non-real, but the real itself. In terms of material monism, Deleuze claims that the 
simulacra of the image are the realm of materiality, in which the movement of objects 
and the complexity of time ceaselessly encounter and interact in the plane of 
immanence.403  
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According to Clair Colebrook, Baudrillard considers only one side of the relation 
between the real and the simulation, reality and the image, the material and the 
immaterial, and the actual and the virtual.404 Colebrook claims that Baudrillard’s ontology 
of the image is based on the rigid distinction between the actual and the virtual, while 
Deleuze conceives the endless becoming of the actual and the virtual. For Deleuze, the 
actual is already an image, and actual being is produced by virtual possibilities. The 
physical reality emerges and transforms from the becoming process of the virtual, the 
image, and the simulacrum. Deleuze emphasises the incessant and endless ‘becoming’ of 
the actual and the virtual and the real and the imaginary. For Deleuze, the reality is 
always the ‘actual-virtual circuit’,405 in which the actual is virtualising, and the virtual is 
actualising. Deleuze’s simulacrum does not mean the similarity and analogy of the image 
to the model. It is not a reproductive image of reality, but physical reality itself. They are 
nothing but the multiplicity of singularity, which Deleuze calls ‘the univocity of being’.406 
 
Conversely, for Baudrillard, the ontological separation of the image from reality entails 
the negative worldview of simulacra. According to Gary Genosko, Baudrilllard arrives at 
a ‘hopeless’ reality, in which the simulation and virtualisation of the image falls down the 
‘alibi of referent’ and the ‘effect of the sign’.407 Baudrillard offers a pessimistic vision in 
postmodern society, which exhibits the ‘special effect’408 of simulated images instead of 
the authenticity of physical reality. In a sense, his cynical assertion of hyperreal images 
paradoxically invokes his hopeless sympathy with the authenticity and transparency of 
the real. He contrasts the ‘good’ realm of physical reality to the ‘bad’ territory of 
simulacra. For him, the simulacrum is a ‘false’ evil in opposition to ‘true’ reality. 
Consequently, as Christopher Norris observes, Baudrillard’s postmodern ontology of 
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images relies on a ‘sceptical mistrust’, in which ‘there is no possibility of distinguishing 
truth from falsehood’.409 Baudrillard concludes that the simulacrum of the virtual image is 
the ‘perfect extermination’ of physical reality.410  
 
Baudrillard’s ontology of the image, which postulates the absolute isolation from the 
material reality, is connected to the radical criticism of the cinema in relation to the 
precession of hyperreal images. Baudrillard’s position on the cinema is ambivalent but 
consistent. On one hand, he intensely favours cinematic magic and illusion. For him, the 
cinema is a ‘mythical image’, celebrated irreplaceably and blessed specially by its 
attractive imagination. Of his intimacy with cinema, he says, “I like the cinema. Of all the 
spectacles it’s even the only one I do like”.411 Because of his intense fascination with 
cinematic magic, Baudrillard firmly appraises the affirmative capacity and possibility of 
cinematic movement and time: 
 
cinema too can recover the specific quality of the image – which is both complicit 
with, and apparently foreign to, narration – having its own static intensity, though 
fired with all the energy of movement, crystallizing a whole course of events in a 
still image by a principle of condensation that runs counter to the principle of high 
dilution and dispersion of all our current images. In Godard, for example.412 
 
Nevertheless, for Baudrillard, the cinema is none other than the ‘white magic’413 of 
simulated images, separating and seducing the mass from the world of actual reality. He 
strongly denounces the hyperreal images of cinema. Baudrillard contrasts the ‘pure 
image’ of the photograph to the ‘simulated’ image of cinema. For him, while the 
photograph is a medium maintaining the power of illusion and enigma, cinema is an 
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‘impure’ and ‘contaminated’ image fabricating and manipulating the actual movement 
and the real time. He describes that, while the photographed image leaves behind the 
‘impenetrable enigma’ and illusion of the object, the illusional capacity of cinematic 
images vanishes in the evolution of the technological process from silent movies to 
talkies, colour, high technology, and special effects. In other words, Baudrillard claims 
that the technological development of cinema toward realism causes the disappearance of 
the imaginary and the magic nature of cinematic image. While the photograph denies the 
reality of the image but retains the pure state of illusion, cinema pursues physical reality 
but loses the illusionary traits of the image. Here Baudrillard’s point is that the cinema 
reaches the hyperreal state by its technological simulation of physical reality, in which 
the ‘pure’ illusion of the image increasingly disappears: 
 
the photographic image is the purest because it simulates neither time nor 
movement and confines itself to the most rigorous unreality. All the other forms 
(cinema, video, computer generated images) are merely attenuated forms of the 
pure image and its rupture with the real.414 
 
Baudrillard criticises the ‘impure’ hyperreality of technological images. Technological 
automatism deprives the cinematic image of magical illusion as well as traces of reality. 
For Baudrillard, the technological development of the virtual image results in the loss of 
the pure image, the annihilation of physical reality, and the hyperreality of simulated 
images.415  
 
In this regard, Gerry Coulter points out that Baudrillard’s concept of cinematic 
hyperreality is associated with the obsession of technology and realism.416 According to 
Coulter, Baudrillard’s concept of cinema has been on a ‘downward trajectory’ over the 
past century, from the fantastic and mythical, to the realistic and hyperrealistic. In 
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particular, for Baudrillard, the technological development of cinematic virtuality, 
progressing from talkies, to colour, to the recent digital technology, has resulted in the 
‘further degradation of the image’.417 Moreover, with increasing simulation and ‘special 
effects’, cinema no longer believes in itself.418 It is not the representation of physical 
reality, but the ‘disappearance of the reality’.419 For Baudrillard, the hyperreal image of 
cinema mediated technological virtuality exterminates the ‘pure’ dream and fantasy of 
images. 
 
Although it is true that Baudrillard disparages the technological virtuality and ontological 
reality of the cinema, he also suggests the examples of some ‘good’ films in terms of the 
‘growing blurring between the real and the virtual’.420 As it were, his complex position on 
cinema does not dismiss the possibility of ‘good’ films, such as Minority Report (Stephen 
Spielberg, 2002), Mulholland Drive (David Lynch, 2001), and The Truman Show (Peter 
Weir, 1998). Baudrillard considers that these ‘good’ films treat the increasing 
indistinction between the real and the virtual. In contrast, Baudrillard consistently alerts 
against ‘bad’ films of pornography and ‘cool cinema’ of disaster and terrorism,421 which 
remove the possibility of illusion in the radical sense.422 Baudrillard definitely criticises 
the hyperreal ontology of cinematic images and the ‘desperate’ state of technological 
virtuality. Nevertheless, his fascination with cinematic images leads to his vision that 
there is a minimal possibility for the restoration of cinematic illusion and fantasy. 
Regarding this point, as Coulter points out,423 we can discover Baudrillard’s ambivalent 
attitude toward cinematic images, in which he tries to give a strict warning about the 
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disempowering aspect of our contemporary lives, despite his pessimistic vision of 
hyperreal images.  
 
Baudrillard’s view of The Matrix trilogy (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999-2003) 
precisely shows his position on cinematic ontology. He criticises that The Matrix trilogy 
is dedicated to attesting to the separation of simulacrum and the virtual world from actual 
reality. For him, the virtual world of The Matrix is nothing but absolute isolation from the 
reality and the ‘disappearance of the real’424. The Matrix’s virtual images replace reality 
with technological simulation. Thus, he denounces not only technological virtuality but 
also aesthetic confusion based on the rigid distinction between the actual and the virtual. 
The Matrix, for Baudrillard, cannot be a ‘good’ movie because it eludes his concept of 
hyperreality as the binary opposition between the actual and the virtual: 
 
The most embarrassing part of the film is that the new problem posed by 
simulation is confused with its classical, Platonic treatment. This is a serious flaw. 
The radical illusion of the world is a problem faced by all great cultures, which 
they have solved through art and symbolization. What we have invented, in order 
to support this suffering, is a simulated real, which henceforth supplants the real 
and is its final solution, a virtual universe from which everything dangerous and 
negative has been expelled. And The Matrix is undeniably part of that. Everything 
belonging to the order of dream, utopia and phantasm is given expression, 
‘realized’. [...] The Matrix is surely the kind of film about the matrix that the 
matrix would have been able to produce.425 
 
In this sense, Catherine Constable argues that Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality 
concerns the ‘mythic aspects’ of the virtual world.426 She claims that Baudrillard denies 
the dichotomy between the real and the hyperreal, and focuses on the ‘mythological 
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material’ within the virtual world of the simulacrum. For Constable, Baudrillard’s mythic 
aspect is not the ‘hope of returning to the real’,427 but a new alternative within a pure 
simulacrum. She claims that Baudrillard’s hyperreality reconceptualises a single, all-
encompassing, universe of simulation as a series of differential worlds.428 She explains 
that Baudrillard’s hyperreality should be grasped according to the concept of ‘difference’ 
and ‘progression’ within the universe of simulacra. For Constable, the mythological 
material within simulacra leads to a re-interpretion of Baudrillard’s concept of 
hyperreality as a progressive potentiality and alternative beyond his nihilist vision: 
 
In Baudrillard’s work the image of the mirror curving over on itself, imploding 
dialectical opposition, is also the visual demarcation of a final zero, signifying the 
end of meaning and choice within the hyperreal. The possible, alternative, 
differential worlds of science fiction are merged into the single universe of 
simulation with the result that there are no possibilities or alternatives any more. 
The Matrix Trilogy reintroduces the concept of the differential into its version of 
the hyperreal. This is done through the presentation of a series of hyperreal 
worlds: the matrix, the vats, Zion and the machine city, among others… The 
introduction of the concepts of difference and progression to the hyperreal means 
that The Matrix Trilogy can be seen to draw on Baudrillard’s imagery without 
promulgating his nihilism.429 
 
In contrast to Constable’s positive reinterpretation of Baudrillard’s hyperreality in terms 
of the ‘mythic material’ within the universe of simulacra, Andrew Gordon claims that 
Baudrillard’s view of simulated virtuality does not suggest a vision of the affirmative 
possibility of physical reality.430 For Gordon, Baudrillard’s simulacrum is none other than 
a ‘symbolic system’ of codes and signs separated from the realm of the real. Baudrillard’s 
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vision of simulacra, which relies on the ‘symbolic intervention’ and ‘implosion’,431 does 
not conceive any positive implication in relation to the interaction with physical reality. 
In this sense, Gordon articulates that the solution of The Matrix trilogy is more 
reasonable than is Baudrillard’s sceptical assertion of the redemption of the real. For 
Gordon, this is because Neo’s hope of ‘returning to the real’ or ‘true love’ provides a 
practical alternative to the ‘symbolic implosion’ of simulacra: “The Matrix offers a 
solution to the problem of simulation whereas Baudrillard believes there is none”.432  
 
Although there are many different views of Baudrillard’s concept of simulation, it is clear 
that he designates the nature of cinematic images in terms of hyperreality and virtuality 
beyond the representative territory of physical reality. As Coulter points out, Baudrillard 
was well aware of the ‘mythical properties’ of the cinematic images.433 In addition, David 
Clarke indicates that Baudrillard’s thought on simulation and its relation to seduction 
carries significant, untapped potential for film theory.434 Baudrillard states that the heart 
of the cinematic myth is seduction.435 He defines seduction as ‘the destiny of appearance’, 
as opposed to the ‘truths of deep structure’.436 For Baudrillard, seduction is the pure form 
of radical obscenity, which is visible and undifferentiated. He claims that, while 
simulation is a disenchanted form, seduction is an ‘enchanted form’. Thus, the seduction 
of cinema is the ‘enchanted’ realm of appearance and illusion beyond actual objects. For 
Baudrillard, the power of cinema originates in the fascinating, magic, attractive force of 
signs and spectacles. The seduction of the cinematic image is the symbolic, illusionary 
and ‘diabolical’ challenge to the truth of reality.437 It is a slippage of reality, and it 
seduces reality by the play of signs and illusions. As Clark accurately points out, 
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Baudrillard indicates the illusionary nature of cinematic images in his concept of 
simulation and seduction.438 
 
Similarly, Alan Cholodenko observes that Baudrillard approaches film with the primal 
joy of a child, with fascination, illusion, myth, magic, seduction and cryptic 
complexity.439 Moreover, he emphasises that Baudrillard’s assertion of hyperreal films is 
none other than the criticism of ‘hyperrealkitsch’, that is, the pure and empty simulation 
of hyperreal cinema. For Cholodenko, Baudrillard’s hyperreal cinema is the ‘hyper-
Cryptic Complex’ and ‘hyperreal-attraction’ beyond real referents and representation.440 
Cholodenko argues that Baudrillard’s hyperreal cinema is a contradictory articulation of 
the reality and virtuality of cinematic images: 
 
But hyperreal film is not a matter of simple reversal, of film becoming reality and 
reality becoming film, but rather of film becoming at once more and less film than 
film and at the same time more and less reality than reality, as hyperreality is 
reality at once more and less reality than reality and at the same time more and 
less film than film. In other words, it is a matter not of simple reversal but rather 
of hyper-indetermination, as each takes off on its own hyperanimated, 
hyperanimatic trajectory, each denegating the other and itself more and more, 
leaving one in an increasingly definitive state of radical, virtual uncertainty.441   
 
In this regard, Baudrillard’s ambivalent position on cinematic ontology is connected to an 
intense refutation of the domination of hyperreal cinema. In particular, in his later 
writings he strongly criticizes the increasing virtuality of cinematic images simulated by 
digital technology. According to Merrin, in his later works Baudrillard rethinks 
hyperreality as ‘virtuality’. Merrin explains that Baudrillard separates the concept of 
virtuality from the Aristotelian logic of ‘virtual reality’ with its connotations of an 
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inferior, artificial reality. Merrin argues that Baudrillard’s virtuality is that which takes 
the place of the real and thus is its final solution insofar as it both accomplishes the world 
in its definite reality and marks its dissolution. Baudrillard claims that the ‘technical 
perfection’ of digital images results in the haziness of the actual object and the radical 
disavowal of reality. 442  The virtuality of digital images destroys the world of 
representation and causes the ‘death of god’ and a ‘desert of the real’.443 The ‘excess of 
the real’ pursued by digital simulation brings about the ‘extermination of the real’. The 
meaning and signification of the realistic image implode in the virtuality of digital 
simulation.444 Baudrillard pessimistically envisions the total annihilation of physical 
reality and historical time in the virtuality of digital images: 
 
The same goes for everything that has to do with virtual reality and synthesized 
models. Digital and programmed, the real does not even have time to happen. It is 
sanitized (prophylactisé), pulverized, short-circuited in its shell like the crime in 
Minority Report. Thinking itself is anticipated by models of artificial intelligence. 
Time itself, the time already lived out that has no more time to take place, is 
captured and spirited away by virtual time, which we choose, mockingly no 
doubt, to call “real time.” The historical time of the event, the psychological time 
of affect and passion, the subjective time of judgment and will, all are being 
questioned simultaneously. We will not even give time to time.445 
 
In this context, Baudrillard degrades the digital aesthetics of ‘real time’ and 
‘interaction’.446 For him, real time and interactive aesthetics are a kind of ‘violence’ 
against time and the event. On the real-time screen simulated by computer manipulation, 
all possibilities are realized virtually, which means the end to their possibility. All 
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potentialities of cinematic images are auto-programmed by computer simulation beyond 
both actual and material time. In addition, the virtual manipulation of images by 
computer programs and interaction results in the disruption and perversion of realistic 
images. As Merrin properly mentions, Baudrillard indicates that technological 
‘interaction’ is the loss of humanity to machines and digital gadgets that is, ‘technical 
fetishism’ and ‘biological confusion’.447 Eventually, Baudrillard claims that real time and 
interaction mediated by digital simulation cause the dematerialization of historical time 
and reality. For him, the aesthetics of digital virtuality is ‘violence’ against physical 
reality and humanity. 
 
Furthermore, Baudrillard asserts that digital virtuality is ‘the end of aesthetic illusion’, as 
well as the extermination of physical reality and historical time. 448 Baudrillard defines the 
digital virtuality as ‘integral reality’, in which the annihilation of physical reality and 
aesthetic illusion takes place in the spectacle of simulated images. Integral reality is the 
world of virtuality pursued by technological perfection and realistic desire. The desire for 
perfect realism begets the faultless images of computer cinema as modified and 
manipulated by computer simulation. For Baudrillard, the cinematic virtuality 
synthesized by the computer is not only ‘technical fetishism’ but also aesthetic violence. 
There is no room for fuzziness or tremor; neither is space left to chance. Baudrillard 
claims that the digital cinema as manipulated by technological perfection is no longer 
conveys images of pure illusion, signs, appearance, and magic. Therefore, the integral 
reality of digital cinema, for him, is ‘the death of pure illusion and sign’.449 
 
It is clear that Baudrillard describes the aesthetics of digital virtuality in terms of his 
consistent pessimism regarding technological progress and realism. Nevertheless, 
Baudrillard dreams of the pure illusion and poetic seduction of cinematic images, 
especially in his later works. He suggests the concept of ‘tremor’ along with 
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Lichtenberg’s aphorism. 450  Baudrillard attempts to derive a new possibility in the 
‘hopeless’ world of hyperreality and digital virtuality. In the violence and misery of the 
world, he desperately covets ‘genuine images’ of cinema as the ‘hologram of the world’: 
 
I dream of an image that would be the automatic writing of the singularity of the 
world – after the Iconoclastic dream of Byzantium… The Iconoclasts rejected 
violently all other images, human-made icons that, according to them, were mere 
simulacra of the divine, acheiropoiesis. Similarly, we, modern iconoclasts, might 
reject all those images that are mere simulacra resembling the real, or an idea, an 
ideology, whichever truth. Most images are of that type, but virtual images even 
more so. They resemble nothing.451 
 
According to Chan, Baudrillard’s later works suggest the possibility of reality in the limit 
of simulacra.452 Chan claims that Baudrillard’s notion of ‘systemic anomalies’453 can be 
read in a positive light because it offers the meaningful potential of reality in digital 
virtuality. Chan evaluates that Baudrillard attempts to discover a new symbolic domain of 
images in the inevitable gap between reality and simulacrum. In addition, Merrin states 
that Baudrillard’s radical analysis of digital virtuality remains one of the best mythologies 
in accessing the postmodern techno-culture as the desert of the real.454 He claims that 
Baudrillard’s extreme denial of the possibility of digital images is a useful tool in the 
analysis of the extreme domination of simulacra. In this sense, Baudrillard could be a 
useful provocateur455 in the development of an aesthetical concept and theoretical strategy 
of simulation and digital virtuality, despite his exaggerated polarization and gloomy 
prospect. As Cholodenko wisely points out, Baudrillard’s complicated position on the 
cinematic image and digital virtuality should be contemplated as the ambivalent 
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relationship between the hyperreality of today’s apocalyptic world and the ‘radical 
uncertainty’ of hyperreal ‘bad’ cinema.456  
 
In summary, in this section I argued that Baudrillard’s ontology of cinematic images is 
based on the superiority of hyperreality and simulation over material objects and 
referents, which indicates the desperate status of physical reality by the proliferation of 
computer simulation. For him, digital virtuality pursued by ‘technological perfect’ and 
the obsession of realism gives rise to the extermination of physical reality. He claims that 
the excess of reality causes the loss of reality in simulated images of digital virtuality. His 
pessimistic view absolutely separates the aesthetics of digital virtuality from the positive 
potential of physical reality and the pure illusion of cinematic images.  
 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to mention Baudrillard’s complex position of cinematic 
images and digital virtuality. He takes note of mythological and magic traits of cinema by 
the concept of simulation and seduction. He suggests a practical possibility of ‘good’ 
movies in blurred boarder between physical realty and simulacrum, against hyperreal 
‘bad’ movies exhibiting the spectacle of pornography and terrorism. He dreams the pure 
illusion and ‘uncertainty revolution’457 of cinematic images despite of the obsession of 
technical perfect and realism by computer-simulated images. I conclude that 
Baudrillard’s positive assertion of cinematic images in his later works should be 
reappraised in terms of the aesthetics of digital virtualism. It implies the complex 
imbrication and interaction between physical reality and the illusionary image. In the next 
chapter, I demonstrate that Deleuze’s affirmative aesthetics of digital virtuality go beyond 
Baudrillard’s negative aesthetics of hyperreality and simulation. 
 
 
3-4. After Postmodernism: Digital Aesthetics beyond Postmodernism 
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In this section, I deal with new tendencies of digital aesthetics after postmodernism. With 
the growth of computer simulation, media convergence, and interactive aesthetics, the 
aesthetics of digital images raises the issues of postmodern hyper-reality. There is a 
significant imperative to examine the similarities and differences between postmodernism 
and digital aesthetics in the changing world of the information society and the digital 
revolution.  
 
Here, my point is that digital ontology goes beyond postmodernism, although digital 
images share some of the characteristics of postmodernism. In fact, the postmodern 
aesthetic was born and has grown in the environmental condition of analogue images. 
Historically, the emergence and prosperity of postmodernism precedes the full-fledged 
development of digital images since the 1990s. While postmodernism mainly depends on 
analogue technology, the digital aesthetic is based on the interactivity and convergence of 
computer media. Furthermore, in terms of cinematic reality, digital aesthetics proposes a 
different ontology of image configuration from postmodernism. While postmodern 
aesthetics radically postulates the superiority of hyper-real images over physical reality, 
digital virtualism suggests the hybrid aesthetics of physical reality and virtual image.  In 
this section, I emphasize that digital virtualism moves toward a new phase of image 
configuration beyond postmodern simulation and hyper-reality. 
 
Regarding postmodernism and digital aesthetics, early disputes focused on the close 
relationship between postmodernism and digital cinema. Andrew Darley argues that the 
emergence of the digital image since the 1990s is associated with the aesthetics of 
postmodernism.458 Darley asserts that the first 3D animation movie, Toy Story (1995), 
presented the hyper-real aesthetics of postmodernism beyond the representative aesthetics 
of realism. For him, digital cinema has to do with the aesthetics of postmodernism in 
terms of the method of image configuration such as parody, pastiche, and collage. In a 
similar context, Lev Manovich points out that digital technology has an intimate 
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relationship with the aesthetics of postmodernism. He considers computer technology 
based on the logic of ‘cut and paste’ to be related to new forms of postmodern culture in 
which the reality is consistently manipulated and transformed by the computer-simulated 
image itself:  
 
And at the same time, to large extent it is this software which made post-
modernism possible. The shift of all cultural production to first electronic tools 
such as switchers and DVEs (1980s) and then to computer-based tools (1990s) 
greatly eased the practice of relying on old media content in creating new 
productions. It also made media universe much more self-referential, because 
when all media objects are designed, stored and distributed using a single 
machine — computer — it becomes much easier to borrow elements from already 
existing objects. Here again the Web became the perfect expression of this logic, 
since new Web pages are routinely created by copying and modifying already 
existing Web pages. This applies both for home users creating their home pages 
and for professional Web, hypermedia, and game development companies.459 
 
However, I would argue that the aesthetics of digital virtuality surpasses postmodern 
aesthetics despite the formal similarity and homogeneity between the digital image and 
postmodern aesthetics. Historically, while postmodern movements have gradually 
decreased since the late 1990s, the development of digital technology has proliferated 
more and more since that time. In other words, contemporary digital culture raises 
different questions in a new historical context beyond the boundary of postmodernism. 
Moreover, in terms of image aesthetics, ‘de-historicity’ 460  and the hyper-reality of 
postmodernism have nothing to do with the interactive and participatory aspects of digital 
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virtuality. The digital aesthetics aligned with the new socio-cultural demand of 
information and network in the twenty-first century has gradually separated from the 
aesthetics of postmodernism. Although Darley and Manovich grasp the tendency of 
postmodernism in the methodology of computer simulation (e.g., pastiche, parody, and 
digital collage), the aesthetic of digital virtualism proceeds to a broader concept and new 
levels of cinematic images. This difference between postmodernism and digital aesthetics 
is derived from the spread of digital convergence and interactivity beyond the hyper-
reality of postmodernism based on the dichotomy between reality and image. The digital 
aesthetic, especially digital virtualism in my terminology, is a hybrid imbrication and a 
virtual conjunction between reality and images, while postmodernism depends on the 
primacy of simulacrum over physical reality. The aesthetic of digital virtualism is a 
denial of the dualistic separation between reality and image, and an affirmation of 
creative traversal and production of new reality. Thus, the end of postmodern history is 
replaced by the beginning of digital aesthetics. Although the historical imbrication and 
aesthetic homogeneity between postmodernism and digital aesthetics are still persistent, 
digital virtualism distinguishes its aesthetical ontology from postmodern de-historicity 
and hyper-reality.  
 
In this context, Manuel Castells’s theory of ‘network society’461 gives a socio-cultural 
basis of theoretical arguments related to the decay of postmodernism and the historical 
transition to a new aesthetic. The spread of digital aesthetics is closely associated with the 
interactive networking of digital information. With regard to the theory of the 
information society, there are many mainstream scholars highlighting the new utopia of 
capitalism based on information and knowledge: Daniel Bell’s ‘post-industrial society’,462 
Peter Drucker’s ‘knowledge society’,463 and Alvin Toffler’s ‘third wave’. 464 Castells 
approaches the theory of the information society by the framework of ‘the network 
society.’ Above all, unlike the mainstream scholars’ uncritical opinion of capitalism, 
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Castells illuminates the process of the digital information revolution in terms of the 
‘restructuring of capitalism’. 465  He denies the technological determinism of the 
mainstream scholars and stresses that the network society implies the comprehensive 
networks of all elements of society including economic, political, and socio-cultural 
factors. In addition, Castells suggests more general and radical characteristics of the 
network society than Jan van Dijk, who first used the term ‘network society.’466 Catells 
claims that information networks have become the basic units of contemporary 
capitalism. For him, the network society is the new social morphology and an 
architecture in which the complex networks of capital, commodity, human, knowledge, 
and information flow and entangle without individual separation. Finally, Castells 
emphasizes the core role of computer networks and the Internet. He defines the network 
society as ‘flow society’,467 in which capital and labour, human and information are 
linked and exchanged by computer networks and digital media. He also notes that 
computer networks and the Internet promote the global network society beyond 
geographical boundaries. Consequently, for Castells, the rise of interactive networks by 
new digital media results in the diversification of mass audience and the ‘culture of real 
virtuality’ in which all realities are virtually perceived and communicated through 
symbols: 
 
What is then a communication system that, in contrast to earlier historical 
experience, generates real virtuality? It is a system in which reality itself (that is, 
people’s material/symbolic existence) is entirely captured, fully immersed in a 
virtual image setting, in the world of make believe, in which appearances are not 
just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but they become 
the experience. (Castells’s emphasis) 468 
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While Castells focuses on the sociological implication of digital networks, Antonio Negri 
and Michael Hardt suggest more politically radical and class-centred perspectives of 
digital culture and aesthetics beyond postmodernism. In particular, they consistently 
assert ‘new forms of class antagonism’ in postmodern capitalism.469 Negri and Hardt 
emphasise  the increased possibility of class struggle in postmodern society, opposing the 
de-historicity and nihilism of postmodernism. They consider the aesthetics of 
postmodernism the cultural logic of neoliberal and global capitalism. As Negri and Hardt 
claim, the empire of multinational capitalism no longer has an ‘outside’.470 Neoliberalism 
throws away the public sphere and neutral territory of humans and society (education, 
health, culture, environment, democratic values, and even the human body) into the cold 
water of privatization and egoism under the logic of fetishism in financial capitalism. 
Neoliberalism relies on unlimited competition and absolute efficiency. In addition, 
factory labour is converted to ‘social labour’ by the flexible system of capital 
accumulation and the generalisation of ‘immaterial labour’ forced by computerization 
and informationisation.471 As ‘the social worker’, who is working and living in the 
immaterial and virtual networks, the middle class falls into the proletariat. The real 
subsumption of labour by capital pervades all areas of society. While the invasion of 
capital spreads into the lifeworld of people, the resistance of people to protect their lives 
and the public sphere develops into a full-scale phase, or to borrow Negri’s words, the 
global multitude struggle for the right to ‘global citizenship’.472 Even if many economists 
and futurologists foresee that the information-oriented and knowledge-based economy 
will give rise to the elimination of the class struggle, the antagonism between capital and 
labour extends to the whole of the informationised society beyond the factory. Unlike the 
abstract thoughts of some postmodernists, the lifeworld of the masses as captured by 
capitalism is tightly bound up with commercialisation and privatisation. However, the 
more multinational corporations fiercely subsume the public sphere and the lifeworld of 
people, the more the multitude struggles to protect its lifeworld and citizenship. The 
productive desire and deviant traversal of the multitude becomes stronger in countries 
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around the world where capital invades and destroys the rights of people and the public 
sphere. Therefore, the cultural logic of postmodernism also has historical and practical 
meanings in the context of the movement of global citizenship and collective intelligence 
related to anti-capitalism. Negri and Hardt highlight the subjective and practical struggle 
for global citizenship of the multitude beyond historical scepticism and postmodern 
nihilism. 
 
As a result, Castelles’s ‘network society’ and Negri and Hardt’s ‘autonomia movement of 
multitude’ indicates the limitation of postmodernism in the informationised society 
reliant on computer networks and immaterial labour. According to them, the digital, 
global, and network society requires new thoughts and aesthetics beyond postmodernism. 
In this context, many analysts proclaim the demise of postmodern aesthetics somewhere 
in the late 1990s or early 2000s. Linda Hutcheon claims that the postmodern moment has 
passed, even though its discursive strategies and its ideological critique continue to live 
on. Hutcheon declares that postmodernism needs a new label of its own.473 Alan Kirby 
also declares the death of postmodernism and explores its historical successor, ‘pseudo-
modernism’.474 He asserts that, while the shift from modernism to postmodernism did not 
stem from any profound reformation in the conditions of cultural production and 
reception, the spread of new digital technologies violently re-structured the relationship 
between the author and the reader and the text and the viewer: 
 
Postmodernism conceived of contemporary culture as a spectacle before which 
the individual sat powerless, and within which questions of the real were 
problematised. It therefore emphasised the television or the cinema screen. Its 
successor, which I will call pseudo-modernism, makes the individual’s action the 
necessary condition of the cultural product. Pseudo-modernism includes all 
television or radio programmes or parts of programmes, all ‘texts’, whose content 
and dynamics are invented or directed by the participating viewer or listener 
(although these latter terms, with their passivity and emphasis on reception, are 
                                                
473 L. Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, New York, London: Routledge, 2002, p.181.  
474 Alan Kirby, The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond, Philosophy Now 58, 2006, pp.34-37.  
 183 
obsolete: whatever a telephoning Big Brother voter or a telephoning football fan 
are doing, they are not simply viewing or listening).475 
 
Similarly, Nicolas Bourriaud announces the demise of postmodernism and the imperative 
demand of alternative aesthetics in the global network society. 476  He claims that 
postmodernism has the historical background between of the oil crisis in 1973 and the 
end of Cold War in 1989. He argues that postmodernism is connected with the economic 
crisis related to world energy consumption. For him, postmodernism is ‘the philosophy of 
mourning,’ confronted with the economic and social crisis of capitalism between the 
1970s and the 1990s. It is a long melancholic episode in our cultural life, a loss of 
historical direction and a depression of lost reality. In particular, he claims that the 
collapse of the globalized financial system in the autumn of 2008 appears to mark a 
definite turning point from postmodernism to a new aesthetic. He believes that the overall 
catastrophe of capitalism caused by the global economic crisis in 2008 requires a new 
perspective and vision to overcome the nihilism of postmodernism. Bourriaud calls this 
new aesthetic ‘altermodernism’,477 which means a different and alternative aesthetic 
beyond postmodernism. He argues that altermodrnism is a heterochronic temporality and 
a spatially nomadic strategy in the global network society.  
 
At the level of the aesthetic ontology of the digital image, there are two different ways to 
go beyond the delimitation of postmodernism; one direction is realism, the other is 
modernism. While realism focuses on the representation of physical reality, modernism 
concentrates on the illusion and experiment of virtual images. The limit and crisis of 
postmodernism again evokes the aesthetic of realism and modernism in new conditions of 
digital technology and network society. Although the points between realism and 
modernism are slightly different, they are entangled with each other in order to move 
forward an alternative aesthetic after postmodernism. The aesthetics of ‘post-
postmodernism’ stems from new forms of realism and modernism. It is both realism and 
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(post) modernism and neither realism nor (post) modernism. The new aesthetic after 
postmodernism was born and has grown in the new environment of digital networks. It is 
the aesthetic of digital virtualism based on the historical hybridity and aesthetic 
complexity. After investigating the dispute of new realism and alternative modernism 
after postmodernism, this thesis concludes that digital virtualism can provide an 
alternative to post-postmodernism. 
 
There have been many attempts to go beyond the limit of postmodern aesthetics in terms 
of new realism. Hal Foster proposes the concept of ‘the return of the real’.478 According to 
him, postmodern images should be read as a third way between referential and simulacra, 
connected and disconnected, affective and affectiveless, critical and complacent. He 
names the third way ‘traumatic realism’,479 based on subjective affection to objectivity. 
For him, the concept of traumatic realism is an effective method that goes beyond the 
impassivity and indifference of superficial images in postmodern aesthetics: 
 
Below I will suggest that some contemporary work refuses this age-old mandate 
to pacify the gaze, to unite the imaginary and the symbolic against the real. It is as 
if this art wanted the gaze to shine, the object to stand, the real to exist, in all the 
glory (or the horror) of its pulsatile desire, or at least to evoke this sublime 
condition. To this end it moves not only to attack the image but to tear at the 
screen, or to suggest that it is already torn. For the moment, however, I want to 
remain with the categories of trompe-l'oeil and dompte-regard, for some post-pop 
art develops illusionist trickings and tamings in ways that are distinct from 
realism not only in the old referential sense but in the traumatic sense outlined 
above. (Foster’s emphasis) 480 
 
While Foster proposes to overcome the superficiality and nihilism of postmodernism by 
returning to new realism based on traumatic affection and subjectivity, Gerald Gaylard 
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suggests the concept of ‘postmodern archaic’ to describe the return of the real in the age 
of the digital image.481 He claims that the development of digital technology in the area of 
the arts leads to the resurgence of realism. Gaylard calls this new realism a peculiarly 
postmodern form of realism, that is, ‘postmodern archaic’. The concept is contradictory. 
On one hand, it indicates the continuity of postmodern aesthetics in digital arts; on the 
other hand, it presents the concept of new realism that relies on the spontaneity and 
participation beyond postmodernism. For Gaylard, the concept of new realism combines 
postmodernism in the aesthetic frame of digital virtuality: 
 
Moreover, I am arguing that virtuality is not confined to technology, but involves 
a wider set of cultural practices that tend to rework the "real" in the service of 
commodification. I want to call these cultural practices the "postmodern archaic" 
because they use the enablements and blandishments of digital technology to test 
and ratify current notions of virtuality and reality by comparison with a version of 
the past. How are we to understand this plethora of digital products and practices, 
all raising in some way reality and realism and the relationship between them?482 
 
In particular, Gaylard cites reality TV series like Survivor as a prime example of 
‘postmodern archaic’. He argues that Survivor is a complex genre that is a combination of 
a tourism show, a game show, a detective program, a reality show, and a docu-soap-
opera. It is postmodern, realistic, and digital simultaneously. Gaylard describes the 
contradiction of postmodern archaic in terms of time and space. On one hand, the 
postmodern archaic is temporal realism based on the ‘illusion of spontaneity’. It denies a 
linear and conventional realistic narrative and presents live and unexpected moments. It 
implies the illusion of spontaneity, credibility, immediacy, and participation. On the other 
hand, the postmodern archaic is a spatial realism that relies on ‘the nostalgia of natural 
space’. It is a new trope of old, primitive, ancient bush and ruin. It is the authentic and the 
virtual, the reality and the archaic guise. Consequently, Gaylard suggests that the 
aesthetics of digital virtuality raises issues of new reality beyond postmodern hyper-
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reality. He considers postmodern archaic the new form of realism beyond the scepticism 
and indifference of postmodernism. It shows a spontaneous and complex form of digital 
virtuality.  
 
In terms of new modernist aesthetics beyond postmodernism, Timotheus Vermeulen and 
Robin van den Akker propose the concept of ‘metamodernism’.483 They metaphorically 
state that the history beyond ‘the end of history’ and the art beyond ‘the end of art’ are 
newly begun beyond the age of postmodernism. For them, this historical transition is 
derived from the threefold ‘threat’ of the credit crunch, a collapsed centre, and climate 
change around the early 2000s. Vermeulen and Akker indicate that the opposite effects of 
the threats inspire doubt, reflection, and move out of the postmodern into the 
metamodern. For them, metamodernism is a new sens, a new meaning, and direction 
beyond postmodernism.  
 
Vermeulen and Akker demonstrate that, ontologically, metamodernism is the oscillation 
and structure of feeling between a typically modern enthusiasm and a markedly 
postmodern irony. 484  Epistemologically, metamodernism is the aesthetics of 
neoromanticism in which people take a history’s purpose as if it exists even though it will 
never be fulfilled. They argue that metamodernism is a-topic metaxis between the utopic 
syntaxis of modernism and the dystopic parataxis of postmodernism. For Vermeulen and 
Akker, the aesthetics of metamodernism is the tension and oscillation between modern 
desire and postmodern doubt about the sense of it all. In this context, they consider the 
so-called quirky cinema of Michel Gondry and Wes Anderson to be associated with the 
metamodern aesthetics.485 Vermeulen and Akker state that the movies are characterized 
by a childlike naivety opposed to the sarcasm and indifference of postmodern cinema in 
the 1990s. For them, the metamodern aesthetics is a diversity of aesthetic movements 
after postmodernism, such as Remodernism, Reconstructivism, Renewalism, the New 
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Sincerity, the New Weird Generation, Stuckism, Freak Folk, and so on. They investigate 
the aesthetics of post-postmodernism in view of new modernism.  
 
However, I am critical of Vermeulen and Akker and suggest that they do not properly 
grasp the influence of digital technology with regard to aesthetics after postmodernism. 
They overlook the technological reasons for aesthetic transformation. In addition, I would 
say that they should consider the relationship between metamodernism and realism in 
terms of the ontology of cinematic images. This is because aesthetics after 
postmodernism, essentially, should establish a new relation between reality and cinematic 
images. Although they emphasize a modern commitment and romanticism, the 
substantial limit and crisis of postmodernism is caused by the ontological dichotomy of 
reality and image. The dynamic process of reality implodes the exclusive aesthetics of 
postmodernism, which relies on the primacy of the image realm over the real world. 
Thus, aesthetics after postmodernism should grasp the technological dynamism of reality 
and the hybrid imbrication of cinematic images.  
 
In this sense, Robert Samuels’s concept of ‘auto-modernism’ is useful to argue digital 
aesthetics after postmodernism. 486  He considers the combination of technological 
automation and human autonomy as a key aspect of the new culture. In particular, he 
takes note of the fact that the innovative uses of digital technology dismiss cultural 
relativism, social constructivism, and aesthetic pastiche of postmodernism. For Samuels, 
the automation of digital innovation expands human freedom and subjectivity beyond the 
superficial and short-lived aesthetics of postmodernism. He stresses that computer media 
and networks prompt the new culture of auto-modernity by automation, multitasking, and 
sharing all different media and information. For Samuels, auto-modernity implies the 
trump of universal reason and subjective autonomy beyond the uncertainty and relativism 
of postmodernism: 
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To clarify what I mean by automodernism, I will examine several common 
technologies that are used heavily by digital youth in the early twenty-first-
century globalized Western world: personal computers, word processors, cell 
phones, iPods, blogs, remote-controlled televisions, and first-person shooter 
computer games. These technological objects share a common emphasis on 
combining a high level of mechanical automation with a height- ened sense of 
personal autonomy. In fact, this unexpected and innovative combination of 
autonomy and automation can be read as the defining contradictions of 
contemporary life in general and digital youth in particular. Importantly, while 
automation traditionally represents a loss of personal control, autonomy has been 
defined by an increase in individual freedom; however, automodernity constantly 
combines these two opposing forces in an unexpected way.487 
 
In a similar perspective, Kirby’s concept,‘digimodernism’, has a grasp of the aesthetic 
core after postmodernism.488 He suggests the new paradigm of digimodernism to describe 
the influence of computer technology on new aesthetics beyond postmodernism. In his 
declaratory essay, "The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond" in 2006, Kirby observed 
the decisive decay of postmodernism and the emergence of pseudo-modernism caused by 
the spread of digital technology and participatory viewers. He re-proposes pseudo-
modernism to the more expanded concept of digimodernism, because pseudo-modernism 
is a concomitant social shift and one aspect of digimodernism.489 By the conceptualisation 
of digimodernism, Kirby asserts that the contemporary phenomenon of computerisation 
and web 2.0 lead to the humanistic issue of reality and the new aesthetics of participation 
and interactivity, sweeping postmodern sarcasm and melancholy away. Kirby defines the 
main characteristics of digimodernism in terms of new textual art form emerging beyond 
postmodernism.490  
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In turn, Kirby claims that the cultural tendency of digimodernism is becoming more and 
more prevalent across all types of culture and art forms, ranging from reality TV to 
Hollywood fantasy blockbusters, from Web 2.0 platforms to the most sophisticated 
videogames, and from certain kinds of radio shows to crossover fiction. He asserts that 
digimodern texts are characterized by the textual intervention of viewers in the creation 
and configuration of cultural contents and artworks. For Kirby, digital technology permits 
viewers to intervene into texts creatively. The clicking and pressing by viewer’s fingers 
and thumbs make new and different texts, narratives, and art forms. He analyses these 
new modern modes of auteurism and textuality by concrete examples of cyberspace; the 
multiple authorship of Wikipedia, the real-time communication of Facebook and Twitter, 
the participatory contents of Youtube, the interactive narrative of computer games, and so 
on.491 In particular, Kirby examines the digimodern texts of cinema inspired by computer-
generated virtual images; the naive and pure reality and fantasy of children’s films like 
The Lord of the Rings (2001-2003) or The Chronicles Of Narnia (2005), 3D computer 
animations since Toy Story (1995), the new reality movement of Dogme 95, the New 
Puritan aesthetics of simplicity, the human issues of the Stuckists, and the public reality 
of Youtube. Kirby suggests the new aesthetic of digimodernism is based on the 
dominance of children’s stories, the new reality and earnestness, and the endless narrative 
beyond postmodern aesthetics.492  
 
As a result, Kirby argues that these digital texts are vital examples showing the authentic 
reality of the contents and the ‘pseudoautism’ of viewers beyond the hyper-image and 
passiveness of postmodernism. He asserts that the digimodern pseudoautism provokes the 
modern desire and creative fanaticism of public masses in digital aesthetics. In a different 
use with common sense, he stresses the positive traits of pseudoautism in digital texts in 
terms of individual creativity; modernism requires a neurosis, while postmodernism 
invokes schizophrenia. 
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Many theorists demonstrate the decay of postmodernism and the emergence of the new 
aesthetics with the spread of digital culture and arts. Foster and Gaylard suggest the 
return of the real in the perspectives of new realism. Bourriaud presents the aesthetics of 
altermodrnism based on multiple temporality and nomadic viatorisation in the global 
network society. Vermeulen and Akker suggest the concept of metamodernism, which 
means the resurgence of modern enthusiasm and romanticism beyond postmodern irony. 
Samuels highlights the expansion of subjective control and individual autonomy by 
digital automation. Kirby claims that digimodernism is a new aesthetic of the interactive 
textuality and multiple authorship. These theories intuit the new aesthetics of digital 
images beyond postmodernism in terms of realism and modernism.  
 
In addition, my point for the new aesthetics is the aesthetic ontology of cinematic images. 
I suggest the aesthetic of digital virtualism, which goes beyond the demarcation between 
physical reality and virtual images, indexicality and manipulation, reproduction and 
pastiche, and finally, traditional realism and postmodern scepticism. The new aesthetic of 
digital virtualism inherits the historical hybridity and ontological complexity of a wide 
range of film aesthetics. Based on computer simulation and digital interactivity, digital 
virtualism expands the filmic reality and expressive force.  
 
In terms of realist aesthetics, digital cinema intensifies the verisimilar and credible 
representation of objects. With the help of computer technology, digital images describe 
more ‘vivid’ and ‘real’ the indexical traces of objects. I argue that computer simulation 
contributes to the seamless representation of real objects, that is, the intensification of 
filmic reality. In addition, I point out that the realism of digital images is related to the 
spectator’s ‘illusionism’. According to Stephen Prince, digital cinema heightens the 
spectator’s ‘perceptual realism’ or ‘immersive aesthetics’.493 Similarly, Warren Buckland 
suggests the concept of the ‘fourth realism’494 in order to explain the new manoeuvre of 
digital cinema. He explains that the realistic characteristics of the digital image rely on 
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Stephen Heath’s psychoanalytic ‘suture’ and David Bordwell’s ‘cognitivism’. Buckland 
claims that digital images reinforce the spectator’s ‘psychological realism’ by the 
structuralizing of unconscious desire. In this context, I claim that digital cinema 
simultaneously heightens the indexical and the imaginary. It is both material reality and 
perceptive ‘illusionism’. It is an ‘embodied simulation’495 of the body and the mind, the 
object and the subject and the actual and the virtual. Digital images strengthen the 
complex contradiction between physical reality and psychic illusion, indexicality and 
fantasy, the object and the subject, and the actual and the virtual.  
 
Furthermore, the contradictory nature of digital images expands the possibility of 
cinematic expression. The virtual nature of computer-animated images suggests the 
creative aesthetics of cinematic configuration and assemblage. Vivian Sobchack notes 
that ‘the movement of the line’ arouses the creative openness and expressive force of 
animated-images.496 For her, the animated figures created by the movement of the line go 
beyond the indexicality and photorealism of cinema. Sobchack emphasizes that the 
incomplete anamorphic figuration causes the creative and expressive force of animated 
and simulated images. Similarly, Patrick Power argues that the aesthetics of 3D computer 
animation is associated with the expansion of cinematic expression.497 The expressive 
aesthetics of 3D animation works as the uneven and complex effects of ‘modality cues’ in 
which realistic and naturalistic coding orientations are mixed with the expressive level of 
computer micromanipulation. For him, the seamless performance capture technology in 
James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) is an important example of the expressive synthesis of 
the real and the virtual. Power emphasizes that 3D computer simulation intensifies the 
expressive aesthetics of cinematic images, as well as heightened photorealism as 
immersive spectacle.  
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Consequently, I claim that the aesthetics of digital virtualism simultaneously intensifies 
both filmic reality and expressive imagination. The ontology of digital images is based on 
the contradictory imbrication between the actual and the virtual, the indexical and the 
symbolic, the real and the unreal, and representation and manipulation. In this sense, I 
argue that the digital aesthetics expands and transforms the incessant process of 
becoming and assemblage with the gaseous intersection and conflation of real world and 
virtual image. The diffusion of computer synthesis and digital interactivity heightens the 
expressive complexity of cinematic images. Digital virtualism suggests the assemblage 
aesthetic of creative expression and configuration in the movement and time of cinematic 
images. In the next chapter, I demonstrate the digital implication of Deleuze’s cinema 
ontology. 
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4. Gilles Deleuze and Digital Virtualism 
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In this chapter, I explore the influence of Deleuze on the aesthetics of digital virtualism. 
Above all, Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema has significant implications for the 
development of film theory. This is because his philosophy of cinema suggests the 
ontology of the material image beyond the dichotomy between physical reality and 
virtual image. For him, cinema is not the ‘degraded copy’ of reality but different realities. 
He denies the aesthetics of representation and suggests the materiality of the image in an 
aesthetics of movement and time. I will argue that, based on the philosophy of simulacra, 
his aesthetics of movement and time is associated with the force of cinema, which 
produces new realties beyond a representative reality.  
 
Moreover, Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema is related to the aesthetics of digital cinema. 
He highlights the virtuality of cinema, which consists of two different aspects of lives and 
images in actuality, existing in an ‘actual-virtual circuit’.498 Whereas virtual images 
actualise, actual reality becomes the virtual. Deleuze suggests the virtual ontology of 
cinematic images as not actual, but real. The virtuality of cinema is the creative potential 
of cinema. Digital virtuality, founded on computational simulation and synthesis, is 
connected to Deleuze’s aesthetics of cinematic virtuality. Digital virtualism heightens the 
aesthetics of creative potential beyond the actual reality. Deleuze suggests the aesthetics 
of virtuality beyond indexicality and actuality. 
 
This chapter consists of three different sections: the philosophy of simulacra, the 
aesthetics of the movement-image, and time-image. In the first section, I deal with 
philosophical ontology of simulacra. While Plato’s simulacra postulated the priority of 
Idea and reality over image, Baudrillard’s simulacra extrapolate the primacy of image 
world over physical reality. Deleuze overturns the dualism of reality and image. He 
asserts ‘the eternal return’499 of difference and repetition in the plane of immanence. 
Deleuze goes beyond the world of representation and copy. His philosophical monism 
and univocity of simulacra suggests the subjective perspective of rhizome and 
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assemblage and deterritorialisation and becoming. Deleuze offers a clue to the creative 
and practical aesthetics of synthesis and configuration, traversing reality and image, and 
media and art forms beyond the conventional world of copy and representation.   
 
In the next section, I will deal with the significance of the movement-image. Deleuze 
considers that cinema is a composition of images and signs that comprise preverbal, 
intelligible content.500 For him, cinema is neither language nor science, but consists of 
material images. Thus, he grasps the material attributes of the image by its movement. He 
claims that the image is a material reality and thus the movement of reality. In this sense, 
Deleuze opposes various approaches that consider cinema as a logic, a language, a 
psychological hermeneutics, a phenomenology, and a science of semiology. He claims 
that cinema is not an image to which movement is added, but a movement-image in 
itself.501 He does not interpret what lies behind the image, but classifies the movement of 
the image. His cinema book is not a history or hermeneutics of image, but is instead a 
classification and taxonomy of the image.502  
 
In addition, I take a note of the concept of ‘moleculisation’ and ‘chromatisation’ of 
movement-image.503 For Deleuze, the montage of cinematic images implies a ‘spiritual 
automaton’ based on the microbiology, ethology, and particle physics in the quantum 
state of the virtual images. Thus, I elicit the singularity of digital movement-images from 
the dynamic movement of molecular lights, colours, and sounds. I re-define the 
movement-image in the digital cinema in terms of the microscopic manipulation and 
biocybernetic synthesis promoted by digital informatics and techno-aesthetic.  
 
Finally, I deal with the issues of spectator’s sense and spiritual automaton. Deleuze 
conceptualises the movement-image of cinema by a sensory-motor schema beyond 
representative copy, which is not the copy of physical reality, but the complex linkage of 
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spectator’s sensation, perceptions, affections, and actions. In this manner, Deleuze’s 
aesthetics of the movement-image is connected to the materiality, sensation, and 
virtuality of the digital cinema. As I defined in the second chapter, digital virtualism is 
the aesthetics of the materiality and sensation of the virtual image. Digital virtualism pays 
attention to the sensuous attraction and automated spirituality of moving images. It is the 
aesthetics of the movement and sensation of material images, not of resemblance and 
indexicality.  
 
In the last section, I explore Deleuze’s aesthetics of the time-image in the context of 
digital virtualism. First, I will demonstrate the relationship between the movement-image 
and the time-image. Deleuze states that the movement-image is the indirect 
representation of time and the time-image is the direct representation of time. Both are 
different aspects of time. For him, the relation of movement and time is not exclusive, but 
complementary. While the rupture of the movement-image begets the pure moment of 
time, time depends on the movement-image and belongs to it. Thus, time is a variation of 
movement. Time is abnormal, aberrant, and decentred movement.504  
 
Deleuze then demonstrates the crystal-image in the hybrid and complex relation between 
the movement-image and time-image. He defines the crystal-image as the complex 
combination of the actual and the virtual, like a mirror.505 It is the indiscernible confusion 
of the real and imaginary. For him, the crystal-image is an internal and opaque circuit 
between the actual and the virtual. He indicates that the crystal-image consists of the 
most fundamental operation of time and is the perpetual foundation of time. The crystal-
image is not chronological time but ‘pure time’ and the ‘gushing of the time’.506 For 
Deleuze, the crystal-image is indiscernible, multiple, inextricable and coexistent time, in 
which the past coexists with the present, and the actual entwines with the virtual. 
Through the crystal-image, he suggests the creative potential of a new reality of images. 
In this context, the aesthetics of digital virtualism pursues the complex and coexistent 
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relation between reality and image, movement and time, the actual and the virtual, and 
the objective and the subjective. This is possible because digital cinema strengthens the 
simulation and synthesis of virtual images by computer technology.  
 
Finally, I will suggest that based on Deleuze’s aesthetics of crystal-image, the Deleuzian 
aesthetics of digital virtuality elicits the subjective and practical aesthetics of cinema, that 
is, the ethics of cinema, which requires the subjective and practical configuration of 
cinematic images. Deleuze states that the new aesthetics of digital virtuality requires the 
‘struggle with informatics’. In this sense, digital ethics is the incessant process of 
becoming and assemblage. It is a configurative process of creative realities, which 
implies the belief in our world and the power of cinematic images. Digital virtualism 
suggests the subjective and participatory configuration and composition of cinematic 
images and art forms.  
 
 
4-1. The Ontology of Simulacra: From Representation To Virtual Conjunction 
 
My point in this section is that Deleuzian concept of simulacra suggests the composite 
aesthetics of virtualism beyond the representative ontology of cinematic images. 
Deleuze’s ontology of simulacra denies the opposition between physical reality and 
imaginary illusion. It provides the aesthetics of digital virtualism with two important 
implications in relation to film theory: On one hand, the virtual image in the universe of 
simulacra is not the disappearance of physical indexicality, but instead the new form of 
physical reality. On the other hand, the imaginary illusion of virtual images is not the 
copy or representation of physical reality, but the incessant becoming process of physical 
reality. In other words, the virtual image of film comprises the new and creative realities 
in the Deleuzian simulacrum and virtuality. While the realm of the simulacrum is the 
same as in our world, filmic images are both physical reality and ‘more reality’. Hence, 
Deleuze proposes the ontological univocity between the material world and the 
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simulacrum and reality and the cinematic image: ‘The modern world is one of 
simulacra’.507  
 
Accordingly, the Deleuzian aesthetics of virtualism proceeds to the composite aesthetic 
of cinematic images beyond the representative ontology of images. Based on the concept 
of Deleuzian simulacra, the aesthetics of digital virtualism subsumes both physical 
indexicality and imaginary illusion, which is because digital virtuality is the extended 
realisation of filmic simulation. Hence, digital virtualism presents the ‘enhanced’ and 
‘intensified’ contradiction of filmic virtuality between the real and the imaginary, the 
actual and the virtual, and the object and the subject. In this section, I demonstrate that 
based on Deleuze’s monism of simulacra, digital virtualism is the composite aesthetics of 
creative reality.  
 
Let me first investigate the concept of the simulacrum in terms of the relation between 
physical reality and filmic images. There are many different views of the simulacrum and 
simulation. I will compare Plato, Benjamin, and Baudrillard with the Deleuzian concept 
of simulation. The comparison provides an appropriate demonstration of the affirmative 
possibility of the filmic images in terms of simulation and virtuality. Through the 
Deleuzian concept of simulacra, I assert that the aesthetics of digital virtuality is the 
ontology of the cinematic image in pursuit of a new reality of the immanent monism of 
simulacra. 
 
In the history of western philosophy, the simulacrum is a contentious concept that 
concerns the relation between physical reality and its representation. In terms of artistic 
mimesis, the concept of simulacrum originated in the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. 
He demonstrated that a simulacrum is the mimetic expression of reality. For him, the 
simulacra cannot attain the Idea, which is the essence of reality. Hence, the simulacrum is 
an imperfect representation. Plato considers that the world of the simulacrum is able to 
show only a false representation of reality, which is also not the essence of the real world:  
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Therefore, imitation is surely far from the truth; and, as it seems, it is due to 
this that it produces everything—because it lays hold of a certain small part of 
each thing and that part is itself only a phantom. For example, the painter, we 
say, will paint for us a shoemaker, a carpenter, and the other craftsmen, 
although he doesn't understand the arts of any one of them. But, nevertheless, if 
he is a good painter, by painting a carpenter and displaying him from far off, he 
would deceive children and foolish human beings into thinking that it is truly a 
carpenter.508 
 
For Plato, the truth consists of three stages: the Idea, technical imitation, and artistic 
imitation. In particular, artistic imitation is the lowest and the furthest stage from the 
Ideal. The first category consists of the immortal ideal, and the second category is the 
sensible world, such as nature or human society, and reflects the Ideal. The last stage is 
the world of art, such as literature and painting, which reflects the second category. Plato 
asserts that since Homer, poets have been only imitators making bad representations. He 
also devaluates art and mimesis as inferior to the products of artisans. For him, the first 
value is the world of the Idea, as in his concept of an ideal republic, whereas the prisoners 
in Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’ can never reach the truth and can understand only a 
false world of simulacra.509  
 
By defining the relationship between reality and the simulacrum as mimesis, Plato 
presents the philosophical dualism of truth and falsity, the actual and the virtual, 
objectivity and subjectivity, and essence and phenomenon, which has carried through in 
the history of western thought. In terms of these dichotomies, the simulacra of images are 
regarded as a kind of representative aesthetics. Consequently, Plato claims that the 
simulacrum is the representative world of falsity, which is inferior to the realm of truth 
and the Idea. For him, the artistic image is a ‘false’ copy of original reality. 
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For Walter Benjamin, the concept of simulation is associated with the concept of 
‘reproduction’.510 He defines filmic images as the ‘mechanical reproduction’ of physical 
reality. For him, the film image mechanically imitates and represents physical objects and 
events. Benjamin claims that film is a representative copy of original reality. In this 
sense, Benjamin’s simulation is opposite physical reality on the grounds of the 
ontological separation between physical reality and filmic images. Moreover, Benjamin 
argues that mechanical reproduction gives rise to the ‘decay of aura’. Hence, filmic 
images destroy the aura of physical reality. For Benjamin, the simulated copy of the film 
is the loss of the originality and the aura: 
 
What is aura, actually? A strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance 
or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be. While at rest on a 
summer's noon, to trace a range of mountains on the horizon, or a branch that 
throws its shadow on the observer, until the moment or the hour become part of 
their appearance—this is what it means to breathe the aura of those mountains, 
that branch.511 
 
For Benjamin, the aura of physical reality is attenuated by the mechanical reproduction of 
filmic images. He argues that filmic simulacra create a new form of reality beyond the 
aura of traditional arts. While Plato considers simulation the world of false mimesis, 
Benjamin argues that filmic simulacrum is a new type of representation. Although 
Benjamin’s concepts of ‘mechanical reproduction’ and ‘the decay of aura’ postulate the 
ontological separation of physical reality and filmic images, he highly values the validity 
and possibility of filmic virtuality. Benjamin contrasts the techno-aesthetical potential of 
film to the limits of traditional arts.512 For him, the mechanical reproduction of film 
makes way for new perceptions, such as tactile sense and optical unconsciousness. In 
addition, Benjamin considers the democratic possibility of artwork beyond fascism in the 
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advent of the age of mechanical reproduction and mass art, whereas the Frankfurt School 
degrades the capability of mass art in the frame of cultural industry based on 
entertainment and consumption.513 Benjamin optimistically proposes that the force of 
filmic images allows the public to acquire the possibilities of political awakening through 
mass art. After all, unlike Plato, Benjamin notes the representative force of simulation 
and virtuality in relation to physical reality. This is a practical advantage of Benjamin’s 
theory of filmic image despite the conceptual drawbacks of ‘reproduction’ and ‘aura’, 
which rely on the ontological dualism of physical reality and filmic images. 
 
Unlike the representative capacity of the filmic image, Baudrillard claims that simulation 
is the disappearance and extermination of physical reality.514 Although he criticises that 
The Matrix distorts his proposition of simulacrum,515 it is clear that his ontology of 
simulacrum is founded on the radical denial of physical reality in the virtual world of the 
matrix. Baudrillard’s simulacrum is a ‘symbolic exchange’516, which is separate from the 
territory of actual and material reality. He pays attention to the sign of the real beyond 
actual objects and referents. However, his symbolic sign falls into the trap of the 
impossibility of representation within the virtual world of simulacra: 
 
By crossing into a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor that of 
truth, the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials - 
worse: with their artificial resurrection in the systems of signs, a material more 
malleable than meaning, in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences, to all 
binary oppositions, to all combinatory algebra. It is no longer a question of 
imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the 
signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of deterring every real 
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process via its operational double, a programmatic, metastable, perfectly 
descriptive machine that offers all the signs of the real and short circuits all its 
vicissitudes. Never again will the real have the chance to produce itself - such is 
the vital function of the model in a system of death, or rather of anticipated 
resurrection, that no longer even gives the event of death a chance. 517  
 
Thus, for Baudrillard, the image of filmic virtuality has nothing to do with material 
actuality and indexicality. Although he has an intense affection for the ‘white magic’ of 
filmic images, he certainly denounces filmic images for resulting in the detachment and 
destruction of physical reality. For him, the hyperreality of film is no longer the reflection 
of the real, or the exchange of pure images. Based on the pessimism of technological 
simulation and historical progress, he concludes that the simulated images of digital 
virtuality are akin to violence, crime and viruses that terrorize physical reality and the 
pure image: 
 
Think about it: it is the virtual itself that is negationist. It is the virtual that takes 
away the substance of the real, setting it off balance. We are living in a society of 
negationism by virtue of its virtuality. Disbelief reigns everywhere. No event is 
perceived as “real” anymore. Criminal attempts, trials, wars, corruption, opinion 
polls: all of that is either falsified or undecidable… The mirror of information has 
been broken. The mirror of historical time has been broken… The reign of the 
virtual is also the reign of the principle of uncertainty. It is the inevitable 
counterpart of a reality turned unreal by excess of positivity.518 
 
In contrast, Deleuze presents opposite viewpoints of the simulacrum and virtuality. 
Whereas Baudrillard pessimistically exaggerates the domination of simulacra and digital 
virtuality, Deleuze has insights into the transformation of reality in the world of simulacra 
and the image. Whereas for Baudrillard, the simulacra are a world of evil and violence, 
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for Deleuze they comprise a creative reality and practical activity. Baudrillard maintains 
that in the condition of contemporary life, simulacra and virtual images are separate from 
original objects and events. However, Deleuze sheds new light on simulacra from an 
entirely different angle. For him, simulacra are not contrary to reality, but are physical 
reality and not falsity or fallacy. Virtual images are not fictional copies of material reality 
but different realities, that is, new forms of realities. He takes a materialist position on the 
ontological monism of the image, which is a decisive difference from Baudrillard. 
Deleuze acknowledges the real possibility and creative potential of an image based in 
material monism:  
 
The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which 
denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. At least two 
divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum-neither can be assigned as 
the original, neither as the copy. It is not even enough to invoke a model of the 
Other, for no model can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum. There is no longer 
any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of 
view. There is no possible hierarchy, no second, no third…519 
 
In this sense, Deleuze’s philosophy of simulacra has nothing to do with the postmodern 
negationism of Baudrillard nor with the representative theory of realism. Unlike 
Baudrillard, Deleuze believes in the creative possibility of the image. Moreover, 
Deleuze’s simulacrum does not mean the similarity and analogy of image to the model. It 
is not a reproductive image of reality, but physical reality itself. The original and the copy 
are both equally independent and juxtaposed. They are nothing but the multiplicity of 
singularity, which Deleuze calls ‘the univocity of being’.520  
 
Historically, the aesthetics of mimesis, that is, the logic of imitation and representation, 
has dominated the theory of art and image since the Plato and Aristotle. However, in the 
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aesthetics of difference and repetition, sensuous figures and rhizomes, from Spinoza and 
Nietzsche to Deleuze, replace the philosophy of mimesis with the aesthetics of 
assemblage and configuration. The concept of difference and repetition in the philosophy 
of Deleuze is definitely vital. 521 It is related to Nietzsche’s thought on the ‘eternal 
return’522, which proceeds to univocity and the multiple constitutions of being, singularity 
and individuality as not reduced by totality, universality and identification. As Daniel W. 
Smith properly points out, Deleuze overturns Plato’s simulacra along with Nietzsche’s 
thought of the ‘eternal return’. Deleuze’s simulacrum is the ‘inversion of Platonism’.523 It 
overturns the dualism of reality and image, original and copy, and model and 
representation. Thus, the Deleuzian philosophy of difference and repetition reverses the 
logic of imitation and representation.  
 
The Deleuzian concept of the simulacrum is based on the monism of material reality in 
which the separation between original and copy disappears. Accordingly, the simulacrum 
is a sensuous figure repeated eternally by the differences in matter. Deleuze claims that 
simulacra are the world that the confrontation between the original and the copy has 
collapsed in the rhizomatic resonance of being and sense. The world of simulacra reveals 
the innate differences in being and in art. It is also a positive potential denying both the 
original and the copy simultaneously. It is the arrangement and constitution of a diversity 
of a series of events between reality and the cinematic image. Thus, for Deleuze, the 
cinematic image is a creative, compositing reality in an arrangement, assemblage, and 
resonance of multiple individuals. In Deleuze’s world of simulation, the cinematic image 
is not only imaginary and subjective but also real and objective. Deleuze denies the 
idealism of the image and advocates its materiality. Both reality and the image are the 
physical world and both have interactive potentiality.  
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In terms of the simulation of images, Hal Foster gives a useful comparison of the 
conceptual difference of ‘repetition’ or ‘reproduction’, 524 by which he investigates the 
relation between reality and simulation, and original and copy. According to Foster, 
while Benjamin’s concept of reproduction attends to the fact that filmic images are the 
‘mechanical’ copy of original reality, Lacan accentuates the ‘repetition’ of absent 
unconsciousness, which means a ‘traumatic’ returning to reality. While Barthes’s Camera 
Lucida is concerned with the representative and psychological effects of the photographic 
‘punctum’, Andy Warhol’s pop art displays the spectacle of mass media and commodity-
signs, which causes the screening and disruption of physical and traumatic reality. Foster 
claims the return to ‘traumatic reality’ beyond the superficial copy of original images. He 
criticizes that the simulation and repetition of postmodern images results in the lack of 
reality and the indifference of the masses.  
 
Hence, the Deleuzian concept of ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’ suggests the configurative 
aesthetics of simulated images beyond the dualism between original and copy.525 For 
Deleuze, the world of simulated images, which pursues the similarity and homogeneity of 
the original and the copy, is not photographic reproduction or superficial repetition, but 
the ‘becoming’ process of a new reality that comprises the immanent plane and the 
accidental events of difference and multiplicity. Here the confrontation between the 
original and the copy collapses, and the logic of representation is overturned by the 
simulacra of Deleuze.  
 
Deleuze’s thought on the homogeneity of the cinematic image and material reality is 
derived from Bergson’s Matter and Memory. Bergson argues that the image of objects is 
utterly real and embodies their existence. For him, the existence of the world is within 
matter itself.526 Everything is matter and image, simultaneously. The matter is the image, 
and vice versa. The human body is an image; the brain-memory is also an image. 
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Bergson suggests the homogeneity and unification of material universe, in which 
simulated images cannot be separated from the world of physical movement and time. 
Similarly, Deleuze claims that the movement of physical reality is no longer opposed to 
the ‘psychic reality of consciousness’.527 Hence, the world of the image perceived by 
human sensation and consciousness cannot be divided from the physical reality of the 
external world. The image, that is, the psychic reality, is within the united world of 
physical reality. 
 
Bogue argues that Deleuze develops Bergson’s account of the equation between image 
and matter by adding the identity of matter and light.528 That is, Deleuze explains that the 
simulation of the virtual image flows, blocks, and filters light as the nature of things.529 
For Deleuze, the virtuality of the cinematic image is the same as the cosmic flow of 
physical matter and light. According to Bogue, Deleuze’s thought of the identity of 
matter-light allows us to conceptualize the perceptual and integrated relationship between 
the visual simulation of cinematic images and the actual reality of material world.530 
Hence, the cinema is the simulation of virtual images, which are none other than the 
circuit and flow of matter-light. It is the world of physical reality beyond the 
representative copy of originals. 
 
Furthermore, Deleuze’s aesthetic monism of physical reality and its virtual simulation is 
related to human sensation and perception. On the immanent plane of material reality and 
virtual simulation, Deleuze claims that human sensation and perception are also the 
material. Sensation is realized in the substances of matter, which convert into sensation. 
In the world of Deleuze’s simulacra, no arts are distinguished by an analogy and 
identification with a model or an original. They are classified only by the differences in 
material substances and human sensation. Therefore, for Deleuze, simulacra do not 
comprise the world of fiction and fantasy. Instead, they are the world of the material 
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image, which is the material reality of the simulated and virtual image and the creative 
time-space of sensuous desire and the image. In other words, unlike the logic of 
representation and the hermeneutics of signification, Deleuze provides insight into the art 
of both the material image and the cinema of sense and sensation, which are living and 
vibrating in the dynamism of our brain-blood:  
 
…the distinction between two states of oil painting assumes a completely 
different, aesthetic and no longer technical aspect-this distinction clearly does 
not come down to ‘representational or not,’ since no art and no sensation have 
ever been representative. In the first case sensation is realized in the material 
and does not exist outside of this realization. It could be said that sensation (the 
compound of sensations) is projected onto the well-prepared technical plane of 
composition, in such a way that the aesthetic plane of composition covers it 
up.531 
 
David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese’s concept of ‘embodied simulation’ is useful to 
extrapolate the material nature of cinematic simulation and human sensation. Like 
Deleuze, they hold that human artistic perception is the material process of human sense. 
In particular, they explain the material process by the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ and 
the concept of ‘embodied simulation’.532 For them, recent neuroscientific research shows 
the material mechanism by which the human brain invokes artistic emotion and reaction. 
Freedberg and Gallese claim that the process of artistic perception and cognition is 
caused by the material mechanism of ‘embodied simulation’ between the physical object, 
the simulated image, and the human body. In other words, the simulation of cinematic 
images is an integrated and embodied process of material objects and the human body, 
such as the brain, eyes, ears, and bodily sensations.  
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Similarly, for Deleuze, the cinematic image is both physical reality and human sense: that 
is, the “Brain is the screen.”533 He states that the perception of cinema is the same as the 
human perception. Furthermore, he claims that cinematic perception is superior to human 
perception. 534  For Deleuze, cinematic perception is more effective than ordinary 
perception. Technological apparatuses, such as the camera and the screen, allow the 
cinema to portray perceptions of physical reality that are superior to human perception. 
Deleuze suggests affirmative views of filmic technology and simulation aesthetics. For 
him, the cinematic image is not the reproduction and copy of material reality and human 
perception, but a new form of material reality and perception, which produces new 
realities beyond the limits of the human body and sense. 
 
In this sense, Rushton emphasizes that the cinema is the symbiotic conglomeration of 
spectator and screen.535 For him, the presentation of film is indistinguishable from the 
perception of the spectator. Likewise, Bogue argues that visual perception is in things.536 
He states that there is no spectatorship outside a film. The image produces cinematic 
reality in a reciprocal process with subjects. The reality of cinema is derived from the 
combination of subject and screen. There is no split between being and being perceived 
in terms of the virtuality of the simulated image. Consequently, based on the monism of 
simulacra, cinematic images produce material reality in an integrated process of human 
sensation and perception. Thus, cinema is the material process of creative simulation 
beyond the imitation and copy of physical reality. 
 
In terms of the simulation of virtual images, my next point is that the Deleuzian aesthetics 
of simulacra and virtuality offers a clue for theorising the assemblage aesthetics of 
cinema—the configurative aesthetics of ‘virtual conjunction’ in the universe of 
simulation: 
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Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universe, in all times, in all places. It is a 
perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the 
principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the 
linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual 
conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the 
instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is a richness in 
potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all 
actualisation, all determination.537 
 
Aesthetically, virtual conjunction is the hybrid combination of the actual and the 
potential, the material and the immaterial, the object and the subject, and physical reality 
and the imagination. In addition, it subsumes the technological process of filmic 
simulation, such as the camera’s movement, selective montage, and the illusionary 
screen. In particular, the numerical and algorithmic composition and manipulation of 
digital cinema intensify the virtual conjunction of cinematic images. Hence, the 
Deleuzian concept of simulacra and virtual conjunction proposes the digital aesthetics of 
compositing and configuration beyond the imitation and copy of physical reality. 
 
In this context, I propose that Deleuze’s concept of ‘rhizome’ and ‘becoming’ is closely 
associated with the aesthetics of digital simulation and virtuality. Deleuze’s philosophy of 
simulacra reinterprets the relation between image and reality in the monism of 
materialism and develops the practical concept of rhizomatic configuration. Reality and 
image as material entities are not a relation of resemblance and representation, but a 
rhizomatic traversal produced by multiplicity. One of his principle volumes, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2, begins with an explanation of the concept of 
the rhizome: 
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Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their 
roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not 
necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different 
regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to 
the One nor the multiple. … Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of 
reproduction: neither external reproduction as image-tree nor internal 
reproduction as tree-structure. The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-
term memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, 
conquest, capture, offshoots.538 
 
In this manner, Deleuze and Guattari attend to the principle of the multiple configurations 
of the rhizome instead of the hierarchical modes of traditional Platonism. Here simulacra 
are not the reproductive objects of truth, models and reality. The philosophy of the 
rhizome concerns the principle of virtual conjunction and networks instead of 
reproduction. Regarding the image, the rhizome presents the philosophy of repetition and 
configuration resulting in accidental differences and interactive events instead of the 
imitation and representation of something fixed and static. Accordingly, the copy that 
dies in the logic of analogy and identification is changed in the philosophy of the rhizome 
into the immediate presentation of difference, which cannot be identified with the 
original. After criticizing the reproductive principle based on Platonism through the 
concept of the rhizome, Deleuze goes on to explain the principle of ‘becoming’ as the 
philosophy of subjective practice: 
 
What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to the 
animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial—
that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of 
"becomings." A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. 
A rhizome is made of plateaus.539  
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In the philosophy of the rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to delineate the practical 
meaning of philosophical concepts. For them, the world of simulacra leads to the logic of 
the innovation of the world by the affirmation of multiple beings. Their philosophy never 
stays in the world of actuality. They proceed to the realm of virtuality, in which the 
potential and possibility of a new world is revealed. Hence, the practical consequence of 
Deleuzian philosophy is the ceaseless nomadicity through traversal, a deterritorialisation 
that is finally serves as a war-machine against the territory of the state.540  
 
As Rodowick argues, Deleuze’s philosophy of the rhizomatic becoming is related to the 
issue of Deleuzian ethics. 541  It implies a belief in the world and the power of 
transformation on the immanent plane of simulacra. Deleuze states, “We need reasons to 
believe in this world”.542 In this sense, Rodowick argues that the Deleuzian notion of 
becoming means the ethical choice to believe in this world, in which we exist now, alive 
and changing, and not in some transcendent or ideal world.543 This is an affirmation of the 
relation between the world and human beings, the world and the arts, and the world and 
cinema. Deleuze presents the ethics of cinematic images as the univocity of being. The 
simulated images of cinema exist in the relation of the movement, time, and change in 
physical reality, which is not a copy of material reality, but the becoming, differentiation 
and multiplicity of being. In terms of the simulated images of cinema, the Deleuzian 
notion of becoming suggests the belief in being and physical reality, the possibility and 
creation of new reality, and the subjective and practical configuration of virtual images 
beyond representative imitation and copy. 
 
In another view, Flaxman demonstrates that Deleuzian aesthetics of becoming and 
configuration concerns the aesthetics of science fiction (sci-fi). This is because sci-fi is 
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 212 
devoted to the ‘not yet’, the ‘otherwise’, or the ‘Outside’. 544 According to Flaxman, the 
recourse to science fiction strikes Deleuze with the force of an absolute exigency because 
the genre pursues an experiment in experience that deterritorialises the concepts of 
representation. In other words, the signs and events of science fiction demand new means 
of expression. This genre moves from the question of ‘what is…?’ to the new question of 
‘what if…?’ 545  Flaxman explains that Deleuze proposes the new expressions and 
experiments of unknown worlds in a concept of science fiction that departs from the 
known world of representative images. Deleuze suggests the new frontier of cinematic 
images as a kind of ‘metacinema’546 of simulated images going beyond the copy image of 
representative reality. Hence, Flaxman proposes that the future of philosophy would be 
science philosophy (sci-phi). Similar to Deleuze’s notion of sci-fi, Flaxman’s ‘sci-phi’ 
evokes the new realities and styles based on unknown experiments and expressions of the 
world and the image. Hence, Flaxman claims that the philosophy of the future is the 
ordination of singularities and the assemblage of components.547  
 
I would add that the ontological future of the cinema depends on the assemblage and 
configuration of virtual images. The simulacra of Deleuze suggest an aesthetics of 
rhizomatic configuration, in which the dynamic relation between physical reality and the 
cinematic image creates a practical potential to overturn the logic of representative 
simulation. In the universe of simulacra, cinematic images rely on the new styles and 
expression of physical reality beyond the realm of representative imitation and copy. In 
the Deleuzian concept of digital virtualism, the new aesthetics of cinema is the aesthetics 
of becoming and configuration by the virtual conjunction of simulated images. 
 
 
4-2. Cinematic Movement: Materiality and Sensation 
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In this section, I first argue that Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image has vital 
implications for the aesthetics of digital virtualism because digital images move toward 
the new dimension of the material image beyond indexicality. Deleuze’s movement-
image postulates that the nature of cinema does not seek the indexical traces of reality but 
presents the material magic and sensation of images. Deleuze states that the materiality of 
the image is realised by the movement of cinematic images. In particular, concerning the 
conceptual extension of Deleuzian movement-image in the age of digital cinema, this 
thesis claims that the dynamic motion and synthesis of digital molecular particles produce 
the new mode of the movement-image. Digital collage based on pixel simulation and 
software algorithm creates the new concept of cinematic motion beyond filmic montage. 
It suggests the hybrid aesthetics of digital information images predicated on the singular 
multiplicity and aesthetic assemblage of microscopic data components. 
 
My next point is that the movement-image is associated with the spectator’s sense. 
According to Deleuze, the thing and the perception of the thing are the same.548 Here the 
perception of the thing is made possible by the spectator’s sense. The movement-image 
of the cinema combines with the spectator’s sense. Thus, the attraction of cinematic 
movement stems from the spectator’s sense. I consider that Deleuze’s movement-image 
suggests the issue of the spectator’s bodily sensation. In particular, digital images 
strengthen the role of bodily sensation by the movement of material images. Digital 
aesthetics presents the interactivity of the screen and the interfaciality of the spectator. I 
conclude that digital virtualism newly expands the significance of cinematic motion and 
the spectator’s sense by the digital transformation of cinema. 
 
With regard to the movement-image, my last point is about its spiritual force. It implies 
that movement-image has three avatars: perception-image, action-image, and affection-
image.549 These avatars are the regime and system of movement-images. This regime of 
movement-images proceeds to the coincidence of object and subject. Therefore, sensory-
motor schema of the movement-image produces the mental image by an acentric set of 
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variable elements that act and react with each other, in which the movement-image 
moves forward from motion to ‘e’motion. Here I suggest that the movement-image is 
related to the role of the spectatorship’s impression, affection, pathos and attraction. It 
also has to do with the issue of the spectator’s immersion in the screen in digital cinema. 
In this sense, the eruption of movement is connected with the moment of pure time-
image.  
 
First, I examine the issue of the material image through the concept of cinematic 
movement. According to Deleuze, the image is the movement of matter. It is not a copy 
or replica of matter, but the material itself. In discussing Bergson’s, Duration and 
Simultaneity, Deleuze states the importance of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Deleuze, 
following Bergson and Einstein, demonstrates that things are the line and figure of lights 
and blocks of space-time.550 The thing is not the consciousness that is light; it is the set of 
images, or the light, which is consciousness immanent to matter. He criticises that 
traditional philosophy and phenomenology separate consciousness from matter. For 
Deleuze (via Bergson), all consciousness is not the consciousness of something, but 
something in itself. Things are luminous by themselves without anything illuminating 
them. Matter moves and changes in an immanent plane. In short, Deleuze indicates that 
the plane of immanence is a set of movement-images, a collection of lines or figures of 
light, and a series of blocks of space-time. Therefore, in the philosophy of material 
monism, the image is also the movement of the matter. Like the atom, body, brain, and 
eyes, the image also consists of moving and changing matter in our world: 
 
This infinite set of all images constitutes a kind of plane of immanence. The 
image exists in itself, on this plane. This in-itself of the image is matter: not 
something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of 
the image and movement. The identity of the image and movement leads us to 
conclude immediately that the movement-image and matter are identical.551 
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For Deleuze, the world of the image is matter and movement. This proposition has a vital 
and viable force in the aesthetics of the image. This is because the concept of the image 
as matter hints at going beyond the logic of the dichotomy between reality and the image. 
Because Deleuze’s ontology of image repudiates the binary relationship of dominance 
and subordination between reality and the image, we can proceed to the potential and 
creative aesthetics of cinematic images. It has two different meaning: the image is matter 
and movement simultaneously. From these propositions, we can draw the ontological 
implications of cinema and then of digital cinema. In short, the cinematic image is the 
movement of matter. 
 
On one hand, the first proposition, ‘the image is the matter’, rejects the diversity of film 
theories that rely on semiology and hermeneutic phenomenology. The cinematic image is 
not a language, science, or index. Instead, it is material and sensational, and 
simultaneously intangible and impalpable. Semiological language can never grasp the 
image of cinema. In this sense, Gunning also points out that the ‘magical’ understanding 
of cinematic images is clearly very different from the logic of signs. Like Deleuze, he 
criticizes that Peirce’s semiotics and the indexical relation falls into the rational realm.552 
The materiality of cinematic images goes beyond the limitation of language and 
hermeneutic logic. Hence, Deleuze states that semiology abolishes the image and tends to 
dispense with the sign.  
 
In addition, the materiality of intangible and impalpable images goes beyond the 
indexicality of reality. This is because the image is not a representative index of matter, 
but of the material, which is not the copy of reality, but the ‘sensory-motor schema’, 
which is linked with the perception-image, action-image, and affection-image. In 
Deleuze’s taxonomy of images, while the perception-image is the master of space and 
long shots, the action-image is the master of time and medium shots. The affection-image 
is the coincidence and close-up of subject and object between perception and action. The 
assemblage of the three different images consists of a special image, a centre of 
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indetermination and the contingent centre of the movement-image.553  According to 
Rushton, Deleuze’s core concept of the movement-image is the ‘universal variation’.554 
That is, all is movement and all is image, and no image is ever static. Rushton argues that 
Deleuze’s taxonomy of images is dedicated to a variety of ways of the world and the 
movement. In other words, the material image of cinema is the assemblage and 
configuration of a diversity of movement-images that are different, creative, and offer 
new realities.  
 
The Deleuzian concept of the materiality of images has important implications in the 
aesthetic dispute on realism. This is because the material image already presupposes the 
vitality of cinematic movement and sensation beyond indexicality and copy. As discussed 
in chapter 3, several scholarly disputes involve Bazin’s concept of realism in relation to 
the materiality of the image and the concept of new reality. Whilst Wollen and political 
modernists stress that Bazin’s realism is objective, thus missing the ideological and 
subjective aspects of cinema, recent theories re-evaluate the material ambiguity and 
complexity of Bazin’s realism. While Rosen points out that Bazin’s realism stresses the 
role of the subject and the style of the artist,555 Morgan indicates that Bazin intuits the 
complex materiality of images beyond the photographic resemblance of physical 
reality.556 Gunning proposes that the dispute on cinematic nature regarding the emergence 
of digital cinema moves toward the movement of the cinematic image beyond 
indexicality.557  
 
Based on Deleuzian ontology, this thesis argues that digital virtualism is the aesthetics of 
the material image. It considers the cinematic image reality itself, that is, material modes 
of different realities. Digital virtualism proceeds to the aesthetics of the assemblage and 
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configuration of creative realities. It goes beyond a reality, especially a conventional and 
obsolete reality. As Markos Hadjioannou states, the world is always missing in the frame 
of reference and indexicality558 because a representative world is not the world, but a 
world. The index is nothing but a view of the world. In the world of cinematic images, 
reality is not singular, but plural. Hence, the aesthetics of digital virtualism claims that 
cinematic images are material images that are perpetually assembling, configuring, and 
being in the plane of immanence. Thus, digital virtualism goes beyond the aesthetics of 
indexicality and representation. 
 
The meaning of ‘beyond indexicality’ is twofold. One simple answer is to dismiss and 
exclude indexicality from digital aesthetics. In other words, the term assumes that digital 
cinema has nothing to do with indexical traces. As Rosen properly points out, this 
assumption is not correct. According to his concept of ‘digital mimicry’559, first, the 
digital camera still collects the light of indexical reality. Digital cinema is also nothing 
but the computer manipulation of indexical images. Furthermore, digital cinema includes 
a variety of photographic images and forms. Therefore, cinema has always relied on the 
indexical traces of physical reality. Similarly, digital cinema has ‘a minimum 
indexicality’ of reality, even though digital images mainly depend on computer 
simulation and the manipulation of reality.  
 
However, on the other hand, the aesthetics of cinema goes beyond the logic of 
indexicality in terms of aesthetical ontology, according to Morgan and Gunning (via 
Deleuze). The ontology of digital images rejects the strict demarcation between reality 
and image. In terms of material monism, the virtual image of cinema is none other than a 
different mode of reality. The actual image also exists in the circuit of virtual images. 
Therefore, the image is not the copy of reality, but different types of realities, that is, 
creative and potential realities. The aesthetics of virtualism suggests the monism of the 
material image beyond the indexical and reproductive image of reality. The materiality of 
image is the complexity and imbrication of movement, time, and sensation. In this sense, 
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the image of cinema goes beyond the logic of indexicality. The ontology of digital 
cinema is also associated with the materiality of the image, that is, the movement and 
sensation of the image beyond indexicality and representation. 
 
Therefore, we should grasp the contradictory imbrication of image and reality, 
reproduction and simulation. Cinema has always been based on both indexicality and 
manipulation. On one hand, cinema is the index of reality. On the other hand, it goes 
beyond the logic of indexicality. Cinema is always the synthesis and manipulation of 
reality, whether in digital simulation or by photographic manipulation. The principle of 
cinema is based on the artistic manipulation of images, even when the images are optical 
and photographic. Hence, cinema is the contradictory combination of physical reality and 
virtual images, indexicality and manipulation, either analogue or digital. As it were, first 
film and then digital cinema are internal circuits that bridge actuality and virtuality. 
Cinema is the aesthetics of virtuality, which is the bridge and threshold between the 
actual and the real. Based on the virtuality of cinema, digital cinema introduces a 
different and expanded way of the synthesis and manipulation of cinematic images, 
which depends on computational simulation and modular configuration. Digital cinema 
expands the virtuality of cinematic images. Digital virtualism is the aesthetics of 
expanded virtuality. It expands the contradiction of cinematic images between reality and 
image, indexicality and manipulation, analogue and digital, object and subject, and 
technology and aesthetics. In this sense, digital virtualism is the aesthetics of historical 
hybridity and aesthetic complexity. 
 
The second proposition is that the image is the movement. It is closely associated with 
the first proposition, ‘the image is the matter’. That is, the materiality of cinematic 
images begets the movement of the image because the matter is the movement. Deleuze 
states that the identity of image with movement stems from the identity of matter with 
light.560 The image is matter living, moving and changing. It is an incessant flow of 
movement in the plane of immanence. In short, in Deleuze’s definition, the movement-
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image is both the object and the modulation of the object.561 The modulation is not a 
resemblance, a code, or a mould. It is a variation of mould, a transformation, code-graft, 
multiplicity, and reconstitution. For Deleuze, cinema is both the object and the 
movement.   
 
Regarding the movement of cinematic images, Deleuze begins with the basic 
components: the frame, the shot, and the montage. According to him, the frame is ‘the 
determination of a closed system’ and is ‘geometric and physical’.562 That is, it consists of 
celluloid strips of film. Simultaneously, Deleuze indicates that the frame is also a 
‘framing’. As it were, the frame is divided into zones and bands and is related to the 
angle of framing. It is the relation with ‘out-of-field’.563 He describes that the frame goes 
beyond the limits of the frame to communicate with out-of-field objects, such as Bazin’s 
mask. He explains that all framing determines an ‘out-of-field’. Next, whereas the frame 
is considered the physically basic element of cinema, the shot is considered the 
movement-image. He states that cutting (decoupage) is the determination of the shot and 
the shot is the determination of the movement, which is established in the closed system 
of elements or parts of the set. In particular, he defines the movement of the shot by the 
relation between the whole and the parts. For him, the shot is the open movement 
between the frame and the montage: 
 
The shot in general has one face turned towards the set, the modifications of 
whose parts it translates, and another face turned towards the whole, of which it 
expresses the - or at least a – change. Hence the situation of the shot, which can 
be defined abstractly as the intermediary between the framing of the set and the 
montage of the whole, sometimes tending towards the pole of framing, sometimes 
tending towards the pole of montage. The shot is movement considered from this 
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dual point of view: the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space, 
the change of a whole which is transformed in duration.564 
 
In addition, Deleuze illuminates the relationship between the movement and the time of 
the shot. For him, the shot is the mobile section of duration. He stresses that the 
movement of the shot presents not only spatial aspects but also temporal perspectives. He 
states that the movement-image of the shot is related to an open whole that changes in 
duration. Pointing to Epstein and Bazin’s intuition, Deleuze highlights the temporality of 
the movement-image of the shot and cinematic reality.565 He recalls Bazin’s statement 
that whereas the photograph is a kind of ‘moulding’, the cinema realizes the paradox of 
moulding in the time of the object and taking the imprint of its duration as well. He also 
states that Epstein comes closest to the concept of the shot, which is a mobile section, that 
is, a temporal perspective or a modulation. Deleuze (via Epstein and Bazin) considers 
that the movement-image of the shot is a temporal duration, distinguishing cinema from 
photograph.  
 
In this context, Rushton explains that Deleuze’s concept of plan in French is different 
from the term ‘take’ in English. 566 The English term ‘shot’ is close to a spatial concept, 
whereas the French term ‘plan’ includes both the ‘shot’ as a spatial concept and the ‘take’ 
as a temporal concept. Ronald Bogue also argues the difference between the French plan 
and the English shot.567 He argues that the double sense of plan as spatial distance and 
temporal continuity aptly captures the nature of movement as indivisible, qualitative 
multiplicity. Bogue explains that Deleuze’s plan is a single movement that expresses the 
open whole of duration. It is related to the multiple elements within various sets and 
subsets of the film in movement and duration. Consequently, Deleuze effectively 
describes the temporality and spatiality of the movement-image of the shot by referring to 
the meaning of plan in French.  
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Deleuze also defines the concept of montage as the whole moving and changing in space 
and time. While the frame and the shot means separated units and parts, the concept of 
montage embraces the whole and the unity of movement. Montage is the cutting and 
linking of shots. Thus, Deleuze states that montage is ‘the determination of the whole’568 
by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities. In this view, montage as the 
whole has two aspects: the unity of movement and the indirect image of time. The 
montage as the whole allows the unity and composition of movements by the 
combination of separated shots. Montage is the whole as it moves and changes. In 
addition, montage creates indirect images of time by separating the whole from direct and 
pure time. Montage is the movement-image emancipated from the image of time. In this 
sense, montage is the composition and assemblage of movement-images as constituting 
an indirect image of time.569 
 
In a conceptual extension of Deleuze’s movement-image and montage, I extrapolate a 
new mode of cinematic motion based on the computer synthesis and digital collage from 
the concept of ‘molecularisation’ and ‘spiritual automaton’.570 For Deleuze, the cinematic 
movement is derived from the dynamic montage of molecular particles, which gives rise 
to the automated spirituality of virtual images. Digital techno-aesthetic expands and 
transforms the dynamic movement of filmic motion and mentality. While computer 
technology enhances the molecular movement of the information image-surface, digital 
aesthetics heightens the dynamic hybridity of singular modulation and quantum speed. As 
Wood argues, the aesthetics of digital synthesis presents the new type of the movement 
and perception, in which the transformation and configuration of image elements arouse a 
diversity of ‘genetic manipulation’ at the level of pixel and data. 571 For instance, digital 
technologies using 3D virtual camera, motion/performance capture, and computer 
animation software in Avatar create ‘ecological configuration’ of cinematic space and 
movement in the multiple intersection and interfaciality of digital codes and simulation 
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algorithms.572 In this context, I articulate that the aesthetics of computer synthesis and 
digital collage creates the new regime of material images and filmic movement, which 
implies the technological transformation from film grains to computer pixels, and the 
‘historical transion’ from the ontology of photochemical representation to the aesthetics 
of digital assemblage as well.573  
 
Meanwhile, after explaining the importance of montage as the unity of movement-
images, Deleuze describes four different schools of montage.574 While Griffiths and the 
American school conceive of the composition of movement-images as an organism, 
Eisenstein and the Russian school developed the concept of dialectic montage. While the 
pre-war French school showed the quantitative trend to montage, the German 
Expressionists presented the intensive trend to montage. In particular, Deleuze evaluates 
Eisenstein’s dialectical montage compared with Griffith’s organic montage. Whereas 
Griffith suggests continuous and parallel montage concealing the intervals and gaps of 
opposite shots, Eisenstein proposes the dialectical nature of montage, that is, the 
qualitative leap and the creation of the third order. Eisenstein stresses the importance of 
the interval. The intervals of movement-images both engender the qualitative leap and 
raise the power of the instant.  
 
Here, my point is that Eisenstein’s ‘montage of attraction’ is associated with the concept 
of digital spectatorship, based on the materiality and sensation of images. The concept of 
Eisenstein’s attractive montage allows us to connect the movement-image with 
spectatorial attraction. This connection between montage and the spectator’s sense helps 
us develop the concept of the materiality and sensation of digital cinema. In particular, I 
note Deleuze’s concept of ‘pathetising’. Deleuze explains that Eisenstein’s montage 
induces the attraction and pathos of spectators. He elicits the concept of the spectator’s 
pathos from an explanation of Eisenstein’s montage of attraction: 
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Of course, attraction must firstly be understood in its spectacular sense. Then also 
in an associative sense: the association of images as a Newtonian law of 
attraction. But, furthermore, what Eisenstein calls ‘attractional calculus’ marks 
this dialectical yearning of the image to gain new dimensions, that is, to leap 
formally from one power into another. The jets of water and fire raise the drop of 
milk to a properly cosmic dimension. And it is consciousness which becomes 
cosmic at the same time as it becomes revolutionary – having reunited in a final 
leap of pathos the whole of the organic in itself –earth, air, fire and water. We will 
see later how, in this way, montage of attractions constantly makes the organic 
and the pathetic communicate with one another.575   
 
Here Deleuze explains the significance of Eisenstein’s montage by referring to the 
concept of ‘pathos’. Deleuze (via Eisenstein) highlights that montage is the whole of 
film, that is to say, the Idea. For Deleuze, the movement-image of Eisenstein’s attractive 
montage creates the link between the pathetic and the organic. It is both a qualitative leap 
and a pathetic development, that is, ‘pathetisation’, the importance of which576 Deleuze 
again explains In Cinema 2: the Time-Image. He evaluates that Eisenstein’s concept of 
attraction and pathos presents the essential relation between nature and humanity, cinema 
and thoughts. By referring to Eisenstein’s montage of attraction, Deleuze demonstrates 
that the movement-image of cinema produces ‘a shock to thought’, communicating 
vibrations to the cortex, thus directly affecting the nervous and cerebral system.  
 
Consequently, he accurately expresses the force of cinematic movement: ‘Automatic 
movement gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, which reacts in turn on movement.’577 
Deleuze indicates that Eisenstein’s concept of the movement-image grasps the force of 
cinematic thought. According to Deleuze, the automatic image of cinema evokes 
concepts or thoughts, which then return to the moment of ‘the affect’. It is the images of 
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emotion, passion, and pathos in Eisenstein’s concept. The movement of material image 
gives rise to the affect and pathos in the final moment of cinematic movement. The 
movement-image results in the unity and monism between humans and the world, action 
and thought, senses and physical movement:  
 
It is indeed true that the three relationships between cinema and thought are 
encountered together everywhere in the cinema of the movement-image: the 
relationship with a whole which can only be thought in a higher awareness, the 
relationship with a thought which can only be shaped in the subconscious 
unfolding of images, the sensory-motor relationship between world and man, 
nature and thought. Critical thought, hypnotic thought, action-thought.578  
 
In this sense, Colman properly evaluates Deleuze’s implications for cinematic movement. 
579 According to her, Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image is not only a technical 
term but also a mental term. Although the movement-image depends on equipment and 
technical ability, it can also engage mental movement. Colman points out that Deleuze’s 
movement-image produces human thought and the reality of world. For Deleuze, the 
technological automation of film is associated with the automatic movement of cinematic 
images. Moreover, the automation of the movement-image produces spiritual automaton, 
by which images are mixed with thought and emotion. For him, cinematic images are an 
automatic machine that creates simultaneously thought, emotion, affect, and pathos in the 
monism of the sensory-motor schema. 
 
Consequently, the core of Deleuze’s assertion of cinematic movement is that the 
automatic movement of cinema produces spiritual automaton by the unity of sensory-
motor schema. He draws on Eisenstein’s concept of attraction and pathos in the relation 
between thought and cinema. Cinematic movement produces the identification of image, 
concept, and affect, which is the unity of the sensory and physical movement and 
humanity and nature. In both analogue film and digital cinema, the movement-image 
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creates the affection and pathos of the spectator according to sensory-motor schema. The 
aesthetics of the movement-image, by creating the identity of thought, affection, and 
pathos of human, persists in sensory-motor integration.  
 
In this context, we should reconsider and re-evaluate Deleuze’s aesthetics of the 
movement-image in the age of digital cinema. This thesis asserts that digital aesthetics re-
appropriates the concept of the attraction of material images and the pathos of spectators 
from Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image. In fact, computer simulation and digital 
synthesis differ from the montage of film images. This is because in digital images, the 
frame and shot do not comprise the minimum unit of image composition. Instead, as 
Manovich points out, the basic unit of composition is the pixel and data.580 The aesthetics 
of digital assemblage is based on the software algorithm and data informatics. However, 
Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image is not only valid but also vital in illuminating 
the aesthetic ontology of digital images. This is because Deleuze’s movement-image is 
not only a technological concept but also an aesthetic concept of cinematic ontology. 
Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image is the aesthetics of material images, the 
shifting universal, varieties of images, spiritual automaton, as well as the spectator’s 
attraction, pathos and affection. In Deleuze’s definition, the cinema is a composition of 
images and signs. The cinema, as a material image and a different reality, is the 
movement itself. Thus, Deleuze suggests not the semiology or hermeneutics of images, 
but the taxonomy of images, which is a complex classification of different types of 
images of perception, action, affection, impulses, reflections, and relations. Even though 
the classification of digital images goes beyond the basic classification of filmic 
components of frame, shot, and montage, we need to understand the conceptual 
implication of Deleuze’s movement-image. It is the aesthetics of the material movement 
of images, their parts and wholes changing in duration and change. For Deleuze, the 
aesthetic concept of montage is the determination of the whole moving and changing in 
space and time and is still a strong tool in cinematic movement. Deleuze’s concept of the 
movement-image alludes to a composite aesthetics of digital images based on the 
synthesis and manipulation of computer pixels and data.  
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With regard to the aesthetics of digital cinema, this thesis argues that Deleuze’s concept 
of the movement-image can be differentiated and specified in the new milieu of digital 
virtualism. I consider that Deleuze’s concept of the attraction and pathos of the 
movement-image can be newly considered in terms of the materiality, molecularisation 
sensation, and spirituality of the digital image. In previous sections, I evaluated the 
diversity of useful concepts of digital attraction and affection. In particular, Gunning 
highlights the importance of cinematic motion and spectator’s attraction in relation to the 
study of new media. Wood suggests the concept of ‘digital affection’, based on digital 
dressing and micromanipulation, borrowing from Deleuze, Foster, and Massumi’s 
concept of ‘affection’. Gurevitch proposes the concept of ‘digital transaction’, which 
relies on the exchange and networking of digital images as a special type of cinematic 
attraction in the age of cybernetic networks. Brown argues that the monstrosity of digital 
images, which transverse the human and the non-human, creates a new phase of super-
cinema and digital complexity relying on datamoshing and glitch arts. These digital 
theories offer clues that are useful in developing the attraction of cinematic movement.  
 
I would add the aesthetic ontology of digital virtualism. The movement-image of cinema 
is connected to the aesthetics of digital virtualism. I define the aesthetics of digital 
virtualism in terms of computer simulation and synthesis, the materiality and sensation of 
cinema, and the informational nature of images. Digital virtualism is dedicated to the 
spiritual automaton of the digital movement-image. It is a new affection and pathos 
produced by computer simulation and synthesis. It means the configuration and 
assemblage of surface and depth, spectacle and emotion, and fantasy and reality. In other 
words, the movement-image of digital cinema creates a new type of thought and pathos. 
It is a historical hybridity and aesthetic complexity of the actual and the virtual, human 
and nature, technology and thought. The digital movement-image is founded on the 
materiality of molecular images and the sensations of the spectator. For example, the 
emotional pathos of spectators of a 3-D digital movie, such as Avatar (2009), stems from 
the technological attraction of spectacular stereoscopic images and the sensuous 
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immersion of spectators in the 3-D screen.581 In addition, one of the most important 
factors in Sony’s computer game for Playstation 3, The Last of Us (2012), is the creation 
of emotional and affectional affinity between the player and the game’s characters, which 
relies on the interactivity and network of informational images.582 Digital cinema creates 
the spectator’s emotional pathos and sensational attraction by digital movement-images 
based on computer simulation and synthesis of pixels and data. This concerns the 
technological and sensuous attraction of digital images, which is material and composite. 
In this sense, digital virtualism presents a new form of the movement-image in the unity 
of sensory-motor schema. In short, digital virtualism is the aesthetics of the digital 
movement-image. It is founded on the molecular assemblage and singular multiplicity of 
material images and the emotional attraction of spectators caused by data informatics and 
computer synthesis. 
 
 
4-3. Digital Time: Crystal-Image and Digital Virtualism 
 
In this section, I explore the implications of Deleuze’s concept of the time-image for the 
aesthetics of digital cinema. After examining the relation between the movement-image 
and the time-image, this section concludes that the aesthetics of the time-image suggests 
new types of cinematic ontology. In particular, I pay attention to the concept of the 
crystal-image, which is indiscernibility and inextricability between movement and time, 
the past and the present, and the actual and the virtual. I consider that the concept is the 
core of Deleuze’s aesthetics of cinema. The aesthetics of digital virtualism is in intimate 
rapport with Deleuze’s concept of the crystal-image. Moreover, as the conclusion of 
Deleuze’s cinema book indicates, the informational nature of digital cinema is connected 
to the aesthetics of the crystal-image. It evokes the primary concepts of digital virtualism, 
such as digital synthesis, intertextuality, network, convergence and interactivity. Thus, 
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we should take note of the aesthetical implications of Deleuzian virtuality, although 
Deleuze could not conceive of the full-fledged diffusion of digital cinema. 
 
I begin by explicating the concept of the time-image, which immediately requires its 
relation with the movement-image and the crystal-image. After investigating the concept 
of the time-image in relation to the movement-image, I will proceed to the implication of 
crystal aesthetics in the age of digital information-image.  
 
In Deleuze’s image taxonomy, the time-image and the movement-image are the core of 
cinema aesthetics. The time-image is a historical and an aesthetic concept, 
simultaneously. Here, it is necessary to emphasize the relationship between the 
movement-image and the time-image. Historically, the time-image is pure time emerged 
from the rupture of the movement-image. Aesthetically, it is also the mode of 
presentation drawn from the filmic via filmstrips. My point is that the primacy of the 
time-image should not be presupposed over the movement-image. Their relationship is 
not exclusive, but complex and interdependent. They are two different regimes and types 
of cinematic images. They are considered different modes of filmic images and realities. 
Deleuze mentions the relationship between the movement-image and the time-image: 
 
It is not a matter of saying that the modern cinema of the time-image is ‘more 
valuable’ than the classical cinema of the movement-image. We are talking only 
of masterpieces to which no hierarchy of value applies. The cinema is always as 
perfect as it can be, taking into account the images and signs which it invents and 
which it has at its disposal.583 
 
In this sense, Rushton also emphasizes that Deleuze’s thought has little to do with 
affirming the richness of the time-image against the poverty of the movement-image.584 
The assertion that the time-image is better and the movement-image is ‘worse’ is a 
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serious misunderstanding of Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinematic images. The relation 
between the movement-image and the time-image is not a matter of hierarchical 
judgment, which automatically assumes the superiority of the time-image over the 
movement-image. Rushton claims that the both ontological regimes of cinematic images 
are neither better nor worse, but real. He argues that the functional relation between the 
movement-image and the time-image concerns two different types of cinematic reality: 
 
Cinematic perception has its own aspirations and is capable of its own modes of 
perceiving. For the movement-image the modes of perceiving are ones that 
depend upon a clear distinction between the real and the unreal, where, in the final 
account, everything is found to be in its place. The time-image, on the other hand, 
presents a different type of reality, on which acknowledges the presence of the 
past and the ways that the past is enveloped in the present. This is another way of 
saying that the time-image presents an indistinguishability between the real 
(present) and the unreal (past).585 
 
With this typology in mind, I examine Deleuze’s historical and aesthetical viewpoint of 
the time-image. Deleuze states that the time-image emerged after the Second World War, 
because the ruin of war and the new post-war conditions gave rise to a new system of 
thought and image.586 In particular, he follows Bazin who suggests the aesthetic criteria of 
realism, instead of the social content. Deleuze pays attention to the ambivalent and 
transparent form of neorealism in terms of the perspectives of new image aesthetics, 
instead of political aspects: 
 
it was a matter of a new form of reality, said to be dispersive, elliptical, errant or 
wavering, working in blocs, with deliberately weak connections and floating 
events. The real was no longer represented or reproduced but 'aimed at'. Instead of 
representing an already deciphered real, neo-realism aimed at an always 
ambiguous, to be deciphered, real; this is why the sequence shot tended to replace 
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the montage of representations. Neorealism therefore invented a new type of 
image, which Bazin suggested calling 'fact-image'.587 
 
Deleuze argues that what defines neorealism is the build-up of purely optical and sound 
situations, which are fundamentally distinct from the sensory-motor situations of the 
action-image in the old realism. He similarly evaluates the emergence of the new post-
war films by Welles, Resnais, Hitchcock, Ozu, Bresson, Antonioni and Godard. For him, 
the modern post-war films present the new cinema of the time-image beyond the 
movement-image. They heralded the birth of pure optical-sound situation, replacing the 
action-image and sensory-motor schema. Hence, according to Deleuze, while the 
movement-image is an indirect image of time, the time-image is a direct image of time: 
 
This is the triple reversal which defines a beyond of movement. The image had to 
free itself from sensory-motor links; it had to stop being action-image in order to 
become a pure optical, sound (and tactile) image. But the latter was not enough: it 
had to enter into relations with yet other forces, so that it could itself escape from 
a world of cliches. It had to open up to powerful and direct revelations, those of 
the time-image, of the readable image and the thinking image. It is in this way 
that opsigns and sonsigns refer back to 'chronosigns', 'lectosigns' and 'noosigns'.588 
 
For Deleuze, the time-image means the emergence of pure optical and sound images 
beyond the movement-image. It implies that movement should not be perceived as a 
sensory-motor image but grasped and thought of as another type of image. The 
movement-image has not disappeared, but now exists only as the first dimension of an 
image that never stops growing. Deleuze asserts that the time-image appears in the 
looseness of sensory-motor schema and the crisis of action-images, that is, the crisis of 
cinematic movement.  
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According to Rushton,589 the  movement-image is an indirect image of time because its 
form presupposes that the world can be brought into a right, proper, and stable order if 
certain specific actions are performed. The movement-image is the discovery of an image 
of the world by a camera-eye that is not human. It is defined by actions and reactions, and 
it aspires to myriad solutions, such as those in Nazi, Soviet, and American narrative 
cinema. Thus, the movement-image implies that changes need not happen within the 
stable system of sensory-motor schema.  
 
Rushton also explains Deleuze’s concept of the time-image by referring to two core 
criteria: the temporality and stability of cinematic images.590 On one hand, in terms of 
temporality, Rushton argues that, whereas the movement-image is the present, the time-
image is the limit of presence. The time-image is the past, memory, renascence, and 
duration. It is the coexistence between the past and the present. Deleuze states that the 
time-image is ‘a little time in pure state’.591 On the other hand, in terms of the stability of 
images, Rushton also claims that Deleuze’s concept of the time-image indicates the 
inability to find such solutions. The time-image means a certain inability to work out 
right, proper, and stable solutions. It goes beyond the capacities of narrative and 
character. Hence, the time-image is a cinematic system of openness: It is open to change; 
its solutions are also open.  
 
Here, I emphasize that the time-image is the virtual, which could be an important 
theoretic premise of digital virtualism. It implies that Deleuzian virtualism is based on the 
complex relation of the movement-image and the time-image and the actual and the 
virtual. Deleuze states that the direct time-image is a ‘virtual phantom’, whereas the 
indirect time-image, that is, the movement-image, is the actual.592 For Deleuze, the time-
image is a non-localizable relation between a pure optical situation and a sound situation. 
It replaces the sensory-motor situation of movement-images. Thus, it is the virtual, that 
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is, the indiscernibility and coexistence of the presence and the absence, and the present 
and the past, whereas the movement-image concerns the present and the actual.  
 
However, the virtual is not opposed to the real, but to the actual.593 We should understand 
that the relation between the actual and the virtual is an actual-virtual circuit on the spot. 
It is a crystal-image: 
 
This perpetual exchange between the virtual and the actual is what defines a 
crystal; and it is on the plane of immanence that crystals appear. The actual and 
the virtual coexist, and enter into a tight circuit which we are continually retracing 
from one to the other. This is no longer a singularization, but an individuation as 
process, the actual and its virtual: no longer an actualization but a crystallization. 
Pure virtuality no longer has to actualize itself, since it is a strict correlative of the 
actual with which it forms the tightest circuit. It is not so much that one cannot 
assign the terms 'actual' and 'virtual' to distinct objects, but rather that the two are 
indistinguishable.594 
 
In this regard, crystal images are indiscernible and inextricable imbrication between the 
actual and the virtual, movement-image and time-image. Here I point out that the time-
image is the virtual and the movement-image is the actual. I emphasize that Deleuze 
defines the new form of crystal image as residing in the entwined circuit of two different 
modes of cinematic images.  
 
Consequently, the Deleuzian aesthetics of digital virtualism should be grasped in terms of 
the complex circuit of the movement-image and the time-image and the actual and the 
virtual. This is why the aesthetics of digital virtualism could be an ontological alternative 
in the dispute on film theories, particularly about the relation between physical 
indexicality and the imaginary illusion. The reality of film and digital cinema should be 
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theorized in terms of the complex relation between actual reality and the virtual 
imagination. As result, Deleuze’s concept of the crystal image suggests the inextricable 
circuit and imbrication of cinematic movement and time, the actual and the virtual, reality 
and the imagination. Deleuzian concept of the crystal image indicates an assemblage 
aesthetics of digital virtualism. 
 
Markos Hadjioannou claims that the Deleuzian concept of crystal images is a complex 
combination of reality and the imagination in the theory of film and digital cinema. 
Hadjioannou argues that the reinventing of time is not the ‘re-presentation’, but the 
constant ‘re-generation’ of an actual time and a virtual time.595 It is not a matter of 
whether the cinematic image is analogical to physical reality or not. For Hadjioannou, the 
simulation of time presents the creative power of cinema through the incessant process of 
assemblage and becoming of the actual and the virtual, the real and the unreal, physical 
indexicality and the imaginary. Hadjioannou indicates that the power of cinema in 
Deleuzian virtuality stems from the potential for the cinematic moving image to induce 
new life and thought, that is, reconnection with the world. Thus, for Deleuze, the crystal 
image of cinema, which is the bridge between movement and time, offers a clue to the 
inextricable relation between cinematic reality and virtuality: 
 
The crystalline regime renegotiates the distinction between real and imaginary 
leading to what is in fact an indecipherable indiscernibility between the two. The 
real and the imaginary within the crystal image become facets of the same 
world… within the crystalline regime the dream becomes actual by transforming 
the real, while the real becomes simultaneously a manifestation of the dream. The 
on layer of existence follows on from the other in a way that the present passing 
of time is just that contracted point where all the past is virtually present, and 
where every action is a motion that moves into the past to reveal the desires and 
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disorientations of the future. The imaginary, in other words, is a state of existing 
as much as the real is a state of virtuality.596 
 
In terms of the crystal image and digital virtuality, Seung-hoon Jeong proposes the 
concept of the ‘quasi-interface’ between the object and the cinema.597 The concept 
originates in the Deleuzian concept of the crystal image, which means the indiscernibility 
between the actual and the virtual, the present and the past, and the real and the 
imaginary. Jeong attempts to develop a Deleuzian concept of the crystal image by 
theorizing the concept of ‘interfaciality’ between actual objects and virtual images.598 For 
him, the cinematic illusion of interfaciality is neither pure similarity and the classical 
imitation of original, nor postmodern simulation without an original. He tries to access 
the new cinematic potential of virtual illusion by denying both the representative copy 
and superficial simulation of images. Jeong defines the illusion of interfaciality as an 
optical allusion to a virtual interface in the surface of the object.599 For him, Deleuzian 
crystal images evolve the concept of the quasi-interface between cinema and the 
spectator, which implies the actualization of the virtual, the interconnection between 2-D 
(the image) and 3-D (the object), and deterritorialisation in the immanent plane of 
virtuality: 
 
The Kernel of this circuit lies in the figurative transformation of things becoming 
quasi-interfaces. This becoming as figuration is thus a sort of cinematic illusion 
that enables immanent interfaciality to surface on to visuality. And the gap 
between interface and immanence decreases along the spectrum form quasi-
camera to quasi-screen, so that a quasi-screen, often taking up most or all of the 
physical screen, appears not detached from the BwO but attached to it as though 
two virtualities had merged or the immanent BwO were nothing but its own 
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sense-effect… This truth is obvious but still worth mentioning, because it gives 
more pertinence to the notion of interfaciality as ‘immanent virtuality’.600 
 
In this regard, Jeong claims that the aesthetics of the crystal image is connected to the 
potentiality and becoming of the world and cinematic images by the notion of 
‘interfaciality’ as ‘immanent virtuality’. For him, the world reveals itself as an interface 
that is a cinematic plane of immanence. Jeong articulates that the quasi-screen of the 
cinematic image causes an imagined of transformation of the world, which is the 
interfaciality of the new reality and the potential of the world.601  
 
In particular, based on the discussion of quasi-interface and digital virtuality, I point out 
the fact that the possibility of crystal images and interfaciality in the digital era is 
proliferating because technological virtuality and spectator’s immersion, which are 
promoted by computer simulation and synthesis, intensify physical indexicality and 
imaginary illusion simultaneously. Borrowing Deleuze’s terminology, the cinematic 
image of digital simulation implies the aesthetics of ‘virtual conjunction’.602 It is the 
configurative and expressive aesthetics of the actual and the potential, the movement-
image and the time-image, physical indexicality and imaginary illusion. The aesthetics of 
digital virtuality is driven by computer simulation and the synthesis between different 
images and media. It is connected to the intertextuality, convergence, and interactivity of 
digital virtualism. Hence, in terms of the digital virtuality of crystal images, I claim that 
digital cinema reinforces the complex contradiction between material reality and virtual 
images on the immanent plane of cinematic simulation and interfaciality. 
 
Next, based on the assemblage aesthetics of the crystal image in the actual-virtual circuit, 
let us move to the discussion of digital information images. In particular, I explore the 
practical implication of Deleuzian ontology in relation to the aesthetics of digital 
virtualism. I will conclude that Deleuze’s aesthetics of the time-image evokes the 
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virtuality and subjectivity of digital cinema. This section reinterprets Deleuze’s position 
on electronic, informational and digital images in terms of his aesthetics of the time-
image. As a philosopher of subjectivity, Deleuze maintains the struggle against the 
negativity of the informational image, which is not only political but also aesthetical. I 
extrapolate the aesthetical base of digital virtualism from Deleuze’s view of the time-
image and digital information image. Although Deleuze could not discuss digital cinema 
in detail, his cinema aesthetics of the crystal image has gained acceptance over time as 
the informational image has become increasing complex and influential. Indeed, we 
cannot help ‘beginning’ from his ‘conclusions’:  
 
A return to the extrinsic point of view obviously becomes necessary: the 
technological and social evolution of automata. Clockwork automata, but also 
motor automata, in short, automata of movement, made way for a new 
computer and cybernetic race, automata of computation and thought, automata 
with controls and feedback. The configuration of power was also inverted, and, 
instead of converging on a single, mysterious leader, inspirer of dreams, 
commander of actions, power was diluted in an information network… But 
new automata did not invade content without a new automatism bringing about 
a mutation of form. The modern configuration of the automation is the correlate 
of an electronic automatism. The electronic image, that is, the tele and video 
image, the numerical image coming into being, had either to transform cinema 
or to replace it, to mark its death.603 
 
In light of the fact that Cinema 2: Time-Image was written in 1985, Deleuze’s intuitive 
discernment that electronic and computer images declare the death of the cinema is 
marvellous. He had the insight that ‘the technological and social evolution of automata’ 
leads to the transformation and replacement of cinema. He continuously points out that 
the new image is internalized in a unitary existing image:  
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The new images no longer have any outside (out-of-field), any more than they 
are internalized in a whole; rather, they have a right side and a reverse, 
reversible and non-superimposable, like a power to turn back on themselves. 
They are the object of a perpetual reorganization, in which a new image can 
arise from any point whatever of the preceding image.604 
 
The question, then, concerns the kind of transformation that emerges in the age of the 
new automatism, which is caused by electronic and computer images. Deleuze first 
maintains the importance of an omni-directional space that constantly varies its angles 
and co-ordinates. In the age of the new automatism, the organization of space loses its 
privileged direction and human posture on the screen. Alternatively, the new image 
constitutes ‘a table of information’ and an ‘opaque surface of data’. Therefore, the 
electronic and computer image, compelled by the evolution of new technological 
automata, is ‘information replacing nature, and the brain-city, the third eye, replacing the 
eyes of nature.’605 In addition, he indicates that new automata give rise to the autonomy of 
sound in which the two images, aural and visual, have a complex relation. Finally, they 
bring about the new spiritual automatism and full-blown substitution of the movement-
image by the time-image. Deleuze clearly points out that the age of new automata invokes 
a significant change in the essence and characteristics of the image.  
 
Eventually, Deleuze defines the digital information image as the new automatism of the 
time-image. For him, the digital image is the aesthetic expansion of the time-image. He 
indicates that the new automata of electronics and computers give rise to a new 
automatism of the time-image. The new automation of cinema can fully accomplish the 
visual and aural system through the expansion of the aesthetic dimension, at which the 
modern cinema of time-image has already arrived. For Deleuze, the time-image means 
the virtual conjunction of the past and the present and the visual and the aural, which 
does not reconstitute a whole but instead enters into an ‘irrational relation’ with 
indiscernible and dissymmetrical trajectories. It is the aesthetic expansion of the multiple 
                                                
604 Ibid, p.254. 
605 Ibid, pp.254-255. 
 238 
dimension of time. Thus, the digital expansion of the time-image implies that the 
information image achieves the inextricably present complexity and hybridity of the 
passing time and the upcoming future. Digital time is the molecular multiplicity and 
autonomous imbrication of all elements of cinematic images in the virtual fusion of 
temporality. In short, Deleuze asserts that the information image replaces nature in the 
new automatism of digital time.606 
 
In terms of digital time, Babett Mangolte accentuates the difference between filmic 
instantaneity and digital transformation.607 While celluloid film depends on the material 
process of temporal succession, digital cinema loses the palpable experiences of celluloid 
films, editing machines, and screen projectors. For her, this means the elimination of the 
material process of shooting and editing and production and exhibition. Mangolte claims 
that the degradation of the material process brings about the loss of the filmic moment 
and duration. In contrast, for her, digital time introduces a new temporality of numerical 
synthesis and transformation, terminating the consecutive flow of the physical reality of 
photographic images. For Mangolte, digital images are difficult to communicate in the 
temporal duration of cinema. She argues that digital time is the loss of physical reality 
and temporal instantaneity: 
 
In the world of digital, time is encoded in a bit-map, and there can be no entropy. 
In the compression algorithm of a digital image. Only what changes in the shot is 
renewed. That which is the same in the shot stays the same in the digital image, in 
contrast to the constantly changing emulsion grain from one frame to the next in 
the film image… Time is fixed as in a map in digital and is totally repeatable with 
no degradation due to copying loss, while silver-based film is structured by time 
as entropy, therefore unrepeatable. The unpredictability of time passing and time 
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past, the slippage between one and the other, and the pathos of their essentially 
ineluctable difference are lost.608 
 
Although Mangolte claims that digital time is opposed to the material continuity of filmic 
time, the Deleuzian concept of the time-image emphasizes the inextricable hybridity of 
actual duration and virtual time, past time and the passing present, and physical 
indexicality and imaginary time. Philip Rosen proposes the concept of ‘historical 
hybridity’, which emphasises the historical continuity of digital images with filmic 
temporality.609 To assert the virtual temporality of digital images is not to deny material 
time and duration, but to propose the expansion of materiality and physical indexicality. 
Similarly, Jeong tactfully describes digital virtuality as the new form of filmic reality: 
‘This virtuality as “the reality of the virtual itself”, therefore, has nothing to do with [the] 
“virtual reality” (VR) that imitates reality in an artificial medium and thus forms non-
immanent actuality in diegesis’.610  
 
Likewise, Hadjioannou argues that digital time is also associated with the material reality 
of cinema. For him, the sense of digital time is not tied to the image but to its medium of 
display. The digital bitmap does not deteriorate the cinematic reality because it is simply 
a set of numerical configurations whose relations and functions strictly follow the 
predetermined commands of a programmer and the computer's operations.611 In this 
sense, the virtuality of digital time is the new form of filmic reality. It expands the 
complex hybridity of the filmic time-image between the actual and the potential into the 
cinematic reality of digital virtuality. 
 
On the other hand, Hadjioannou asserts the distinctiveness of digital time in relation to 
filmic time. He points out that the specificity of digital time rests in the temporality of 
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real time and the present.612 For Hadjioannou, the Deleuzian new automatism of the 
digital time-image evokes the ‘intensified’ configuration and manipulation in the 
interactivity of real time. For him, digital time creates tension between the past and the 
present. It is an inextricable combination of past being and the passing present. The future 
of information images simulated by computer technology depends on the assemblage 
aesthetics of an archival database. The molecular and numerical manipulation of digital 
images results in the configurative aesthetics of the past and the present in the virtuality 
of digital time.  
 
Barbara Filser argues that digital information images produce new values and thought 
regarding cinematic reality.613 Similarly, Peter Weibel demonstrates that the development 
of quantum technology induces an aesthetics of the new temporality of digital images. He 
argues that the digital time of information images promotes a new potential of real time 
and interactivity.614 For Hadjioannou, digital time intensifies the temporality of the 
present as the continual and instantaneous renewal of the image in real time, which 
means that it is disconnected from a time past and a time in passing. Based on the concept 
of Deleuzian virtuality, Hadjioannou claims that the specificity of digital time is the 
incessant becoming of new images in the temporality of the interactive present of 
cinematic images and spectators: 
 
…the digital can become a constant and instantaneous invitation for 
transformation and a metamorphosing activity. Accessed in the present, its 
potential for manipulation is the constant promise that flings the encounter into 
the open vastness of a future where access is a structure of change itself. 
Imperatively, though, this relation is based firmly on the grounds of the agency on 
the part of the individual because it is activity from the outside that endures, not 
the mathematical configurations in themselves. Time is placed on the experience 
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of the event and its potentialities, between technology and worlds rather than the 
medium's own operations. Here is where time can be imaged, or even imagined – 
either way, where a sense of time can be felt.615 
 
In this context, I articulate that the Deleuzian aesthetics of the digital time-image allows 
the complex configuration and assemblage of a diversity of component elements of 
cinematic images, which indicates the expressive and experimental potential of digital 
simulation and manipulation beyond the realm of representative indexicality. For 
Deleuze, digital time is the conceptual extension of the filmic time-image. It is a hybrid 
combination of actual duration and virtual temporality. The temporality of digital images 
intensifies the tensions and contradictions between the present and the past, the actual and 
the virtual, and indexicality and the imaginary. In the realm of digital virtualism, 
cinematic time proposes the expressive and configurative aesthetics of images. It is based 
on the temporality of the present real-time and the interactive database. In short, the 
digital time-image is the assemblage aesthetics of hybrid temporality between actual 
reality and the virtual image. It reinforces the configurative force of cinematic images in 
the present real-time and in interactive manipulation. 
 
Finally, I argue for the subjectivity and ethics of the digital time-image. Deleuze 
definitely alerts us to the duplicity of the digital information image in terms of subjective 
becoming and aesthetic configuration. While the information image is a new automatism 
expanding the reality of cinematic images, it also carries with it political and aesthetical 
negativity. For him, digital information images are both the potential of new cinema and 
the weakening of spiritual automaton. Based on the ethical view of the actualization of 
the virtual, Deleuze claims the ‘internal struggle’ and ‘overcoming’ to the information 
images: 
 
The irrational cycle of the visual and the sound is related by Syberberg to 
information and its overcoming. Redemption, art beyond knowledge, is also 
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creation beyond information. Redemption arrives too late (the point shared by 
Syberberg and Visconti); it appears when information has already gained 
control of speech-acts, and when Hitler has already captured the German myth 
or irrational. But the too-late is not only negative; it is the sign of the time-
image in the place where time makes visible the stratigraphy of space and 
audible the story-telling of the speech-act. The life or afterlife of cinema 
depends on its internal struggle with informatics. It is necessary to set up 
against the latter the question which goes beyond it, that of its source and that 
of its addressee, the head of Wagner as spiritual automaton, the Parsifal couple 
as psychic automata.616 
 
This proposition that ‘the life or afterlife of cinema depends on its internal struggle with 
informatics’ is twofold. Above all, it means that modern cinema is already surrounded by 
informational images. It also implies that the cinema, as an informational image, should 
be committed to the complex attributes of a new image, to the division of the visual and 
sound, to non-totalized fragmentation, and to organization irreducible to causality and 
indexicality. It is the virtual conjunction of the actual and the virtual and the fusion of the 
real and the imaginary.  
 
On the other hand, regarding informatics, Deleuze raises the questions, ‘What is the 
source and what is the addressee?’617 He keeps his eyes on the negative attributes of 
informational images, such as ‘Hitler, Hollywood, violence, pornography, and 
business’.618 He pays attention to the limit of the informational image. Modern cinema 
that goes beyond the continuous, closed, narrative features of the movement-image 
should surmount the negative attributes of informatics through the extension of the time-
image. According to this logic, the informational image is not a perfect factor, but only an 
attributor of technological and social evolution in its developmental phase. Accordingly, 
the aesthetic life of cinema will inevitably be terminated at the limit, unless the 
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informational image overcomes the negative attributes by questioning its source and 
addressee. Deleuze uses Syberberg’s films, Hitler, Ein Film aus Deutschland (1978), and 
Parsifal (1981), to argue that any information is not sufficient to defeat Hitler, and that it 
is necessary to surpass information and overturn the image to defeat Hitler. Going beyond 
information raises the questions of source and addressee. In other words, it means that the 
technology and mechanism of information should combine with the aesthetics of the 
time-image in order to surpass the negative factors of the informational image in the new 
automation of cinema. 
 
Ultimately, Deleuze’s theory requires a full-scaled time-image as spiritual and psychic 
automata. He claims that cinematic automata in the age of the electronic and computer 
image should proceed to a new automatism, mechanical aesthetics and crystal image. In 
order to overcome the limits of the informational image and to achieve the full-blown 
time-image, he requires that the new automatism of informational and numerical images 
should advance the new subjectivity and spectatorship of cinema consistently by 
questioning the source and addressee of the informational image.  
 
Although it is clear that he did not have the opportunity to witness the whole meaning of 
the digital age in his lifetime, Deleuze attempted to conceptualise the aesthetics of the 
new automatism in the age of the emerging electronic and computer image. Similarly, in 
the 1930s, Walter Benjamin asserted the concept of ‘politicizing art’ against the 
aesthetical politics of Fascism because “This is the situation of politics which Fascism is 
rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.”619 In the 1980s, Deleuze 
tried to develop Walter Benjamin’s critical point that the conceptual change of art and the 
advent of the age of mass art are caused by the technological reproducibility of film by 
the subjective re-examination of information in the age of the computer image. Whereas, 
in the 1930s, Benjamin focused on the possibility of film as a mass art, in the 1980s, 
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Deleuze tried to discover an affirmative subjectivity based on the joyful desire and 
creativity of the multitude in the reality of the informational image. 
 
In this context, it is now possible to raise questions about the ethical tasks of digital 
aesthetics from the viewpoint of Deleuze, which include the following: whether the 
informational image in the digital age is dominated by capitalism and state power; 
whether digital cinema is ruled by the negative attributes of informational images, such as 
Hitler, Hollywood, violence, pornography, business, and neoliberalism, as the radical 
ideology of multinational capitalism; whether the multitudes struggle against the 
negativity of the informational image; and whether the full-fledged time-image as the 
new automatism of digital culture could evolves into a practical aesthetics of creative art 
and the affirmative subjectivity of the multitude.  
 
For Deleuze, going beyond information does not only mean making political cinema. On 
one hand, it is both a pure speech-act and creative storytelling.620 On the other hand, it is 
the deconstruction and division of all elements of cinema. In short, it is the redemption 
and evolution of the time-image as spiritual and psychic automata. Deleuze suggests that 
the new subject of digital automata as the source and addressee of information proceeds 
to the nomadic ‘war-machine’,621 struggling with capitalism and its aesthetic expression. 
Here the new automata of digital cinema politically and aesthetically combine with the 
new automatism of the time-image. 
 
Deleuze suggests that we should question both the ‘source and the addressee’ of 
information.622 This means that he not only stayed within the contemplative bounds of 
theoretical hermeneutics but also his philosophy accentuated the joyful desire and 
affirmative potential of the multitude as both war-machine and nomad. In his practical 
ethics, Deleuze maintained that the age of new cinema should be prepared aesthetically 
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and subjectively by the internal struggle of informational images. Therefore, Deleuze’s 
aesthetic of the time-image proceeds to a new configurative aesthetics of becoming and 
assemblage beyond the nostalgia of representative images. In this sense, Deleuze 
questions the source and addressee of information in the age of the digital image. He 
theorizes the new aesthetics of assemblage and configuration beyond imitation and 
representation in terms of the crystal image, in which new spiritual and psychic automata 
of cinema inspire the nomadic war-machine, deterritorialisation, the creative will to art, 
and the affirmative desire of the multitude in the age of the informational image. 
 
Timothy Murray demonstrates that Deleuze’s assertion of the struggle with information 
images should be understood in terms of the complex crystallisation of digital time. He 
claims that Deleuze’s concern about digital information images is related to not only the 
computer simulation of cinematic space but also the potential transformation of cinematic 
time itself.623 This is because time is closely associated with the thought on cinema and 
reality. In this sense, Murray opposes Manovich’s assertion of computer manipulation, 
which indicates a shift from temporal montage to spatial montage. While Manovich 
considers the concept of montage as the technological compositing of the image, Deleuze 
extrapolates the cinematic image from the relation between cinematic movement, time 
and thought.  
 
Thus, Murray asserts that Deleuze’s argument of the combat against informatics is to 
protect the very stakes of the time-image and spiritual automaton as machinic thought. 
For Murray, the struggle with the information image implies the incessant recombination 
of information processing and data synthesis in the increasing complexity of new 
computer technology. Hence, he recalls Deleuze’s concept of the ‘montrage’,624 replacing 
the spatial notion of montage. The crisis of the time-image promoted by informatics 
evokes the cinematic imperative of the ‘montrage of time’.625 For Murray, Deleuze’s 
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struggle of informatics indicates the ‘montrage of becoming’ in the crystallisation of 
digital time. It is the endless process of becoming and assemblage, which means the 
creation of new spiritual automaton in the ‘irrational interval’ and the ‘imcompossibility’ 
of digital time.626 In this sense, Murray concludes that the struggle against the information 
image suggests a new aesthetics of digital virtuality based on the crystallised-time of 
computer images: 
 
In the context of new media art, I propose that we consider the form or event of 
the irrational interval in relation to a series of incompossible events: archival 
intensities, interactivities, coded automatons, and the returns of the future. As 
extensions of the time-image, its fabulations and its irrational intervals, the new 
media image capitalizes on the complexification of information science and 
culture by mixing and matching its softwares and hardwares, while experimenting 
with the crystallized density of the digital point to foreground the extended 
frontiers of virtual reality (as that event of the virtual touching upon the actual).627 
  
Garrett Stewart also argues that the digital time of information images concerns the 
aesthetics of the virtual configuration of cinematic images. 628  He presupposes the 
different timing of the image between mechanical procession and electronic process. 
‘Digitime’ is not a sprocketed drop of frames past the aperture, but a coded phasing in 
and out of the graphic grid. It is also not ocular rhythm at the threshold of perception, but 
an algorithm beneath it.629 For Stewart, digitime is ‘electronic mutation’ and ‘compositing 
time’ instead of mechanical succession.630 He asserts that the digitime of the image is no 
longer segmental, incremental, and sequential. In the virtuality of digitime, all forms of 
cinematic images are determined by ‘internal interchange’, which change over time. 
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Thus, for Stewart, digitime is the emergence of new temporal models across all modes of 
screen narration between ‘European humanism’ and ‘American science fiction’.631  
 
Furthermore, Stewart claims that the new modes of digitime cause a ‘new distance’ 
between cinematic images and subjective perception.632 In light of Deleuze’s statements 
questioning the sources and addresses of the information image, Stewart’s intuition of the 
new distance of digital images is useful to explore the new possibility of digital time and 
ethics. He indicates that the new cinema of digital images brings about the separation 
between and dismantling of the actual and the virtual, the actor and the digital agent, and 
the subject and the image. The dismantling stems from the ontological indiscernibility 
and instability of computer -simulated images. The virtuality of digital images is mixed 
with the actuality of physical reality in computer software and databases. As Stewart 
points out,633 on one hand, the compositing aesthetics of digital images results in the 
unstable temporality of image processing. On the other hand, it causes the decentring of 
the spectator in the surface play of spectacle images, which raises the issue of subjectivity 
and ethics in the digital time of information images. 
 
Therefore, the aesthetics of digital virtualism raises the theoretical and practical task of 
digital ethics in the contemporary spread of information images. In the struggle with 
informatics, Deleuze emphasizes belief in both the world and the power of cinematic 
images. For him, belief in being and cinema is an incessant process of becoming and 
thought. Hence, the aesthetics of digital virtualism responds to the Deleuzian ethics of 
differentiation and virtual conjunction: 
 
We must believe in the body as in the germ of life, a seed that splits the pavement, 
that is conserved and perpetuated in the holy shroud or mummy’s wrappings, and 
which bears witness to life and to this very world such that is. We need an ethic or 
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faith that makes idiots laugh, not a need to believe in something else, but a need to 
believe in this world, of which fools are a part.634  
 
Rodowick points out that Deleuze’s aesthetics of the time-image presupposes the 
importance of digital ethics. 635  He argues that Deleuze’s ethics comprise a moral 
reasoning that wants to give back to us the belief in the capability of perpetuating life as a 
movement, change, becoming, that is, the eternal recurrence of difference. Similar to 
Deleuze, Rodowick emphasises that we must believe in the body and the flesh, and the 
material reality and the potential virtuality of the world as the becoming of being instead 
of the sceptical yearning for another transcendent world. For Rodowick, the aesthetics of 
Deleuzian virtuality requires the subjective and ethical task of digital cinema: 
 
Belief must then be reconnected to the two principles of Deleuze’s system. 
Skepticism is the sign of a thought disconnected from Life comprised of a single 
substance and a time of constant becoming. But Being and thought are in Life; 
they speak with a single voice and become in the same time, such that skepticism 
must be overcome with another will to power, which draws its energy from Life’s 
potential for self-differentiation, and moralism overcome by choosing to believe 
in the ever renewable possibility of beginning again—eternal recurrence.636 
 
Consequently, I state that the aesthetics of Deleuzian virtualism is closely related to the 
ethics of digital cinema. Bogue argues that the Deleuzian aesthetics of the time-image is 
connected to ‘an ethic of choosing to choose and a faith that allows belief in this 
world’.637 For Bogue, the ethics of the time-image means thinking and seeing differently 
the beliefs and choices in the world. 638  Similarly, I presuppose an aesthetics of 
assemblage and configuration in the virtuality of the digital time-image. The aesthetics of 
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digital virtualism is an ethical and subjective attempt to create a new, potential, different, 
and heightened reality of our world. I conclude that Deleuzian ethics, based on the belief 
in the world and being, suggests the aesthetical task of the virtual configuration and 
assemblage of digital time-image.  
 
In summary, Deleuze’s concept of the time-image is a significant clue regarding the 
approach to the aesthetical ontology of cinema in the age of digital image. Deleuze 
suggests the multiple dimension of time, in which the past coexists with the passing 
present, which also shares the fragmentation of the future. For him, the new mode of 
cinema presents not only the simulation of space and movement but also the multiple 
configuration of time. It is the inextricable and indiscernible crystallisation of the actual 
and the virtual, the movement-image and the time-image, and the real and the imaginary. 
In the world of Deleuze’s simulacra, the complex assemblage of movement and time is 
the beginning of the new system of the image. The crystal image is composed of the 
aesthetics of the rhizome, of becoming, and serial configuration instead of imitation and 
representation. Deleuze looks at cinematic ontology from the new perspective of the 
crystal image. He also theorizes the potential of the subjective assemblage and becoming 
of digital cinema for creative desire and nomadic traversal.  
 
In this context, I assert that, because the aesthetical ontology of digital cinema is derived 
from the deconstruction and reconfiguration of movement and time, the new automatism 
of digital cinema begins in Deleuze’s concept of the crystal image. Numerical and 
composite information based on computer technology deconstructs and reconfigures 
physical reality beyond the aesthetics of imitation and representation. The aesthetics of 
digital virtualism enhances the crystallisation of the cinematic movement and the digital 
time. Based on the ceaseless division and synthesis of informational images, it invokes a 
new automatism of digital cinema. On one hand, digital virtualism is a denial of the 
representational copy of computer-generated images. The digital virtualism intensifies the 
physical reality of cinema, and simultaneously goes beyond its indexical traces. On the 
other hand, the aesthetics of digital virtualism reinforces the imaginary and expressive 
characteristics of the cinematic image. The digital virtualism advocates the positive and 
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creative potential of computer-simulated images. It is the contradictory combination of 
physical reality and imaginary illusion.  
 
In conclusion, I elicit the concept of the digital ethics from the aesthetics of crystal-image 
and digital virtualism. This is because the technological evolution does not automatically 
guarantee the aesthetic achievement. The creative possibility of new artform depends on 
aesthetic practices and ethic tasks rather than technology itself. Although there is no 
doubt that the digital technology expands and transforms the expressive possibility and 
aesthetic potential of film art, the positive possibility of digital technology could be at 
risk by technological fetishism and de-historical ideology. In this ambivalent context, I 
suggest the ethical aesthetics of digital virtualism that film productions and artistic 
practices should expand and maximise the technological and aesthetic potentials of 
digital virtuality. While the concept of digital virtuality indicates the objective nature and 
trend of digital arts, the aesthetics of digital virtualism implies subjective and practical 
diffusion of digital virtuality. Thus, the digital virtualism is a theoretical and practical 
methodology, which strengthens the positive and active potentials of digital technology 
and virtual images. The digital virtualism moves towards the conceptual extension of 
filmic virtuality and crystal-image in the digital age. In the new milieu of computer 
simulation and global networks, digital technology encounters the intertextuality and 
interactivity of cinematic images. The digitalisation of cinema virtually re-configures the 
images of deconstruction and fragmentation. Deleuze’s aesthetics of the crystal image is 
both the bridge between and the imbrication of the actual and the virtual, the movement-
image and the time-image, and the indexical and the imaginary. Thus, physical reality 
and virtual image should be combined creatively in the actual-virtual circuit. The 
crystallisation of cinema is increasingly involved in the complexity and hybridity of 
cinematic movement and time. The hybrid aesthetics of digital cinema requires subjective 
and practical tasks of digital ethics. Deleuze questioned both the source and the addressee 
of information images. The aesthetic assemblage and configuration of digital images is 
connected to the ethical task of the digital virtualism.  
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In this thesis, I have demonstrated the aesthetic ontology of digital virtualism. I conclude 
that digital virtualism is the inextricable imbrication of the actual and the virtual, the 
material and the immaterial, the real and the imaginary. I elicit the assemblage and 
configuration aesthetics of cinematic images from the spread of digital images. On one 
hand, digital virtualism is associated with the intensification of physical reality. Digital 
technology creates new realities in the cyberspace of computer simulation. It reinforces 
the complex relationship between the real world and the cinematic image. On the other 
hand, the digital image strengthens the imaginary nature of cinema beyond material 
indexicality. The fantasy and illusion of cinema are increased by the technological 
spectacle of computer-simulated images. By theorising the digital virtualism, I emphasise 
that the imaginary nature of cinema is a symbiotic relationship with the physical 
indexicality. The diffusion of digital cinema implies the intensified contradiction between 
cinematic reality and imagination. Thus, this thesis reaches the theoretical conclusion that 
the aesthetics of digital virtualism proceeds to the assemblage of cinematic images and 
the practical task of digital ethics. 
 
Regarding the assemblage aesthetics, digital virtualism presents three main tendencies of 
contemporary cinema in terms of hybrid aesthetics. First, I point out that the combination 
of technology and aesthetics is proliferating. Although the spread of computer simulation 
expands the expressive possibility of cinema, the development of digital technology itself 
is neither utopia nor dystopia. Whilst Baudrillard rebukes the technological perfect and 
digital virtuality as violence to the physical reality and pure image,639 Frank Popper 
envisions the affirmative future of digital virtualism as the humanization of ‘techno-
aesthetics’.640 Moreover, while Gene Youngblood appraises that computer cybernetic 
cinema brings about the expansion of human sense and the possibility of new reality,641 
                                                
639 Jean Baudrillard, Violence of the Virtual and Integral Reality, translated by Marilyn Lambert-Drache, 
International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2005, (n.p.) 
640 Frank Popper and Jeseph Nechvatal, Origins of Virtualism: An Interview with Frank Popper, CAA Art 
Journal, Spring 2004, pp.64-66. 
641 Gene Youngblood, Expanded Cinema, New York: P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1970, pp.179-185. 
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Philip Rosen denounces the ‘historiography of conquest’ in ‘digital utopia’. 642 The reality 
of digital cinema is a historical process rather than a utopian ideal. 
 
Hence, I emphasize the ambivalent aspects of digital aesthetics. On one hand, digital 
technology intensifies the ‘perceptual realism’643 of spectators and the ‘attraction’ of 
spectacle images.644 Aylish Wood argues, digital dressing and micromanipulation cause 
‘digital affection’, and expand the expressive capacity of cinema.645 On the other hand, 
the digital image provokes the fetishistic desire of technological perfect and digital 
gadgets. In this sense, Scott McQuire indicates that digital techno-aesthetics is not simply 
‘realism’ but ‘reality’ in the historical context of contemporary capitalism.646 Willemen 
gives a warning that digital fantasy falls down the ‘stockbroker aesthetics’ of Hollywood 
cultural capitals.647  
 
As Kristen Whissel observes, digital technology can function as a catalyst to spatialize 
time and dramatize history.648 For her, the ‘digital multitude’ such as computer-generated 
swarms, armies, and hordes stand for occulted histories, repress pasts, and interrogate the 
idea that there is the great power of crowd. In digital spectacle movies such as The Lord 
of Rings: The Two Towers (Peter Jackson, 2002), The Mummy series (Stephen Sommers 
etc., 1999-2008), Troy (Wolfgang Petersen, 2004), I, Robot (Alex Proyas, 2004), Star 
Was Episode 2-Attack of the Clones (George Lucas, 2002), The Matrix Reloaded (Andy 
and Lana Wachowski, 2003), and 300 (Zack Snyder, 2007), digital technology 
contributes to dramatizing the apocalyptic change of history and the heroic worldview of 
Hollywood. 
                                                
642 Rosen, Philip Rosen, Change Mummified, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, 
pp.315-326. 
643 Stephen Prince, Digital Visual Effects in Cinema: The Seduction of Reality, New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 2012, pp.31-37. 
644 Tom Gunning, The Cinema of Attractions, Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde, Early 
Cinema, Space, Frame, Narrative. London: British Film Institute, 1986, pp.56-57. 
645 Aylish Wood, Digital afx: Digital Intermediates and Micromanipulations of the Image, Film Criticism, 
September 2007, pp.72-94. 
646 Scott McQuire, Impact Aesthetics: Back to the Future in Digital Cinema?: Millennial fantasies, 
Covergence, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp.41-61. 
647 Paul Willemen, Indexicality, Fantasy, and the Digital, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (14:1), 2013, pp.126-
127. 
648 Kristen Whissel, The Digital Multitude, Cinema Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4, Summer 2010, pp.90-110. 
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Furthermore, Laura Mulvey argues that digital technology arouses the new model of 
fetishism and spectatorship.649 She notes that digital technology causes the resurgence of 
the still image, such as the ability to pause a DVD and the manipulation of image frames. 
For Mulvey, the freezing images of digital cinema cause the ‘delay of linear narrative’, 
which enables a ‘fetishistic control’.650 Although Maria Walsh emphasizes that the 
psychoanalytic unconsciousness persists in the complex process of cinematic continuity 
and discontinuity,651 it is clear that digital interactivity has elicited a new mode of 
‘controlled fetishism’ beyond the traditional fetishism of the spectator’s representative 
identification.652 The freeze frame of digital moving images has provoked the new 
concept of feminist aesthetics and spectatorship with the intensification of digital 
interactivity. 
 
Therefore, I stress the viewpoint of the balance between digital utopia and dystopia. I 
conclude that the techno-aesthetic of digital virtualism is the new form and expansion of 
cinematic virtuality. Although digital technology expands the verisimilar reality and 
spectacle attraction of cinematic images, the techno-aesthetics of digital cinema can fall 
into the trap of technological fetishism and ‘California ideology’. Thus, digital techno-
aesthetics should be dialectically approached in terms of a contradictory hybridity 
between technology and aesthetics. 
 
Second, I indicate that digital virtualism is the hybrid aesthetics between live-action and 
computer-animated images. Lev Monovich describes digital cinema as a particular case 
of animation which uses live-action footage as one of its many elements.653 The digital 
cinema does not depend completely on live-action materials that are shot by digital 
camera, stored by computer memory, and edited using software programs. At the same 
                                                
649 Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image, London: Reaktion Books, 2006, 
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time, it does not fully rely on 3D animation, which is drawn by computer and coloured by 
compositing tools. It is a combination of the two, and created using a variety of digital 
images in the work of reproduction, storage, transformation, modification, and synthesis. 
This hybridity changes not only the concept of the live-action movie, but also our original 
conception of animation. It is clear that the two different streams will converge toward a 
new concept of digital cinema. 
 
In this sense, Richard Linklater’s ‘digital rotoscoping’ technique in Waking Life (2001) 
and A Scanner Darkly (2006) carries important implications in terms of the hybrid 
aesthetics of live-action and animated images. Digital rotoscoping combines the hand-
touch technique of cell animation with digital post-production using Photoshop software. 
Computer synthesis and digital effects effectively transform the filmic live-action images. 
As Linklater’s movies deal with the main characters’ anxiety and wandering between 
reality and fantasy, the digital rotoscoping technique reveals the unstable and floating 
border between the recorded reality and the animated images. Through the digital 
manipulation of the filmic image, Linklater presents the imbrication of film and 
animation, live-action and computer manipulation, and reality and dream.  
 
The development of computer animation provokes new aesthetic concepts. Vivian 
Sobchack argues that computer-generated images return us to the contradiction and 
dialectic between ‘animation’ and ‘automation’.654 For her, while 2D cell animation 
distinguishes mechanical movement from the ‘real’ movement of ‘life’, Pixar’s 3D 
computer-animated WALL-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008) embodies the signs of both 
automated-mechanical movement and programmed-electronic self-movement. The little 
trash compactor in WALL-E is a ‘category-blurring’ entity which embodies not only 
mechanical and animistic modelling but also autonomous and autopoietic synthesis.655 
Sobchack asserts that the computer-animated aesthetics of WALL-E function as a 
‘transitional object’ with both mechanical treads and a microchip core. Moreover, for 
Sobchack, the transition of computer electronic aesthetics evokes a ‘transitional 
                                                
654 Vivian Sobchack, Animation and Automation, or, the Incredible Effortfulness of Being, Screen 50(4), 
Winter 2009, pp.375-391. 
655 Ibid, p.385. 
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subject’,656 implied a primary shift from the desolate terrestrial vision of human absence 
to the quasi-human curiosity and sensibility of the ‘touched’ robot WALL-E. Sobchack 
concludes that computer-animated cinema bridges the blurred threshold between the 
animated and the animate, movement and liveness, animation and automation, and human 
and computer.657 
 
Furthermore, Jenna Ng takes note of the motion capture technology in Avatar (2009), in 
which computer-generated images comprise more than eighty percentage of the film.658 
She argues that motion capture technology is a bridge between live-action and computer-
animated images, the object and the captured, the actual and the virtual, the indexical and 
the simulated image. The computer-animated images captured and fabricated by motion 
capture technology are the hybrid combination of indexical objects and virtual 
simulation, rather the object itself. The motion capture technology accelerates the virtual 
fusion between perceptual reality and computer simulation, and live-action and animated 
images.  
 
William Brown proposes the concept of ‘monstrous cinema’ between human and non-
human, the actual and the virtual, live-action and computer images.659 For him, Beowulf’s 
virtual images synthesized by computer present the aesthetics of ‘digital complexity’ 
between human and animal, live-action and 3D animation, the actual indexicality and the 
virtual imagination. In addition, as Hadjioannou indicates, Waltz with Bashir (Ari 
Folman, 2008) shows the new form of digital hybrid realism.660 While the theme of the 
movie deals with the historical trauma regarding the massacre of Palestinian refugees, the 
form skillfully combines with a diversity of aesthetic forms named ‘a unique sort of 
animated, fictional docu-psycho-autobiography’661, or ‘digitographic documentary’.662 For 
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Hadjioannou, Waltz with Bashir presents one of the significant examples of crystal-image 
and digital virtualism. It is because the movie suggests the aesthetics of ‘the unreal 
real’.663 The technological conflation of live footages, 2D drawings, digital rotoscopings, 
and computer graphics is connected to the aesthetic hybridity of reality and dream, 
indexicality and virtuality, movement-image and spiritual automata, historical memory 
and complex temporality, and finally the analog and the digital. As David Martin Jones 
illustrates, there have been many remarkable films presenting the new mode of hybrid-
images since the 1990s: Groundhog Day (1993), Pulp Fiction (1994), Sliding Doors 
(1997), Run Lola Run (1998), Being John Malkovich (1999), The Cell (2000), Momento 
(2000), Irreversible (2002), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), 50 First Dates 
(2004), and so on. 664  Those have explored the indistinguishable and inextricable 
imbrication between movement and time, the object and the subject, the actual and the 
virtual, the reality and the imaginary. In recent days, the diffusion of digital technology 
has expanded the nature and tendency of cinematic hybridity. In the conceptual extension 
of Deleuzian hybridity, I conclude that the technological development of computer 
synthesis reinforces the hybrid aesthetics of digital virtualism. It proceeds to the 
assemblage aesthetics of computer-simulated images, which means the extension of the 
expressive capacity of digital images. 
 
Finally, I emphasize that the aesthetics of digital virtualism expands the complex 
hybridity between cinematic narrative and spectacle. Leon Gurevitch claims that the 
spread of digital images results in the aesthetic fusion between filmic narrative and 
spectacle. 665  He indicates that Hollywood narrative convention is mixed with the 
cybernetic image of ‘digital attraction’. In addition, David Bolter explains the 
‘remediation’ between filmic narrative and digital spectacle. 666 While film incorporates 
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the ceaseless spectacle and interactivity from computer games, digital media imitates the 
filmic storytelling and verisimilitude.  
 
The combination of narrative and spectacle is two-fold. On one hand, the linear 
convention of the Hollywood narrative combines with the superficial images of digital 
spectacle. According to David N. Rodowick, The Matrix is a marvellous example of how 
Hollywood has always responded ideologically to the appearance of new technologies.667 
A number of digital spectacle movies, such as The Matrix (1999–2003), Avatar (2009), 
Transformers (2007–2011), and Man of Steel (Zack Snyder, 2013), have been 
incorporated into the representative narrative convention of Hollywood. On the other 
hand, new forms of non-linear narrative have emerged in the development of digital 
technology. For example, Mike Figgis’s Timecode (2000) suggests the possibility of 
multiple perspectives and a non-linear narrative. The film consists of four incessant 
ninety-minute takes which are composed as one-shot, one-scene by four digital cameras. 
The screen simultaneously exhibits the four different takes, which intertwine through the 
subject of love and obsession that the characters share. However, the exhibition of the 
different stories and sounds simultaneously on the screen prevents the spectators from 
passively following each narrative. Instead, the spectators must actively infer and 
interpret what they are watching. Thus, Timecode presents the new methodology of the 
complex narrative, multiple screens, and interactive spectatorship. 
 
Therefore, I accentuate that the digital cinema intensifies the complementary and 
reciprocal relationship between narrative and spectacle. As Brown clearly indicates, the 
cinematic image, either photochemical or digital form, has essentially the material nature 
before narrative.668 The image pre-exists narrative. However, the image simultaneously 
requires narrative to offer us a cinematic meaning. Showing combines with telling. In this 
sense, it is clear that the cinema is the hybrid imbrication of the narrative and spectacle. 
Furthermore, digital cinema enhances the possibility of non-linear narrative and the 
sensuous attraction of spectacular images. I conclude that digital cinema presents the 
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‘increased contradiction’ between narrative and spectacle by the virtual simulation of 
computer technology. It simultaneously and contradictorily intensifies the reality of 
cinematic meaning and the fantasy of spectacle image.  
  
Consequently, I come to the conclusion that digital hybridity presents the aesthetic task of 
configuration and assemblage between physical reality and cinematic imagination, 
technology and aesthetics, live-action and computer simulation, narrative form and 
spectacle image. The aesthetics of digital hybridity raises an issue of subjectivity and 
digital ethics. Deleuze intuits that the task of philosophy moves from knowledge to 
aesthetics and ethics. For him, the ethics is to create ‘the new form of life’.669 In this 
context, while Rodowick argues that digital ethics is based on the ‘belief and becoming 
of the being’,670 Bogue stresses the force of ‘thinking and choice’ in digital time.671 I 
articulate that digital ethics is the aesthetic pursuit of the ‘power of the false’,672 which 
implies the potential of the virtual image of the cinema. 
 
In terms of the practical possibility of cinema art, digital cinema gives rise to the 
democratic diffusion of the production, distribution, and consumption of cinema: cheaper 
digital video cameras and simpler movie-making, easier compositing tools and editing 
software, more convenient screening through digital devices beyond the threshold of 
theatre. With the help of computer-mobile networks, we can make and enjoy movies 
anytime and anywhere. Cinema is everywhere, from theatres to mobile phones. The 
popularization and democratization of cinema encourages the multitudes to express their 
lives and thoughts freely and actively. The art of digital cinema is drawing closer to the 
daily lives of the multitudes. 
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However, does the spread of digital technology proceed to the intensification of 
cinematic subjectivity without any parameters? In a sense, although the access to cinema 
becomes easier, the subjectivity of the masses tends to be eroded by capitalist 
commercialization and state regulation. The more that people have access to and enjoy 
movies with the help of digital technology, the more that capitalism—especially 
multinational and neoliberal capitalism—invades the public sphere of cinema art and 
culture. Therefore, the multitude in the digital age cannot help but prevent their 
autonomous art and democratic culture from the offense of commercialisation and 
technological fetishism by demanding public access to culture and the arts. 
 
Meanwhile, the digitalisation of cinema expands the interactivity of the cinematic 
spectator. Digital technology arouses a considerable change in spectatorship by the 
proliferation of computer synthesis and interactive aesthetics. Whether 3D movies, or 
head-mounted videos or holograms, digital virtuality goes beyond the unilateral 
representation and passive appreciation of the image and proceeds to the aesthetics of 
participation and communication. It fundamentally breaks the perspective and vision-
centrism of 2D space of film, and highlights the tactile, sensual and empirical aspects of 
cinema in 3D space. The representative strategy of mainstream cinema, which, since the 
Renaissance, has tried to bring spectators to an ideological position by the scopic regime 
of visual perspective and the system of narrativisation, is threatened by the new 
spectatorship of digital cinema. In virtual time and space, spectators have an increasing 
possibility to participate positively and play as users beyond the position of passive 
observers.673 An active spectator user could realize utopian hopes and desires through 
positive participation and communication in simulated environment of digital images. It 
virtually goes beyond the oppression of the present time and cybernetically surpasses the 
restricted present space. A utopian hope and desire is to overcome tedious and suppressed 
reality. In other words, digital virtuality creates the possibility of new reality in computer-
simulated images. It is a creative potential for the emancipation of people’s lives. 
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However, this process of artistic emancipation is neither linear nor automatic. It is 
complex and contradictory because the logic of perceptual realism works in the process. 
Although it is clear that the computer simulation and the interactive aesthetics lead to the 
active attitude of the spectator, it also brings the spectator to the world of illusionary 
immersion with realistic verisimilitude. They emerge in virtual time and space and escape 
from the cold-bloodedness of reality. With the principle of perceptual realism, the new 
world of digital virtuality makes it easier for spectators to fall into fictional diegesis. 
Digital virtuality causes a contradictory subjectivity in spectators: viewer and user, 
passive consumer and active player, and uncritical immersion and positive interactivity. 
The digital virtuality maximizes the illusion and fantasy of the image. In the process, the 
passivity and positivity of the cinematic subject are simultaneously intensified in 
immersion and deviation, hallucination and awakening, verisimilitude and interactivity.674  
 
Therefore, it is important that these two possibilities, either the apparatus for passive 
escapism or the tools of subjective innovation, are not decided in advance. This decision 
is made in the course of practical aesthetics and cinematic practice. It is the process of 
endless becoming in the ‘actual-virtual circuit’,675 and the contradictory ‘struggle with 
informatics’676. In this sense, digital virtualism suggests the digital ethics of interactive 
communication and positive participation with the assemblage aesthetics of cinematic 
virtuality. It means the affirmative action that converts the time and space of cinematic 
virtuality from the ruling territory of the capitalistic fetishism to the plateau of joyful 
desire of the multitude. In line with the concepts of Benjamin’s ‘politicizing art’677 and 
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Deleuze’s ‘rhizomatic becoming’,678 digital virtualism discovers the affirmative potential 
of cinematic subjectivity and autonomous movement in the virtual world of cinema. 
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